Doe v. Champaign Cmty. Unit 4 Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-CV-3355,11-CV-3355 |
| Parties | JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, as Parents and Next Friends of D.M., a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. CHAMPAIGN COMMUNITY UNIT 4 SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (d/e 20) entered by Magistrate Judge Byron G. Cudmore on February 24, 2012. Plaintiffs have filed an Objection and Appeal from Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge (Plaintiffs' Objections) (d/e 21) and Defendants have filed their Partial Objections to Report and Recommendation (Defendants' Objections) (d/e 23). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Cudmore recommends allowing in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Motion to Dismiss) (d/e 12). This Court reviews de novo any part of the Report and Recommendation that has been properly objected to. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts in part and rejects in part Judge Cudmore's Report and Recommendation.
On September 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a 12-count Complaint (d/e 1) against the following Defendants: Champaign Community Unit 4 School District (District); Rhonda Howard1 , in her individual and official capacities; Arthur Culver2 , in his individual and official capacities; and Sue Grey, Stig Lanesskog, Tom Lockman, Greg Novak, Jamar Brown, Kristine Chalifoux, and David Tomlinson in their official capacities.3 The general allegations of the Complaint are as follows.
On January 21, 2011, Howard entered D.M.'s classroom prior to D.M. arriving at school. Howard detected the smell of cannabis and then left the classroom. Later, D.M. arrived at school and took his seat in the classroom, which had about 30 students in it at the time. D.M. was one of two African-American students in that classroom.
Howard entered the classroom, removed D.M. from the classroom, and took D.M. to her office where she searched D.M.'s coat and backpack. Howard then required D.M. to remove his shirt, unbutton his pants, remove his belt, remove his shoes, and partially disrobe.4 Howard did not find any contraband on D.M. during the search. Howard did not contact D.M.'s parents prior to conducting the search. D.M. then returned to his classroom. Howard did not conduct a search of any other student in the classroom or of any other student's belongings.
According to the Complaint, Howard did not have reasonable cause to conduct this "strip search" of D.M. Howard's actions were takenpursuant to her position as Principal, pursuant to the policies of and direction of Culver and the Board, and under the supervision of Culver and the Board.
Plaintiffs allege the Board and Culver had a policy, procedure, or practice and custom of failing to adequately train and supervise principals and personnel on the appropriate and correct procedures for apprehension, contacting parents of minors, conducting searches, avoiding profiling of students on the basis of race, and preventing violations of the rights of students.
The parties are familiar with the specific allegations in each of the 12 Counts of Plaintiff's Complaint, and this information is fully set out in Judge Cudmore's Report and Recommendation. Because the Parties only object to Judge Cudmore's Report and Recommendation with respect to certain counts of the Complaint, the Court will recite the specific allegations of each count in the "Analysis" section of this Opinion and then only as necessary to address the Parties' specific objections.
B. Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) On November 14, 2011, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint (Defendants' Memorandum in Support). In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contended that all 12 counts of the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, Defendants argued as follows: (1) Counts I through XII should be dismissed because the alleged search of D.M. was reasonable in scope and justified by the compelling interest of safeguarding students and the educational environment from illegal drugs; (2) Counts I through VI, and Count XII alleging claims under §§ 1981 and 1983 should be dismissed because Plaintiffs failed to plead facts that would establish liability against the Board or Howard and Culver in their official capacities; (3) Counts II, IV, VI, and XII alleging claims under § 1981 should be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to allege they were discriminated against in the making or enforcement of a contract; (4) Counts V and XI should be dismissed because they fail to state a claim for either failure to protect or failure to train; (5) theindividual capacity claims against Howard in Counts I and II are barred by qualified immunity ; (6) the state law claim against Howard for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Count VII should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and is barred by the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act; and (7) Counts VIII through X should be dismissed because there is not a recognized claim under the Illinois Constitution for an unreasonable search where the student has a remedy under federal law and Illinois tort law.
C. Judge Cudmore's Report And Recommendation And The Parties' Objections Thereto
As stated, Judge Cudmore recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be allowed in part and denied in part. As is relevant here, Judge Cudmore recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be denied with respect to: (1) the individual capacity claims against Principal Howard in Counts I and II; (2) the individual and official capacity claims against Superintendent Culver in Count V for failure to train and supervise; and (3)the official capacity claim against the Board in count XI for failure totrain and supervise. Judge Cudmore recommends that the remainder of the Motion to Dismiss be allowed.
As stated, both Parties have objected to parts of Judge Cudmore's Report and Recommendation. Plaintiffs object to Judge Cudmore's recommendation that the official capacity claims against Principal Howard in Counts I and II be dismissed and that the individual and official capacity claims against Culver in Counts III and IV be dismissed. Plaintiffs make no argument other than to ask that they be given leave to replead these Counts. Finally, Plaintiffs object to Judge Cudmore's recommendation that Count VII be dismissed because Principal Howard is immune under 745 ILCS 10/2-201.
Defendants object to the recommendation that this Court deny the request to dismiss Counts I and II against Principal Howard in her individual capacity. Defendants also object to the recommendation to not dismiss Counts V and XI against Culver and the member of the Board of Education.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement must be sufficient to provide the defendant with "fair notice" of the claim and its basis. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (2007). This means that (1) "the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant 'fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests" and (2) its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a "speculative level." EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). While detailed factual allegations are not needed, a "formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 940.Conclusory allegations are "not entitled to be assumed true." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 885 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). "In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party." In re marchFIRST Inc., 589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081). A. Defendants' Objections
Counts I and II allege claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, respectively, against Principal Howard in both her individual and official capacity. Defendants object to the conclusion in the Report and Recommendation that the allegations in Counts I and II state a claim against Principal Howard in her individual capacity. Specifically, Defendants contend that Report and Recommendation errs in concluding that, based on the facts pled, Principal Howard lacked reasonable suspicion to search D.M. With respect to Count II, Defendants do not object to the conclusion that § 1981 authorizes a claim for denial ofequal benefits under the law for racially discriminatory illegal searches and seizures.
In their argument regarding the reasonableness of the search, Defendants cite only one case, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007). Defendants cite Morse for the proposition that the serious nature of the infraction at issue justified the search at its inception.
Our Supreme Court has "applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator's search of a student." Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S.Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743-44 (1985)). The...
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