Doe v. City of Bos.

Decision Date16 June 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 20-2948 (CKK)
PartiesJANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BOSTON, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

JANE DOE, Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BOSTON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-2948 (CKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

June 16, 2021


MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this civil action, Plaintiff Jane Doe alleges that her former employer, the Boston Police Department, retaliated against her by providing falsified and negative employment references to prospective employers with whom Plaintiff applied for a job. Plaintiff now sues the Boston Police Department, the City of Boston, and a group of unnamed Boston police officers (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting claims under Title VII, the First Amendment, and the common law doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In turn, Defendants have filed a [14] Motion to Dismiss, arguing that this Court should dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and because venue is improper. Alternatively, Defendants request the transfer of this case to the District of Massachusetts. Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole,1 the Court will GRANT IN PART Defendants' [14] Motion. Specifically, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Boston-based

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Defendants and will, accordingly, TRANSFER this action to the District of Massachusetts, in the "interest of justice," pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jane Doe began her career at the Boston Police Department (the "Department") in 2007. Compl. ¶ 16. At the outset of her tenure, Plaintiff was one of only "a few women of Asian descent" within the Department. Id. But according to Plaintiff, the Department harbored a "pervasive culture of sexism." Id. ¶ 18. For example, Plaintiff was allegedly told that she "must be either a bitch or a lesbian" given her interest in police work and was advised to "be careful with her male colleagues." Id. ¶ 17. Notwithstanding this adversity, Plaintiff "worked hard and did well" as a young officer, ultimately receiving a promotion to the Department's "Special Operations Division" in 2009. Id. ¶ 18.

While awaiting transfer into the Special Operations Division, Plaintiff "attended a firearms competition" with her fellow Special Operations officers in August of 2009. Id. ¶ 20. During the competition, another officer from the Department "violently and repeatedly raped" Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 21. "After returning to Boston" from the firearms competition, Plaintiff "reported the assaults" to her union representative. Id. ¶ 22. Then, in September 2009, Plaintiff's union representative notified Plaintiff's Department supervisors of Plaintiff's sexual assault allegations. Id. Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff's supervisors instructed her to "stay home" and take "paid vacation" and "sick leave." Id. ¶ 24.

Following Plaintiff's report of sexual assault, investigators from the Department's Sexual Assault Unit reviewed Plaintiff's allegations and "found no evidence contradicting" her claim. Id. ¶ 32. The Department, however, still suggested that Plaintiff's assault claim was merely an "opinion," id., and the Department's investigators allegedly advised Plaintiff "not to continue to seek justice," id. ¶ 26. Thereafter, the Department also required Plaintiff to visit a Department-

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employed psychiatrist, who allegedly asked Plaintiff inappropriate questions about Plaintiff's motives as a police officer and her ethnic heritage. See id. ¶ 27. Nonetheless, Plaintiff attended six required sessions with this appointed psychiatrist, see id., and, three different medical professionals subsequently cleared Plaintiff for a return to work, id. ¶ 29. Yet despite this clearance, the Department refused to allow Plaintiff to return to work for almost a year. See id. ¶ 27. Conversely, the Department permitted Plaintiff's alleged rapist to return to service "less than three months" after the alleged assault. Id. ¶ 28. In the following months, Plaintiff's alleged rapist "frequently drove his vehicle to [Plaintiff's] street and parked outside her residence," in an attempt to intimidate Plaintiff and her family. Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff began to apply for new law enforcement jobs, outside of the Boston Police Department, in 2010. See id. ¶ 33-34. Plaintiff explains that she "was motivated to apply for other employment" because the Department had transferred her from the Special Operations team and precluded her from participating in the "type of law enforcement work that she had trained for." Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was similarly "motivated to find employment outside of Boston because her assailant continued to physically threaten her." Id. To date, Plaintiff asserts that she has submitted 135 total job applications, including 111 applications sent specifically to law enforcement agencies. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff finally left the Boston Police Department in 2014 and moved to Northern Virginia, where she began employment in "the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area." Id. ¶ 7. In August 2020, Plaintiff moved to Rhode Island, where she continues to reside today. Id. ¶ 1.

Plaintiff alleges that since 2010, the Boston Police Department has purposefully thwarted her efforts to secure a new law enforcement job in retaliation for her rape allegations. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Department has either failed to respond to reference requests from

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potential employers or, alternatively, provided falsified information that deliberately casts Plaintiff in a negative light. See id. ¶¶ 38-39. This includes the Department's decision to provide "negative statements in writing or otherwise about the Plaintiff leading to the denial of her applications," with a number of "D.C. employers." Id. ¶ 11. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that she has applied to "over twenty" positions with such D.C. employers, see id., although her complaint only identifies one specific interaction between the Boston Police Department and a District of Columbia employer, see id. In that interaction, the Boston Police Department allegedly provided false background information about Plaintiff to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), causing DHS to rescind the tentative job offer it had extended to Plaintiff in 2017. Id. ¶ 41. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after she had finally "obtained employment in D.C.," the Boston Police Department "falsely informed a Washington Post reporter that [Plaintiff] had essentially been terminated from [the Department], which led the reporter to alert [Plaintiff's] D.C. employer" of this allegation. Id. ¶ 43. Overall, Plaintiff alleges that the Boston Police Department's conduct has impeded her search for "subsequent long-term law enforcement work," causing damage to Plaintiff's "professional and personal life." Id. ¶ 46.

On January 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against the Boston Police Department and the City of Boston, before the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (the "MCAD"). See MCAD Ruling, ECF No. 14-2, at 4. Therein, Plaintiff alleged that the Boston Police Department and the City of Boston provided "deleterious and false employment history information to prospective employers and journalists," in retaliation for Plaintiff's prior reports of sexual assault. Id. at 8. On July 16, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter from the MCAD affirming the dismissal of her administrative claim before the agency. Compl. ¶ 12. Within ninety days of her MCAD dismissal, Plaintiff filed this present civil action against the Boston Police Department,

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the City of Boston, and various unnamed Boston police officers (collectively, "Defendants"). See id. ¶¶ 5-9.

In her complaint, Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendants. In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim under Title VII, alleging that in retaliation for her prior sexual assault complaints, Defendants withheld background information from Plaintiff's prospective employers or, alternatively, provided them with "negative, false information." Id. ¶¶ 54-55. In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a constitutional tort claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of her First Amendment "right to be free from retaliation." Id. ¶ 58. Finally, in Count III, Plaintiff raises a common law claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, also predicated upon Defendants allegedly intentional dissemination of falsified employment information to Plaintiff's prospective employers. See id. ¶¶ 76-82. Plaintiff elected to file her present lawsuit in the District of Columbia because "Defendants' actions, which form the basis of this claim, were directed at D.C. employers and prevented [Plaintiff] from filling positions with agencies that are based in D.C." Id. ¶ 13.

On February 25, 2021, Defendants filed the pending motion, seeking the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, for improper venue, or, alternatively, to transfer this action to the District of Massachusetts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Defs.' Mot. at 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3). Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion in every respect and filed her opposition brief on May 3, 2021. Defendants filed their reply brief on May 24, 2021. Accordingly, Defendants' motion is now fully briefed and ripe for this Court's review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When personal jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears "the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff "can satisfy that

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burden with a prima facie showing." Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). "To make such a showing, the plaintiff is not required to adduce evidence that meets the standards of admissibility reserved for summary judgment and trial;" but rather, the plaintiff...

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