Doe v. City of New Haven
Docket Number | AC 44406 |
Decision Date | 23 August 2022 |
Citation | 214 Conn.App. 553,281 A.3d 480 |
Parties | John DOE v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Rosalie D. Louis, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas R. Gerarde, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Beatrice S. Jordan, for the appellees (defendants).
Prescott, Clark and DiPentima, Js.
The plaintiff, John Doe,1 brought this negligence action against the defendants, the Board of Education of the City of New Haven (board) and Edith Johnson, principal of Wilbur Cross High School (high school), for injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of sexual abuse by Jennifer Frechette, a former teacher at the high school. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's decision rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity.2 The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to whether Johnson had a ministerial duty to report suspected child abuse under General Statutes § 17a-101 et seq., (2) Johnson's deposition testimony did not establish the existence of two additional ministerial duties—specifically, a duty to prohibit free class periods and a duty to take attendance, and (3) the plaintiff was not an identifiable person subject to imminent harm for purposes of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity for discretionary acts.3 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which we view in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, and procedural history provide the necessary background for our resolution of this appeal. During the 2016–2017 academic year, the plaintiff was fifteen years old and a sophomore at the high school. He and approximately sixty to seventy-five students at the high school were enrolled in afternoon classes at the Educational Center for the Arts (arts center) and therefore were dismissed from the high school at 12:30 p.m. Monday through Thursday.
Frechette began working for the board as a theater teacher at the high school in 2013. It was her first experience teaching high school students. Prior to that position, she had taught second and third grade students for fifteen years. The board offered Frechette the position after conducting a background check, which revealed no prior criminal history, and contacting her professional references, each of whom provided a positive recommendation. Prior to the events giving rise to this appeal, neither Johnson nor the board had received any complaints about Frechette, and her personnel file was devoid of any disciplinary actions.
In addition to her teaching duties, Frechette supervised and directed an extracurricular school play. In October, 2016, Frechette held a meeting for students interested in participating in the play and asked them to disclose their contact information, including a cell phone number, and sign a commitment form.4 Frechette collected this information to communicate with students about the rehearsal schedule. Frechette also occasionally met with students involved in the play for one-on-one singing and acting lessons. Johnson did not know that Frechette met with students privately for lessons, but the school's guidance counselor and other teachers were aware of that.
The plaintiff was not enrolled in any of Frechette's classes, but he auditioned for and was cast in the play. In November, 2016, Frechette began to send text messages from her personal cell phone to the plaintiff and other students about rehearsals and matters related to the play. Subsequently, after learning that the plaintiff was not performing well in his English class, Frechette told the plaintiff's English teacher that she would "get [the plaintiff] back on track" and began sending text messages to the plaintiff about his English assignments. The plaintiff also sent text messages to Frechette after rehearsals to inquire about whether she had any feedback about his performance. Eventually, the plaintiff and Frechette's conversations became more intimate, and Frechette disclosed to the plaintiff that she was having marital problems.5
By December, 2016, Frechette and the plaintiff had begun exchanging sexually suggestive messages. One evening in mid-December, Frechette and the plaintiff discussed wanting to kiss each other. The next day, the plaintiff went to Frechette's classroom in the morning before classes started. When they were alone, the plaintiff approached Frechette to hug her and she kissed him. During the following week, the plaintiff would immediately go to Frechette's classroom after he arrived at the high school in the morning, and the two would kiss. On the Friday before winter break, a day he did not have classes at the arts center, the plaintiff went to Frechette's classroom after his last high school class ended at 12:30 p.m. and remained there until approximately 2 p.m. During that time, Frechette removed her blouse and brassiere and performed oral sex on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff did not tell anyone that he and Frechette had sexual contact because she had warned him that she could "get in big trouble" and he was concerned that she would be fired. Before any such contact occurred, the plaintiff ensured that he and Frechette were alone in her classroom and that the classroom door was closed. Additionally, they both tried to keep quiet to avoid alerting anyone passing by the classroom. According to the plaintiff, no one witnessed any of the sexual conduct between them.
On January 5, 2017, Frechette picked up the plaintiff from the arts center after his afternoon classes ended and drove him to the high school. They had agreed to meet that day under the guise that she was providing him a one-on-one voice lesson. Frechette previously had met with the plaintiff privately on two other occasions for voice lessons. After they arrived at the high school, they went to her classroom and started kissing. They eventually moved to one of the dressing rooms adjoining the auditorium stage, which was near Frechette's classroom. Shortly thereafter, a security guard entered the dressing room and discovered the plaintiff sitting with his shoes off on a makeshift bed and Frechette, who had also removed her shoes, hiding between two costume racks. The New Haven Police Department and the high school administration immediately were notified, and a criminal investigation ensued. Johnson also reported the incident to the Department of Children and Families (department) that same day. Frechette was placed on administrative leave the following day and resigned from her position in May, 2017. She subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of risk of injury to a child and was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, execution suspended after nine months, followed by ten years of probation.
On July 12, 2018, the plaintiff commenced this negligence action, seeking damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n6 and General Statutes § 7-465.7
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendants failed (1) to supervise employees and classrooms in order to prevent the sexual assault of students by employees, (2) to supervise teachers’ use of social media and cell phones to ensure that teachers were not sexually harassing or assaulting students, (3) to satisfy affirmative duties imposed under Connecticut's mandatory reporting statutes, and (4) to provide a safe and secure educational environment. The defendants filed an answer on October 4, 2018, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting, by way of a special defense, that they were entitled to governmental immunity.
On October 30, 2019, following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint on, inter alia, the grounds that the plaintiff's claims were barred by statutory and common-law governmental immunity. In support of their motion, they argued that they had satisfied any ministerial duties owed to the plaintiff under the mandatory reporting statutes and that the other conduct alleged in the complaint involved discretionary governmental acts. In addition, the defendants argued that the claim against the board pursuant to § 7-465 failed as a matter of law because such a claim must be predicated on a finding that an employee had acted negligently and that Johnson, whose alleged negligence underlay the indemnity claim, was entitled to immunity. In response, the plaintiff countered that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because there existed genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the defendants had breached the mandatory reporting statutes and whether the defendants were liable for their discretionary acts because the plaintiff was an identifiable person subject to imminent harm. The plaintiff additionally argued that Johnson's deposition testimony established two ministerial duties that precluded summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. Specifically, he asserted that (1) his free period between 12:30 through 2 p.m. on Fridays violated a school policy prohibiting free class periods, and (2) students attending the arts center in the afternoons were not adequately accounted for in violation of an attendance policy.
In a memorandum of decision filed November 13, 2020, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the court concluded that nothing in the record supported the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants had knowledge of, or reasonable cause to suspect prior to January 5, 2017, that Frechette was sexually abusing the plaintiff. The court noted the plaintiff's testimony that, to his knowledge, no one had observed the inappropriate physical contact between him and Frechette and that they took measures to avoid being discovered. The court also concluded...
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