Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16637)
• Citation: 818 A.2d 14,263 Conn. 39
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHN DOE v. CONNECTICUT BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE

263 Conn. 39

818 A.2d 14

JOHN DOE v.CONNECTICUT BAR EXAMINING COMMITTEE

(SC 16637)

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued March 12, 2002

Officially released April 1, 2003

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.James F. Stapleton, with whom was Paulette Wunsch, for the appellant-appellee(defendant).

William F. Gallagher, for the appellee-appellant(plaintiff).

Opinion

BORDEN, J.

The defendant, the Connecticut bar examining committee, appeals and the plaintiff, John Doe, cross appeals¹ from the judgment of the trial court reversing the defendant's decision not to recommend him for admission to the bar of Connecticut and remanding the case for a new hearing before a new panel of the defendant.The defendant claims that the trial court: (1) utilized an improper standard of review when evaluating the defendant's decision; and (2) improperly granted the plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously in these proceedings.In his cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly remanded the issue to the defendant, and, instead, should have ordered the plaintiff's admittance to the bar.We agree with the defendant that the trial court used an improper standard of review, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.²

The defendant issued a decision recommending that the plaintiff not be admitted to the bar.The plaintiff then filed this petition requesting the trial court to admit him to the bar.The trial court rendered judgment reversing the decision of the defendant, and remanded the plaintiff's petition to the defendant for a new hearing before a different panel of the defendant.This appeal and cross appeal followed.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history.The plaintiff entered Quinnipiac College School of Law (Quinnipiac) in January, 1991.In May, 1994, while a third year law student, the plaintiff reached an agreement with the Quinnipiac student discipline committee, which found that he had "violated Student Conduct Code Section 3 B by submitting . . . the work of another as his own for academic credit in satisfaction of the substantial paper writing requirement."The plaintiff, among other sanctions, was suspended from school through the 1995 summer session.

Following graduation from Quinnipiac, the plaintiff filed an application to take the Connecticut bar examination and for admission to the bar.The plaintiff disclosed his act of plagiarism on the application for admission, as well as a history of financial credit problems.Thereafter, the statewide grievance committee (grievance committee) conducted an investigation of the plaintiff concerning an anonymous allegation that he was involved in the unauthorized practice of law.That allegation stemmed from the plaintiff's work as a law clerk for the law firm Basilica & Stewart.Also working at the law firm was Tammy Gervais, a legal secretary, whose duties included depositing and writing checks.Both Gervais and the plaintiff admitted that there was a degree of animosity between them.Although the plaintiff believed that Gervais had made that allegation, she denied any involvement.The grievance committee found no misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.Thereafter, the plaintiff amended his application in order to notify the defendant of this investigation.

As a result of the plaintiff's disclosures, the defendant forwarded the plaintiff's application to the New London standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar (standing committee) for review.After conducting a hearing concerning the issues of plagiarism, the plaintiff's credit problems, and the unauthorized practice of law, the standing committee recommended the plaintiff for admission to the bar.This recommendation was forwarded to the defendant.

The defendant then conducted its own proceeding, taking six days of testimony over a period of thirteen months.The first hearing, occurring on November 14, 1997, concerned the three issues previously addressed by the standing committee, as well as the issue of the plaintiff's "candor and credibility."As the hearing progressed, the defendant became concerned over apparent inconsistencies between the testimony of the plaintiff and certain other witnesses called by the defendant.In light of the concerns raised by the testimony, the defendant issued an amended notice of hearing, notifying the plaintiff that it had expanded its hearing from the four issues that it originally was considering, so as to include whether the plaintiff had: (1)"[engaged] in conversations with a [c]ertified [p]ublic [a]ccountant concerning confidential financial, personal and/or personnel matters of the [plaintiff's] former employer"; and (2)"[acted] in such a manner as to slander, defame or tarnish the character of a former coemployee, in a manner which could adversely affect both her reputation and income, and denying such activities to their former common employer."After five hearing dates, the defendant circulated a draft memorandum of decision recommending that the plaintiff be denied admission to the bar.The plaintiff, after being given the opportunity by the defendant, presented additional evidence concerning the factual findings of the memorandum.Thereafter, the defendant issued its final memorandum of decision, in which it concluded that the plaintiff"lacks present good moral character and . . . is not recommended for admission to the [bar]."

In reaching its decision, the defendant focused on two particular areas: "(1) allegations of plagiarism with respect to a major project submitted by the [plaintiff] when he was a student at [Quinnipiac], and (2) honesty in dealing with a member of the [b]ar, the [plaintiff's] former employer, concerning a personnel matter."Regarding the plagiarism incident, the defendant found that the plaintiff's testimony concerning the incident "was in some regards ambiguous and equivocal," and "lacked candor and clarity on the subject of who authored the non-plagiarized portions of the research paper."On the issue of honesty in dealing with a member of the bar, the defendant found that the plaintiff had made a statement to his former employer that "constituted a falsehood to a member of the [b]ar, by an individual seeking membership to the [b]ar, concerning a matter which involved sensitive dealings with other members of the legal profession."The defendant concluded that these two incidents, when taken together, along with the contradictory testimony they engendered, impaired the plaintiff's candor and credibility to such an extent that the defendant could not recommend him for admission to the bar.

The plaintiff then filed this petition in the Superior Court for admission to the bar, claiming that the defendant's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, an abuse of its discretion or without a fair investigation of the facts, and in connection therewith he applied to the trial court for permission to proceed anonymously with respect to the review of the defendant's decision.The trial court, Handy, J., initially granted the plaintiff's ex parte request to proceed as John Doe.After granting the defendant's motion for reconsideration of the ex parte order, the trial court reaffirmed its earlier decision.After a hearing on the merits, the trial court, Hon. D. Michael Hurley, judge trial referee, reversed the decision of the defendant and remanded the case to the defendant for it to constitute a new panel, and to conduct a new hearing to determine the plaintiff's present fitness to practice law.Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

Before reaching the merits of the defendant's appeal, we address the plaintiff's claim that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the trial court's order reversing the decision of the defendant and remanding it for a new hearing before a new panel of the defendant was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal.We disagree.

In examining the question of whether this appeal is from a final judgment, we begin with the premise that, "except insofar as the constitution bestows upon this court jurisdiction to hear certain cases;seeFonfara v. Reapportionment Commission,222 Conn. 166, [173]610 A.2d 153(1992); the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appellate Court and of this court is governed by statute.Grieco v. Zoning Commission,226 Conn. 230, 231, 627 A.2d 432(1993).It is equally axiomatic that, except insofar as the legislature has specifically provided for an interlocutory appeal or other form of interlocutory appellate review;see, e.g., General Statutes § 52-278l(prejudgment remedies);General Statutes § 54-63g(petition for review of bail);General Statutes § 51-164x(court closure orders);State v. Ayala,222 Conn. 331, 340, 610 A.2d 1162(1992); appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments of the trial court.General Statutes § 52-263³ . . . ."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Conetta v. Stamford,246 Conn. 281, 290, 715 A.2d 756(1998).

Although the trial court's remand order was interlocutory in nature, "[w]e previously have determined that certain interlocutory orders have the attributes of a final judgment and consequently are appealable under § 52-263.In State v. Curcio,[191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566(1983)], we explicated two situations in which a party can appeal an otherwise interlocutory order: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them."(Internal quotation marks omitted.)Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,249 Conn. 36, 46, 730 A.2d 51(1999).⁴

"A judgment by a trial court ordering further administrative proceedings cannot meet the first prong of the Curcio test, because, whatever its merits, the trial court's order has not terminate[d] a...