Doe v. City of Stamford

Decision Date22 July 1997
Docket NumberNo. 15631,15631
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesJohn DOE v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

Stewart M. Casper, with whom, on the brief, were Victoria de Toledo, and Renee M. Cannella, Stamford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Kevin J. Maher, Fairfield, with whom were James D. Moran, Jr., Fairfield, and James J. Sullivan, Manchester, for appellees (defendants).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PETERS, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, under the Workers' Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq., an employee has suffered a compensable injury for purposes of recovering expenses for medical testing and treatment at a time when he has been exposed to, but has not yet contracted, a potentially fatal contagious disease. The claimant, John Doe, 1 an employee of the defendant, the city of Stamford, 2 appealed from the decision of the compensation review board (review board) affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner). The commissioner had denied the claimant's application for compensation and his request for an order requiring the defendant to enter into a voluntary agreement with him. We transferred the appeal from the Appellate Court to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c), and now reverse the judgment of the review board.

The parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, which arise out of two separate incidents. In the first incident, which occurred in February, 1993, the claimant, a police officer engaged in the performance of police duties, was exposed to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) when medical pads contaminated with body fluids of a criminal suspect came into contact with an open wound on the claimant's thumb. After the suspect revealed that he had tested positive for HIV, the claimant proceeded immediately to Stamford Hospital, where his wound was treated and he was released. In the second incident, which occurred in May, 1993, the claimant, again while engaged in the performance of police duties, was exposed to tuberculosis when he came into repeated, close physical contact with another criminal suspect who, it was later learned, suffered from an active case of that disease.

The claimant subsequently underwent testing for the two diseases. Although he did not test positive for either disease, 3 his physician recommended a follow-up consultation with respect to his HIV exposure. In connection with the initial testing, the claimant incurred bills for medical treatment and laboratory work. The defendant has paid for the laboratory services, but not for the medical treatment. With the exception of time lost for the medical testing, the claimant has missed no work as a result of these incidents and claims no loss of income.

The parties agree that both incidents arose out of and occurred in the course of the claimant's employment with the defendant. The parties further agree that the claimant's contacts with both suspects were sufficient to constitute "exposures" to HIV and tuberculosis. Nonetheless, although the claimant filed a timely application for compensation for past and future unpaid medical testing and treatment, the defendant refused his application and refused also to enter into a voluntary agreement with the claimant recognizing the compensability of his exposures. Accordingly, the claimant's compensation claim proceeded to a formal hearing before the commissioner. See General Statutes § 31-294c(b).

At the hearing, held in May and August, 1994, the principal witness for the claimant was Debra Adler-Klein, a physician specializing in infectious diseases. Adler-Klein testified that an exposure to HIV similar to that sustained by the claimant would, for at least one year thereafter, require regular testing, drug therapy and, potentially, psychological counseling. 4 She also testified that an exposure to tuberculosis similar to that sustained by the claimant would require testing and preventive drug therapy for at least six months. The defendant offered no contradictory medical testimony.

The commissioner denied the claimant's application for compensation. He found no fault with the claimant's factual representation but held that, as a matter of law, "mere exposure to infectious diseases does not give rise to a viable claim that the [c]laimant has suffered an injury or occupational disease" under the act.

The review board affirmed the commissioner's decision. The board agreed with the commissioner that exposure to an infectious disease, without more, constitutes neither a "personal injury" nor an "occupational disease" under the act. While recognizing that principles of equity militate against the defendant's refusal to cover the claimant's medical expenses, the review board concluded that, in the absence of statutory authorization, it could not compel the defendant to fulfill its equitable obligation. One member of the review board dissented.

On the claimant's appeal to this court, we must decide whether exposure to an infectious disease constitutes a compensable "injury" under the act. 5 The claimant contends that, in order to effectuate the act's humanitarian purposes, "injury" cannot be defined so narrowly as to exclude a serious risk of contracting a life threatening disease. At least, he argues, the term "injury" must be construed to include exposures in circumstances under which the prevailing standard of care calls for immediate and ongoing medical monitoring and treatment. The defendant urges us to uphold the decision of the commissioner and the review board. It contends that, in the absence of either visible physical trauma or present loss of income, a claimant has not suffered a compensable injury. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, in which the claimant concededly has sustained actual exposures to life threatening infectious diseases in incidents that arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment, the claimant has suffered compensable injuries under the act and may recover the expenses associated with reasonable medical testing and treatment.

The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established. "The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Besade v. Interstate Security Services, 212 Conn. 441, 449, 562 A.2d 1086 (1989). Neither the review board nor this court has the power to retry facts. See Six v. Thomas O'Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 798-99, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996). Where, however, the appeal involves an issue of statutory construction that has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, this court has plenary power to review the administrative decision. See Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995) (state agency not entitled to special deference when its construction of statute has not undergone previous judicial scrutiny).

Although the parties have called our attention to the public policy implications of this case, the issue presented is, at bottom, a matter of statutory construction. General Statutes § 31-294d(a) provides in relevant part that "[t]he employer, as soon as he has knowledge of an injury, shall provide a competent physician or surgeon to attend the injured employee and, in addition, shall furnish any medical and surgical aid ... as the physician or surgeon deems reasonable or necessary." (Emphasis added.) See also General Statutes § 31-294d(e) (if employer refuses to provide medical assistance, "the injured employee" may pursue medical assistance at employer's expense). The defendant does not dispute that the claimant's exposures to HIV and tuberculosis reasonably require both long and short term medical monitoring. The sole issue, rather, is whether these exposures constitute compensable "injuries" within the definitional boundaries of the act. We conclude that they do.

We reach this conclusion mindful both of general principles of statutory construction and of principles specifically applicable to workers' compensation law. As a general matter, "[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994). We discern that intent by looking to the statutory language, to legislative history and policy and to other legislation and common law principles. See id., at 409, 645 A.2d 965. In appeals arising under workers' compensation law, we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act. See Hansen v. Gordon, 221 Conn. 29, 32, 602 A.2d 560 (1992). Although we recognize that, in enacting workers' compensation law, the legislature did not intend to create "a general health and benefit insurance program"; id.; we do not read the act to include limitations on eligibility for compensation for which there is no statutory basis. See Crochiere v. Board of Education, 227 Conn. 333, 359, 630 A.2d 1027 (1993).

The dispositive statute in this case is General Statutes § 31-275(16)(A), which defines the term "injury" to encompass an "accidental injury which may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred...." There is no dispute in this case that the claimant's exposures to HIV and tuberculosis may be definitely located as to time or place or that they resulted from accidental contact with infected suspects. The commissioner and the review board concluded, however, that, because the claimant had not yet contracted either disease, he had not suffered an "injury" within the meaning of § 31-275(16)(A).

Nothing in the text or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Dominguez v. N.Y. Sports Club
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 14 July 2020
    ..."we must resolve statutory ambiguities or lacunae in a manner that will further the remedial purpose of the act." Doe v. Stamford , 241 Conn. 692, 698, 699 A.2d 52 (1997) ; see also Lucenti v. Laviero , 327 Conn. 764, 774, 176 A.3d 1 (2018) ("[t]he act is to be broadly construed to effectua......
  • Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 24 April 2001
    ...has the power to retry facts. See Six v. Thomas O'Connor & Co., 235 Conn. 790, 798-99, 669 A.2d 1214 (1996).... Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 696-97, 699 A.2d 52 (1997). It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers......
  • Dougan v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 14 September 2020
    ...recovery in many states, whether such recovery is permitted in Connecticut is still an open question of law. See Doe v. Stamford , 241 Conn. 692, 699–700 n.8, 699 A.2d 52 (1997) (discussing medical monitoring test outlined in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation , 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d ......
  • Luce v. United Technologies Corporation/Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Div., 15839
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 22 September 1998
    ...merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also Doe v. Stamford, 241 Conn. 692, 697, 699 A.2d 52 (1997) ("[a]lthough the parties have called our attention to the public policy implications of this case, the issue presented is......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • Medical Monitoring – 50-State Survey
    • United States
    • LexBlog United States
    • 12 June 2023
    ...medical monitoring, while expressly contrasting such administrative remedies with “traditional tort principles.” Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52, 54 (Conn. 1997). Delaware (NO) Delaware rejects no-injury medical monitoring. In Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp., 480 A.2d 647, 651 (Del. 198......
5 books & journal articles
  • Labor Relations and Employment Law: 1998 Developments in Connecticut
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 73, 1998
    • Invalid date
    ...and similar files when it does not reasonably believe that such disclosure would legally constitute invasion of personal privacy." 355. 241 Conn. 692, See discussion at notes 331-334, 356. Docket Number CV 98 0577452; J.D. of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, 22 Conn. L. Rptr No. 6, 196 (Au......
  • Labor Relations and Employment Law: 1997 Developments in Connecticut
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 72, 1997
    • Invalid date
    ...684 A.2d 1155 (1996) (injury occurring during return from a union meeting attended during unpaid lunch break held not compensable). 97.241 Conn. 692, 699 A.2d 52 98.Id. 99.Id. at 694. 100.Id. at 698. 101.Id. at 700-701. 102.Id. at 697. 103.242 Conn. 570, 698 A.2d 873 (1997). 104.Id., at 572......
  • Recognition of "medical monitoring" claims in Florida.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 74 No. 11, December 2000
    • 1 December 2000
    ...entitling the victim to workers' compensation benefits, even where the claimant had not contracted AIDS. See Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1997). Given the apparent uncertainty surrounding judicial treatment of these evolving concepts, until there is further legislative or jud......
  • American Law Institute Proposes Controversial Medical Monitoring Rule in Final Part of Torts Restatement.
    • United States
    • Defense Counsel Journal Vol. 87 No. 4, October 2020
    • 1 October 2020
    ...recovered when plaintiffs demonstrated no physical manifestation of an asbestos-related disease) distinguishing Doe v. City of Stamford, 699 A.2d 52, 55 n.8 (Conn. 1997) (permitting medical monitoring in a workers' compensation case involving an employee exposed to HIV and tuberculosis, bec......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT