Doe v. City of Pawtucket

• Decision Date: 29 September 2022
• Docket Number: C. A. 17-365-JJM-LDA
• Parties: JANE DOE, parent and next of friend of MARY DOE, a minor in and for her own behalf and in their own right, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PAWTUCKET, and the PAWTUCKET SCHOOL DEPARTMENT Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

JANE DOE, parent and next of friend of MARY DOE, a minor in and for her own behalf and in their own right, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF PAWTUCKET, and the PAWTUCKET SCHOOL DEPARTMENT Defendants.

C. A. No. 17-365-JJM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

September 29, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This case comes to the Court on partial remand and vacatur by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 969 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2020). Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on the ground that the United States Supreme Court's intervening decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C, 142 S.Ct. 1562,1570 (2022) eliminates all remaining damages that Plaintiffs seek. ECF No. 118 at 3. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion in part and GRANTS Defendants' motion in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Mary Doe, a minor, and Jane Doe, her mother and next of friend, brought this action alleging an assortment of Federal- and state-law claims against the City of Pawtucket, the Pawtucket School Committee and its members, the

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Superintendent of School, as well as several members of the Pawtucket Learning Academy staff, regarding incidents of alleged sexual assault. ECF No. 57. The Court granted Defendants' joint motion to dismiss all the claims in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint. Doe Next Friend Doe v. City of Pewtucket, et al., 374 F.Supp.3d 188, 204-05 (D.R.L 2019). Plaintiffs then appealed the adverse decision, concentrating their efforts primarily on Count I, which alleged a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See Doe E Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 969 F.3d at 6. The First Circuit vacated the Court's entry of judgment against Doe on her Title IX claim against the City and School Department and allowed this narrower version of the claim to proceed. Id. at 11. However, the First Circuit affirmed the Court's dismissal of the remaining claims. Id. Defendants now move for summary judgment. ECF No. 118.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 56”) controls in deciding whether a party is entitled to summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. More particularly,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When deciding whether the Court should grant summary judgment, the Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995). As alluded to, there must first be no genuine issues of material fact. “[M]ere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247'48 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the issue must be genuine and material. See id. “In this context, ‘genuine' means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.... Material' means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law [if] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court decides this latter element of the summary judgment standard by evaluating “whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon

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whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs only remaining claim alleges a violation of Title IX. See Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep't, 969 F.3d at 11. However, in the intervening time, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, PL.L. C., which held that emotional distress damages are precluded in private actions to enforce the Affordable Care Act ("ACA”) and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA”). Cummings, 142 S.Ct. at 1576. Defendants argue that, because Title IX resembles the ACA and RA, emotional distress damages are similarly unavailable in private suits to enforce its provisions. ECF No. 118 at 6'11. Accordingly, Plaintiffs would no longer have a viable claim because their request for relief was limited to emotional distress damages. Id.

Plaintiffs muster several arguments in response, most of which are unavailing. See ECF No. 119 at 6-11. First, they argue that Cummings does not apply to Title IX because the Supreme Court's holding was limited to the ACA and RA. Id. at 6. Second, they contend that they have asserted claims for several forms of damages in addition to emotional distress. Id. Third, they note that there is still outstanding discovery, which should preclude summary judgment. Id. at 7. The following sections address each issue in turn.

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A. Emotional Distress Damages under Title IX after Cummings

While the Supreme Court's holding in Cummings was limited to the ACA and RA, the opinion's underlying reasoning forces the same conclusion for Title IX. Because “Congress has broad power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution to set the terms on which it disburses federal funds,” the Supreme Court reasoned that legislation passed by Congress under the Spending Clause is analogous to a contract between the Federal Government and the recipient of federal funds. Cummings, 142 S.Ct. at 1568. Congress thus has the power to dictate the terms with which federal funds recipients must comply, but these obligations must be clearly stated so that a recipient has notice of its obligations before choosing to accept the agreement. Id. at 1570. Without such notice, a recipient would not be able to knowingly accept the agreement with the Federal Government, and thus bind itself to such terms. Id. In other words, the federal funds recipient must have unambiguous notice of the liability that it could face for accepting federal funds. Id. at 1570-71 (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)).

Neither statute at issue in Cummings-the ACA and RA-mentions remedies. Id. at 1571. However, the Supreme Court noted that remedies that have been traditionally available in breach of contract suits remain available. Id. A federal funds recipient would have notice of those remedies given the contractual nature of its relationship with the Federal Government. Id. (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002)). After surveying several legal authorities, the Supreme Court

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concluded that compensatory damages and injunctions are the only two remedies that have been traditionally available in breach of contract suits. Id. at 1571. Moreover, emotional distress damages have not been “generally” or “normally” available in breach of contract suits. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187-88). Emotional distress damages could be available if the contract, or breach thereof, is particularly likely to lead to emotional disturbance. Id. at 1572. Such damages may also be available where a party to a contract may bring a related tort action. Id. at 1575'76. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court observed that these two situations represent special rules. Id. at 1572, 1575'76. The controlling precedent from Barnes requires that a type of damages be generally available in breach of contract suits for that type to also be available under Spending Clause statutes. Barnes, 536 U.S. at 187-88. Because emotional distress damages only result from breach of “highly unusual contracts, which do not fit into the core of contract law,” the Supreme Court concluded that emotional distress damages are unavailable in private suits to enforce the ACA and RA. Cummings, 142 S.Ct. at 1576 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting David A. Hoffman & Alexander S. Radus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1230 (2012)).

It is no large leap to conclude that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Cummings applies to Title IX cases. In fact, in its opinion, the Supreme Court expressly noted that Congress has enacted four statutes that proscribe federal funds recipients from discriminating against persons based on protected characteristics. Id. at 1569. Congress passed all these statutes pursuant to its Spending Clause

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authority. Id. The Supreme Court further noted that it had previously found an implied private right of action to enforce Title VI and Title IX, as they did not explicitly provide for private remedies.^[1] Id. In turn...