Doe v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 22 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19cv2335 JM (AGS) |
| Citation | 576 F.Supp.3d 721 |
| Parties | Jane DOE, BY AND THROUGH her Guardian ad litem, Jennifer TANIS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Donnie R. Cox, Law Office of Donnie R. Cox, Carlsbad, CA, Joseph Mark McMullen, Law Offices of Joseph M. McMullen, San Diego, CA, Paul W. Leehey, Law Office of Paul W. Leehey, Fallbrook, CA, for Plaintiff Jane Doe.
Juan Fernando Kish, Matthew Patrick O'Sullivan, San Diego County Counsel, San Diego, CA, for Defendant County of San Diego.
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING
Presently before the court are Plaintiff Jane Doe's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 119) and Defendant County of San Diego's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 120). Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Having considered the Parties’ arguments, the evidence, and the law, the court rules as follows.
This action arises from Plaintiff's sexual assault and the access of Plaintiff's investigative file by her assailant.
On March 21, 2018, Defendant Timothy Wilson ("Wilson") approached minor Plaintiff Jane Doe from behind at a restaurant in Vista, California and sexually assaulted her by grabbing her buttocks. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 8; 119-16 at 3). At the time, Plaintiff was fourteen years old and Wilson was employed as a corrections officer at the County of San Diego's Vista Detention Facility. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 12; 119-16 at 1; 120-2, Ex. C at 15:21-36:10). Wilson was not on-duty or in uniform. (Doc. No. 120-2, Ex. C at 93:22-94:5; Ex. D at 83:1-7). Wilson immediately fled the scene following the assault. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 8).
On the same day, Plaintiff's mother reported the incident to the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 9; 120-2 at Ex. D, 87:1-5, 87:15-24). The Sheriff's Department subsequently opened an investigation. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 9). As part of this investigation, Plaintiff and her mother provided the Sheriff's Department with certain information, including Plaintiff's legal name, home address, cell phone number, and the school Plaintiff attended. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 14; 119-16). The Sheriff's Department additionally took photographs of Plaintiff. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 14). This information and Plaintiff's photographs were placed in a case file on the San Diego Sheriff's Department's NetRMS system. (Doc. No. 120-2, Ex. C at 34:17-20, 56:9-23, 59:2-8).
On May 18, 2018, Wilson was arrested after he was identified by another San Diego County employee from a video that was broadcast on local news. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶¶ 10; 16; 120-2, Ex. E). Wilson resigned from the Sheriff's Department following his arrest. (Doc. No. 120-2, Ex. C at 16:1-7).
Prior to Defendant Wilson's arrest, Wilson accessed Plaintiff's investigative file on the NetRMS system approximately forty-four times. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 12; 120-2 at Ex. C, 52:5-18, 54:17-23). Using the NetRMS system, Wilson was able to obtain Plaintiff's legal name, home address, date of birth, and all statements Plaintiff had made to the Sheriff's Department. (Doc. No. 120-2, Ex. C at 49:2-8). Wilson further accessed photographs of Plaintiff approximately eight times, downloaded photographs of Plaintiff, and sent certain photographs of Plaintiff to his personal e-mail account. (Doc. Nos. 22 at ¶ 14; 120-2 at Ex. C, 56:22-57:5, 71:13-21).
On October 3, 2018, Wilson pled guilty to one count of committing a lewd act on a minor and two counts of unlawfully taking computer data. (Doc. No. 22 at ¶ 11). He was sentenced to one year in jail, five years of probation, and ordered to register as a sex offender. Id.
On April 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint against Wilson and the County in state court. (Doc. No. 1-3 at 5, 9). On May 8, 2019, Wilson was personally served (id. at 33), and on June 10, 2019, default was entered against him. (Id. at 6, 41-42). On July 2, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint in state court against Wilson and the County. Id. at 18, 46-56. On November 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint in state court against Wilson and the County, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. Id. at 18, 166-179. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted causes of action for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) negligence; (3) invasion of privacy; (4) sexual battery; (5) negligent supervision and/or training; (6) invasion of privacy ( § 1983 ); (7) liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ( § 1983 ); and (8) "state-created" danger ( § 1983 ). Id. at 166-179.
On December 6, 2019, the County removed the case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction with Wilson consenting to the removal. (Doc. Nos. 1; 1-2). On December 13, 2019, the County filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 2). On April 9, 2019, the court: (1) denied the County's motion with respect to Plaintiff's claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, breach of privacy under § 1983, and Monell liability under § 1983 ; (2) denied as moot the County's motion with respect to Plaintiff's claims for negligent supervision and a "state-created" danger under § 1983 ; and (3) granted the County's motion with respect to Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 12 at 20-21).
On September 24, 2021, Plaintiff and the County filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 119, 120).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." See id. "[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The question is "whether a jury could reasonably find either that the [moving party] proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law or that he did not." Id. (emphasis in original). "[A]ll justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmovant's] favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading," Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and affidavits or declarations supporting his opposition "must be made on personal knowledge," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The opposing party need not show the issue will be resolved conclusively in its favor. See Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. All that is necessary is submission of sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute, thereby requiring a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions at trial. See id.
Both Plaintiff and the County have moved for summary adjudication on Plaintiff's claims against the County. (Doc. Nos. 119, 120).1 As both Parties’ motions address the same or similar issues, the court's resolution is guided by the same analysis. For these reasons, the court will consider the Parties’ motions together.
The County asserts a number of evidentiary objections to the declarations and documents submitted by Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 131-3). The court considers each of these objections below.
"A deposition or an extract therefrom is authenticated in a motion for summary judgment when it identifies the names of the deponent and the action and includes the reporter's certification that the deposition is a true record of the testimony of the deponent." Orr v. Bank of Am. , 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002). Ordinarily, this is accomplished by "attaching the cover page of the deposition and the reporter's certification to every deposition extract submitted." Id.
Here, it is undisputed Plaintiff's counsel submitted numerous deposition transcripts without attaching a reporter's certification. Plaintiff's counsel seeks leave of the court to correct this defect, attributing counsel's failure to provide complete exhibits to "remote work communication difficulties" caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. (Doc. No. 135 at 2). The County opposes. (Doc. No. 141). Plaintiff's request to belatedly provide "complete" versions of its exhibits, supported only by a conclusory statement regarding "COVID-19 related issues" lacks good cause and is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall STRIKE the documents lodged at Docket No. 134.
Notwithstanding the above, "a court reporter's certification is not the only method of authenticating a deposition excerpt." White v. Home Depot USA Inc. , ...
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