Doe v. Childress
| Decision Date | 01 October 1874 |
| Citation | 22 L.Ed. 549,88 U.S. 642,21 Wall. 642 |
| Parties | DOE v. CHILDRESS |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Circuit Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
Doe, lessee of Vaillant, assignee of Montgomery, a bankrupt, brought ejectment against Childress to recover land in Tennessee.
The question was this:
When attachment proceedings are regularly commenced, a levy made, and the property is in the possession of the sheriff before the filing of petition in bankruptcy;—when there is no stay of proceedings or other measures in the bankrupt court to arrest the suit in the State court, there being no fraud, a sale is had under the judgment of the State court, a deed is given by the sheriff, and possession taken under it—can the title acquired under such sale be attacked by the assignee collaterally in a suit at law?
In other words, can the assignee allege that under these circumstances the State court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the action after an adjudication in bankruptcy, and that no title passed to the purchaser under the judgment of the State court?
The defendant's title rested upon a purchase under two decrees in the Court of Chancery of the State of Tennessee. Proceedings in the suit were commenced by attachment on the 15th and 27th days of April, 1867. Decrees in them were obtained in April and June, 1868, and on the 17th of September, 1868, sales were made under the decrees. The purchaser then entered into possession, and the defendant under him now claimed title and possession by virtue of that purchase. By the laws of Tennessee the levy of an attachment gives a specific lien in the property described in them.1
Montgomery had filed his petition to be declared a bankrupt on the 18th of February, 1868. This was ten months after the attachment proceedings had been commenced, and four months before the decrees were obtained in those suits, and seven months before the sale took place under those decrees.
He was adjudged a bankrupt on the 27th of February, 1868. This again was about seven months before the sale under State decrees took place, and ten months after the actual commencement of the attachment proceedings in the State court.
The fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act enacts that the register shall convey to the assignee all the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt. The section thus proceeds:
'And such assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereupon, by operation of law, the title to all such property and estate shall vest in said assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment made within four months next preceding the commencement of said proceedings.'
The court below held that the attachment was not dissolved, and gave judgment for the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiff brought the case here.
Mr. Henry Cooper, for the plaintiff in error. No opposing counsel.
The Tennessee Court of Chancery having jurisdiction of the subject of the proceeding in the attachment suits, no defence being interposed by the assignee, in the State court, and no measures having been taken to arrest their proceedings or to transfer them to the bankrupt court (if power to take such steps existed), and there being no fraud proven or alleged, we are of the opinion that a good title was obtained under the decree of sale made in the State court.
Under the fourteenth section of the Bankrupt Act the title pendente lite is transferred by operation of law from the bankrupt to the assignee in bankruptcy. The conveyance of the register operates as would, under ordinary circumstances, the deed of a person having the title, with two differences—first, it relates back to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding; secondly, the register's conveyance dissolves any attachment that has been made within four months previous to the commencement of bankrupt proceedings. Neither of these differences are material in the present case. The attachments here had been made and levied more than four months previous to the commencement of the bankrupt proceedings on the 18th day of February, 1868, to wit, in the month of April, 1867, and no change had taken place in the estate between the filing the petition in bankruptcy and the conveyance by the register.
The transfer of his real estate by a debtor against whom an attachment has been issued, and before judgment or decree, whether by his own act, or by operation of law, cannot impair or invalidate the title of a purchaser under such decree or judgment. It is evident that unless this is so an attachment suit could never be invoked for the collection of a debt. The debtor need only wait until judgment is about to be entered, then make a conveyance of the property attached, and the virtue of the proceeding is at an end. The authorities so declare. A reference to some of the authorities in Tennessee will be sufficient.
The statute of that State provides as follows:
'Any transfer, sale, or assignment made after the filing of an attachment bill in chancery, or after the suing out of an attachment at law of property mentioned in the bill of attachment as against the plaintiff,...
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Bracewell v. Hughes
...may have judgment against the bankrupt, to be levied only upon the property attached. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 623 ;Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642 . When the attachment has been dissolved, in accordance with the statutes of the state, by the defendant's entering into a bond or recogniza......
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Bracewell v. Hughes
...against the bankrupt, to be levied only upon the property attached. Peck v. Jenness, 7 HOW 612, 623, 12 L.Ed. 841; Doe v. Childress, 21 Wall. 642, 22 L.Ed. 549. the attachment has been dissolved, in accordance with the statutes of the State, by the defendant's entering into a bond or recogn......
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