Doe v. City of Apple Valley
| Decision Date | 16 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-CV-0499 (PJS/DTS) |
| Citation | 487 F.Supp.3d 761 |
| Parties | John DOE 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and John Doe 4, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF APPLE VALLEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Daniel E. Gustafson and Karla M. Gluek, GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC; Adele D. Nicholas ; Mark G. Weinberg, for plaintiffs.
Monte A. Mills and Katherine M. Swenson, GREENE ESPEL PLLP, for defendant.
Section 130.08 of the Apple Valley City Code prohibits certain sex offenders from residing within 1500 feet of schools, child-care centers, places of worship, and parks.1 See ECF No. 35-1. John Does 1–4 filed this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of § 130.08. This matter is before the Court on the motion of John Does 1, 2, and 4 (collectively, the "Does") for a preliminary injunction prohibiting Apple Valley from enforcing § 130.08 against them while this litigation is pending.2 Because the Does are not likely to succeed in proving that § 130.08 is unconstitutional, the Court denies their motion.
On February 23, 2017, the Apple Valley City Council approved Ordinance No. 1026. ECF No. 35-1. The ordinance implemented new restrictions on where certain sex offenders are permitted to reside. Those restrictions are codified at § 130.08 of the Apple Valley City Code.3
Section 130.08 includes a statement of "findings and intent," which declares that "[r]epeat predatory offenders, predatory offenders who use physical violence, and predatory offenders who prey on children or individuals less than 16 years of age, are predators who present a threat to the public safety." ECF No. 54-1 at 1. The stated intent of § 130.08 is "to promote, protect and improve the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the City, particularly children, by creating areas around locations where children regularly congregate in which certain sexual (predatory) offenders are prohibited from establishing residence." Id. To accomplish that goal, § 130.08 prohibits "designated offenders" from residing within 1500 feet of schools, public parks with playground equipment or other facilities designed or used for youth activities, places of worship providing regular educational programs for children, and licensed child-care centers (excluding in-home daycare providers). ECF No. 67 at 2. These restricted areas are referred to as "protected zones." Id. The Does allege that approximately 90 percent of the residential properties in Apple Valley fall within a protected zone.4 ECF No. 57 ¶ 21.
Section 130.08 defines a "designated offender" as any person who (1) has committed a "designated sexual offense"5 against a child under the age of 16, (2) is required to register as a predatory offender under Minnesota law as a result of having committed an offense against a child under the age of 16, or (3) has been categorized as a Level III sex offender under Minnesota law, regardless of the age of the offender's victim. ECF No. 54-1 at 1–2. In Minnesota, sex offenders receive a designation (such as a Level III designation) following an individualized risk assessment conducted by a review committee at the time that the offender is released from confinement. See Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 3.
Section 130.08 allows a designated offender to live within a protected zone if (1) the offender established and registered the residence prior to the implementation of the residency restriction; (2) the offender is under the age of 18 and living with a parent or legal guardian; (3) the offender established and registered the residence before a school, park, playground, place of worship, or child-care facility opened within 1500 feet of the residence; or (4) the offender owned and resided at the residence at the time that he committed the designated offense and retained ownership at all relevant times. ECF No. 54-1 at 2–3.
Violations of § 130.08 are punishable as misdemeanors, and each day that an offender maintains a non-compliant residence is deemed to be a separate violation. Id. at 2. Under Minnesota law, a misdemeanor may be punished by a fine of up to $1000 and imprisonment of up to 90 days. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 3.
John Doe 1 was convicted of sexual assault of a minor in 2003, when he was 15 years old. ECF No. 13-3. Id. John Doe 1 is categorized as a Level I sex offender. Id. John Doe 1 rented an apartment in Apple Valley, but he moved after he was informed by the Apple Valley Police Department that he was violating § 130.08. Id.
John Doe 2 was convicted of possessing child pornography in 2018 and sentenced to seven years’ probation. ECF No. 13-4. John Doe 2 was not assigned a risk level, and his name does not appear on any public sex-offender registry. Id. John Doe 2 purchased a home in Apple Valley in July 2018, but was forced to move in with his parents after he learned that § 130.08 prohibits him from living in his new home.6 Id.
John Doe 4 was convicted of misdemeanor indecent contact with a minor in 2002. ECF No. 49-1. Like John Doe 2, John Doe 4 was not assigned a risk level, and his name does not appear on any public sex-offender registry. Id. John Doe 4 is currently living with his wife and five children at a friend's home in Apple Valley. Id. John Doe 4 received a letter from the Apple Valley Police Department informing him that he is prohibited from living at his friend's home under § 130.08.
The Does argue that § 130.08 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because it increases the punishment for crimes committed before it was enacted. The Does seek a preliminary injunction enjoining Apple Valley from enforcing § 130.08 while this lawsuit is pending.
Courts consider four factors in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction: (1) the movant's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction is not granted; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm that granting the injunction will inflict on the other parties; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc. , 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). " ‘[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy,’ and ‘the party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of proving’ that these factors weigh in its favor." Mgmt. Registry, Inc. v. A.W. Cos. , 920 F.3d 1181, 1183 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Watkins Inc. v. Lewis , 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003) ).
Ordinarily, a movant seeking a preliminary injunction need only establish a "fair chance" of prevailing on the merits. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds , 530 F.3d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). "Fair chance" is often characterized as "something less than fifty percent." Id. But when a movant seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a "duly enacted state statute," the movant must make "a more rigorous threshold showing that the movant is likely to prevail on the merits." Id. This heightened standard " ‘reflects the idea that governmental policies implemented through legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes are entitled to a higher degree of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.’ " Id. at 732 (quoting Able v. United States , 44 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1995) ).
The Eighth Circuit has instructed that, when a court must determine whether to apply this heightened standard to a motion to enjoin government actions other than the enforcement of a statute, the court must "evaluate whether the full play of the democratic process was involved in the actions ...." D.M. by Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. League , 917 F.3d 994, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see also Rounds , 530 F.3d at 732 n.6. Here, the Court finds that § 130.08 resulted from "the full play of the democratic process." After community members raised concerns about sex offenders living in Apple Valley, the City Council directed that a draft ordinance be prepared for discussion. ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 13–14. The Patrol Captain for the Apple Valley Police Department helped to prepare the draft ordinance and then gave a presentation to participants at a "workshop meeting." Id. ¶¶ 14–15; ECF No. 34-3. The ordinance was subsequently discussed at a City Council meeting, adopted by unanimous vote, and signed by the Mayor. ECF No. 35-1 at 4; ECF No. 35-6 at 4; ECF No. 35-7 at 4. In short, there were multiple opportunities for members of the public to have input regarding the ordinance, the ordinance was discussed and voted on by the elected City Council members, and the ordinance was signed by the elected Mayor. Compare Xiong , 917 F.3d at 1000–01 (). The Court therefore finds that the heightened "likely to prevail" standard applies to the Does’ motion to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of § 130.08.7
"The Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution prohibits the States from enacting laws that increase punishment for criminal acts after they have been committed." Doe v. Miller , 405 F.3d 700, 718 (8th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a law inflicts punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, a court must apply the framework set forth in Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). First, the court considers whether the legislature intended the challenged law to impose criminal punishment. Id. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140. If so, the inquiry is at an end and the law is deemed unconstitutional. If...
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