Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 00-2523-CIV-MARTINEZ.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-2523-CIV-MARTINEZ.,00-2523-CIV-MARTINEZ. |
| Citation | 287 F.Supp.2d 1321 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | Jane DOE, Plaintiff, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Gerhardt Adam Schreiber, Mary Lou Rodon-Alvarez, Schreiber Rodon-Alvarez, Coral Gables, FL, George J. Tsimis, Stephan Skoufalos, Richard M. Ziccardi, Daniel F. Paige, Skoufalos Llorca & Ziccardi, Stamford, CT, for plaintiff.
Ralph O. Anderson, Hicks & Kneale, Hollywood, CA, Carol Flynn Finkelhoffe, Jeffrey Bradford Maltzman, Darren Wayne Friedman, Kay Rose & Maltzman, Miami, FL, for defendants.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the various post-verdict motions filed, including: Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (D.E. No. 225-1), Defendants' Motion for a New Trial (D.E. No. 226-1), and Defendants' Motion for Remittitur (D.E. No. 227-1), filed on December 12, 2002. The Court held argument on the fully-briefed motions and has ordered supplemental briefing, which has been completed. The Court has carefully considered the case file and is sufficiently advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall grant Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
Plaintiff, Jane Doe, initiated her case on July 14, 2000 (D.E. No. 1-1). As the parties stipulated in their Joint Pretrial Stipulation ("JPTS") (D.E. No. 159-1):
This case involves a female passenger [Jane Doe] aboard a cruise ship who alleges to have been sexually assaulted, raped and battered by a male crewmember [sic] [Baris Aydin] while ashore in Bermuda during a roundtrip [sic] cruise from New York to Bermuda. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the rape she has suffered damages resulting from emotional, psychological, and physical injuries. The Defendants allege the encounter was consensual and deny that any sexual assault, rape or battery occurred.
JPTS at 1. Jane Doe originally sued the following Defendants: Celebrity Cruises, Inc. ("Celebrity")(the ship operator), Zenith Shipping Corporation ("Zenith")(the ship owner), Apollo Ship Chandlers Corporation ("Apollo")(provides services to the catering company), Baris Aydin (the crew member), and M/V Zenith, in rem (the vessel)(see Complaint, D.E. No. 1-1). Doe filed a nine-count complaint, which alleged breach of contract of carriage; negligence; battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of contract.
Defendants, Celebrity, Apollo, and Zenith, filed motions to dismiss (D.E.Nos.8-1, 27-1). Defendant, Baris Aydin, was never served with a summons and a copy of the complaint (see generally the docket). The Honorable Alan S. Gold granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions (D.E. No. 29-1). Judge Gold dismissed with prejudice Doe's allegations regarding: breach of contract; duty to investigate; and the ship doctor's negligence. Id. With regard to the remaining allegations, Judge Gold, as is discussed more fully below, held vicarious liability can be imposed upon a common carrier for Aydin's tortious conduct, which occurred outside the scope of his employment. Id. Judge Gold noted Doe's Complaint failed to allege the claimed intentional torts occurred during Aydin's contractual period; therefore, Judge Gold dismissed those counts without prejudice. Id.
Doe filed her Amended Complaint (D.E. No. 33-1), which was followed by a motion to dismiss by Defendants, Celebrity, Apollo, and Zenith (D.E. No. 36-1). Prior to the Court ruling on the motion to dismiss, Doe filed her Second Amended Complaint (D.E. No. 84-1), which added Celebrity Catering Services Partnership ("CCSP")(the catering company) as a Defendant. Judge Gold subsequently granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss by striking two of Doe's negligence allegations and leaving the remaining allegations pending (D.E. No. 85-1).
Doe filed her Third Amended Complaint on August 2, 2001 (D.E. No. 87-1), which was the operative complaint at the time of trial. This cause was subsequently reassigned to the undersigned on September 24, 2002 (D.E. No. 151-1). On October 18, 2002, the parties submitted their Joint Pretrial Statement (D.E. No. 159-1), which stated: "For the purposes of the forthcoming trial, the parties will try only those issues relating to the strict (vicarious) liability articulated and ordered by Judge Gold in his Order dated February 26, 2001." Therefore, the claims at issue for the trial were Doe's claims of strict liability against the Defendants for the alleged intentional torts by Aydin for intentional infliction of emotional distress, sexual assault, and sexual battery.
A jury trial was held in this matter on November 18, 2002 through November 22, 2002. The Court granted Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on Doe's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and denied the motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the claims of sexual assault and sexual battery. The claims of sexual assault and battery were submitted to the jury (see generally, Jury Instructions, D.E. No. 218-1). The jury found Aydin did not sexually assault Doe; however, the jury found Aydin did commit a sexual battery upon Doe and awarded Doe $1,000,000.00, attributing 25% responsibility to each of the Defendants, Celebrity, Zenith, Apollo, and CCSP (D.E. No. 219-1).
The Defendants sought re-submission to the jury, arguing the verdict was inconsistent, which this Court denied (D.E. No. 221-1) after hearing argument and reviewing the legal memoranda submitted by the parties (D.E.Nos.210-1, 220-1). The Court entered judgment on November 27, 2002 (D.E. No. 222-1).
Defendants filed their post-verdict motions on December 12, 2002 (D.E.Nos.225-1, 226-1, 227-1). The Court heard argument on the post-verdict motions on March 18, 2003. During the hearing and by subsequent Order, the Court ordered supplemental briefing (D.E.253-1). The parties filed their additional legal memoranda, which may be found at D.E. Nos. 256-1 and 257-1.
Under a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, under Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(b), the Court must review the motion under the standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a):
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against the party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See e.g., Reynolds v. CLP Corp., 812 F.2d 671, 674 (11th Cir.1987). The Court does not weigh the conflicting evidence or make credibility decisions. Id. "The trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). In this case, Doe has not established she is entitled to judgment under the governing law.
Defendants' seek judgment as a matter of law under various theories. Defendants' claim Judge Gold's opinion that held Defendants could be held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of an employee outside the scope of his employment is incorrect, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon Plaintiff's inconsistent prior sworn testimony (see motion, D.E. No. 225-1).
With regard to Judge Gold's opinion, the Court is bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The Supreme Court described the law-of-the-case doctrine as follows:
A court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own court or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loath to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice."
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). The Eleventh Circuit has clarified: "Courts must rarely invoke the `clear error' exception, less the exception swallow the rule." Jenkins Brick Co. v. Bremer, 321 F.3d 1366, 1370 (11th Cir.2003). In this case, the Court does not find Judge Gold's opinion to be clear error; therefore, this opinion shall not disturb Judge Gold's holding.
With regard to Defendants' second argument about Plaintiff's inconsistent testimony, this Court shall not make a credibility determination, because, under the above-discussed legal standard, the Court is required to determine if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's determination. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). In this case, the jury reasonably could have concluded Jane Doe was more credible than Aydin, and the verdict reflects such finding.
In reviewing Defendants' motions, the Court, however, became concerned with the evidence as it related to Judge Gold's opinion. Judge Gold, in his opinion issued on February 26, 2001, posed the issue: "can vicarious liability be imposed for Aydin's tortious conduct?" (D.E. No. 29-1 at 5).1 This issue sets forth two distinct questions: 1) is the proper standard strict liability or negligence; and 2) can the employer be held strictly liable for the acts done outside the employee's scope of employment. After an analysis of the relevant case law, Judge Gold found the circuits are split on whether the relevant standard to impose liability is strict liability or negligence. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not yet had the opportunity to...
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