Doe v. Connecticut Dept. of Child and Youth Services

• Decision Date: 13 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 536,D,536
• Citation: 911 F.2d 868
• Parties: John DOE b/k/a Mary Doe, Mary Doe and Frank Doe, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES and Mark J. Marcus, Raymond Farrington, Patricia Simpson, and David Goldner, individually and officially as employees of the Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 89-7601.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 868

911 F.2d 868

John DOE b/k/a Mary Doe, Mary Doe and Frank Doe, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES and Mark

J. Marcus, Raymond Farrington, Patricia Simpson, and David

Goldner, individually and officially as employees of the

Connecticut Department of Child and Youth Services,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 536, Docket 89-7601.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Feb. 7, 1990.

Decided Aug. 13, 1990.

Joseph D. Garrison, New Haven, Conn. (Garrison, Kahn, Silbert & Arterton, New Haven, Conn., on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Daniel R. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn. (Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before TIMBERS, NEWMAN, and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal, like van Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Social Services, 911 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.1990), decided this day, concerns the availability of the qualified immunity defense in the context of temporary interruption of parental custody. Two parents and their minor child appeal from the May 19, 1989, judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Peter C. Dorsey, Judge) dismissing, on motion for summary judgment, their suit against the Connecticut Department of Social Services and some of its employees. The suit sought damages for the actions of the defendants in removing the minor child from the parental home on an emergency basis for a 96-hour period, see Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 17-38a(e) (1988), and placing him in a state home. The defendants acted in response to serious allegations of sexual child abuse perpetrated upon the child by his older brother, with the toleration, and perhaps the participation of, the child's parents.

In a thorough opinion, Judge Dorsey concluded that the defendants were entitled, as a matter of law, to the defense of qualified immunity. Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Children and Youth Services, 712 F.Supp. 277 (D.Conn.1989). The facts are fully set forth in the District Court's opinion and need not be recounted here.

Appellants challenge Judge Dorsey's conclusion, essentially on two grounds, neither of which has merit. First, they contend that factual issues remain as to whether the defendants fully complied with the requirements of state law. Even if true, the claim is irrelevant. The question is whether " 'no reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to, the plaintiffs, could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendant[s]' to believe that [they were] acting in a fashion that did not clearly violate an established federally protected right." See Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 189 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J., sitting by designation)) (emphasis added). "[A] violation of state law neither gives [plain...