Doe v. Coe

Decision Date30 March 2018
Docket NumberNo. 2–17–0435,2–17–0435
Parties Jane DOE, a Minor, BY her Mother and Next Friend, Jane A. DOE, and BY her Father and Next Friend, John DOE; Jane A. Doe; and John Doe, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Chad COE ; The First Congregational Church of Dundee, Illinois; and Pastor Aaron James, Defendants (The First Congregational Church of Dundee, Illinois, and Pastor Aaron James, Defendants–Appellees).
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Kevin M. Lyons, of Lyons Law Group, LLC, of Downers Grove, and Francis C. Lipuma, of Chicago, for appellants.

Thomas P. Scherschel and Kaylea H. Weiler, of SmithAmundsen LLC, of St. Charles, and Michael Resis, of SmithAmundsen LLC, of Chicago, for appellees.

JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Jane Doe (Jane), Jane A. Doe, and John Doe, appeal the dismissal with prejudice of their second amended complaint against defendants, the First Congregational Church of Dundee, Illinois (FCCD), and its pastor, Aaron James. The complaint alleged that Chad Coe sexually groomed and ultimately raped1 Jane while Coe was employed as FCCD's director of youth ministries and Jane was a member of FCCD's youth group, which was overseen by Coe. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 A. Plaintiffs' Original and First Amended Complaints

¶ 4 Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in August 2015. They named several defendants, including Coe, James, and FCCD. FCCD is a local congregation of the United Church of Christ (UCC) that employed James and Coe during the relevant period. Plaintiffs also named the UCC itself and various entities within its loosely hierarchical organization (collectively, the UCC defendants).

¶ 5 In January 2016, on the motion of FCCD and James, the trial court dismissed without prejudice the counts against them. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint in February 2016. They alleged four causes of action against both FCCD and James: negligent supervision, negligent retention, "willful and wanton failure to protect," and "willful and wanton retention and failure to supervise." Against FCCD, plaintiff additionally alleged negligent hiring. The core allegations of the complaint described a two-year period, from 2011 through 2013, in which Coe abused his position as FCCD's youth director through various forms of sexual misconduct toward female minors who were members of FCCD's youth and confirmation groups. A particular focus of the allegations was Jane, whom Coe subjected to persistent sexual advances before raping her in June 2013.

¶ 6 In the negligent-hiring count, plaintiffs alleged that, if FCCD had searched Coe's online activity prior to hiring him, it would have discovered that Coe maintained profiles on several websites that featured adult or child pornography. In the remaining counts, plaintiffs alleged that FCCD and James failed to properly supervise Coe. They also alleged that FCCD and James knew or should have known of Coe's misconduct prior to the rape of Jane.

¶ 7 James, FCCD, and the UCC defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint, pursuant to section 2–619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2014) ). James and FCCD also moved the trial court to strike, as irrelevant or cumulative, certain paragraphs of the first amended complaint, in case the court denied the motions to dismiss or granted them with leave to refile. FCCD and James sought to have stricken, inter alia , paragraphs alleging how FCCD and James responded after Jane disclosed the rape and Coe was arrested for it.

¶ 8 The trial court agreed with FCCD and James that the counts against them failed to state a cause of action. As to the negligent-hiring count against FCCD, the court reasoned that an online search of Coe's name would not necessarily have disclosed his activity on pornographic websites, because, according to the complaint, he conducted that activity under a pseudonym. As to the remaining counts, the court found nothing in the complaint to indicate that either FCCD or James was or should have been aware of Coe's malfeasance prior to his sexual assault of Jane.

¶ 9 The court denied plaintiffs leave to replead any of the counts against James or the willful-and-wanton counts against FCCD. First, the court reasoned that, if plaintiffs could not adequately plead simple negligence after two attempts, there was scant chance of their success on a subsequent attempt to plead willful and wanton conduct (which is an aggravated form of negligence (see Doe–3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors , 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 19, 362 Ill.Dec. 484, 973 N.E.2d 880 ) ). Second, the court held that, while James's acts or omissions as an agent of FCCD might form the basis for FCCD's liability, James could not be held personally liable.

¶ 10 The court dismissed the negligence counts against FCCD without prejudice. The court also granted in its entirety FCCD and James's motion to strike portions of the first amended complaint.

¶ 11 The court dismissed with prejudice the counts in the first amended complaint that were particular to the UCC defendants. Subsequently, we reversed that dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. See Doe v. Coe , 2017 IL App (2d) 160875, 416 Ill.Dec. 114, 83 N.E.3d 612.

¶ 12 Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the dismissals of the counts against FCCD and James. The court granted the motion only to the extent of permitting plaintiffs to replead the negligence counts against James.

¶ 13 B. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
¶ 14 1. Overview of Counts Against FCCD and James

¶ 15 In December 2016, plaintiffs filed their 70–page second amended complaint, which is the subject of this appeal. Plaintiffs renewed their various claims against Coe and their claims against FCCD and James for negligence and willful and wanton conduct. They pled 16 counts in total. Counts I through VII named only Coe. James alone was named in counts VIII (negligent supervision), IX (negligent retention), X (willful-and-wanton failure to protect), and XI (willful-and-wanton retention and failure to supervise). FCCD alone was named in counts XII (negligent hiring), XIII (negligent supervision), XIV (negligent retention), XV (willful-and-wanton failure to protect), and XVI (willful-and-wanton retention and failure to supervise).

¶ 16 We organize the general and specific allegations under the following headings:

¶ 17 2. The UCC, the IUCC, and the Safe Church Policy

¶ 18 Plaintiffs alleged that the UCC is "a religious organization composed of Local Churches, Associations, Conferences, and a General Synod organized in a hierarchical structure." The UCC has an entity called the Insurance Board, one purpose of which is to "assist in creating and maintaining safe church environments within the UCC organization, including, but not limited to, Local Churches." On August 21, 2006, the Insurance Board "sent a letter to the UCC and its sub-entities to provide expectations and recommendations regarding the adoption of written safe church abuse prevention policies at UCC Local Churches." The August 21 letter contained recommended " ‘Internet Safety Guidelines’ " (ISG). The ISG restricted adult-minor online interaction and barred "improper" or "offensive" online content. The letter also contained a sample policy on " ‘Appropriate and Inappropriate Affection Between Staff and Children,’ " which provided specific examples of such inappropriate contact.

¶ 19 Following the August 21 letter from the Insurance Board, the general counsel for the UCC (General Counsel) sent a letter to local churches within the UCC "regarding compliance with the Insurance Board's recommendations." The General Counsel included in the letter "a sample safe church policy that the General Counsel drafted pursuant to the Insurance Board's recommendation for a more comprehensive safe church policy for Local Churches." On November 18, 2006, the Illinois Conference of the United Church of Christ (IUCC) "approved the ‘Safe Church Policy–Abuse Prevention’ policy" (SCP), which was based on the safe church policy provided by the General Counsel.

¶ 20 As FCCD is a local church within the IUCC, "[FCCD] employees and volunteers were required to read and follow the [SCP]" and "to sign a disclosure statement attesting to and acknowledging the [SCP]." The SCP required that (1) all employees and volunteers undergo a background check prior to working with minors, (2) "at least two adults be present to supervise any minor youth or child activities," and (3) "incidents of child abuse observed by employees or volunteers *** be reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services[.]" The SCP also defined "sexual exploitation" and "sexual harassment."

¶ 21 3. FCCD's Hiring of Coe

¶ 22 Plaintiffs alleged that, when Coe was hired as youth director by FCCD, his father, Douglas Coe (Douglas), "held a senior position within the UCC as an Association Council Member of [the Fox Valley Association]" (FVA), which is an "Association" within the IUCC. In hiring Coe, FCCD relied on the recommendation of Douglas or the FVA and performed no further investigation into Coe's background or fitness for the position.

¶ 23 In their specific allegations within the negligent-hiring count (count XII) against FCCD, plaintiffs alleged that FCCD "failed to conduct even a basic, cursory Google search, or any investigation into the background and fitness of Coe for the position of Director of Youth Ministries in violation of church policy." They further alleged:

"A basic, cursory Google search into the online public presence of Coe would have revealed Coe's activity, which included posting public photos of his own genitalia, on numerous websites, such as, ‘newbienudes,’ ‘motherless,’ ‘wouldyouhitthis,’ ‘ratemybody,’ ‘ratemymelons,’ and ‘datehookup,’ among many others."

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4 cases
  • Doe v. Coe
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 23, 2019
    ...and reserved against the UCC defendants. The appellate decision below quoted a good number of the allegations from the complaint. 2018 IL App (2d) 170435, ¶ 43, 422 Ill.Dec. 304, 103 N.E.3d 436. We summarize them to the extent they are relevant to our decision.¶ 13 Plaintiffs alleged that F......
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    ...proximately caused [his] injuries." Doe v. Coe , 2019 IL 123521, ¶ 52, 434 Ill.Dec. 117, 135 N.E.3d 1, 15 (2019) (quoting Doe v. Coe , 2018 IL App (2d) 170435, ¶ 90, 422 Ill.Dec. 304, 103 N.E.3d 436, 456 (2d Dist. 2018) ). Although Plaintiff need not have alleged that MNASR had prior notice......
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    • June 7, 2022
    ...term “harming party” in cases outlining the duty to reasonably supervise an employee for the benefit of third parties. (Doc. 113, p. 6). In Doe v. Coe, the Illinois Supreme Court highlighted the three elements of a claim for negligent supervision: (i) the employer has a duty to supervise th......
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