Doe v. Cooper
Decision Date | 22 August 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 1:13CV711.,1:13CV711. |
Citation | 40 F.Supp.3d 657 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Parties | John DOES 1–5, Plaintiffs, v. Roy A. COOPER III, et al., Defendants. |
Paul Moore Dubbeling, Hillsborough, NC, George Glenn Gerding, Gerding Blass, PLLC, Chapel Hill, NC, for Plaintiffs.
Harold F. Askins, N.C. Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.
This matter is currently before the Court on a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. # 17], filed by Plaintiffs John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, John Doe 4, and John Doe 5 (collectively “Plaintiffs”). Also before the Court is an Amended Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Intervene as a Matter of Right [Doc. # 30] (“Defendants' Motion” or “Motion to Dismiss”), filed by all Defendants (“Defendants” or “Attorney General Cooper and District Attorneys”), seeking dismissal pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6). This Court held a hearing on these Motions on August 8, 2014. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
The factual allegations of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint [Doc. # 28] (“Amended Complaint”), taken as true for purposes of Defendants' Motion, allege that Plaintiffs are all residents of North Carolina who are required to register as sex offenders under North Carolina state law.1 Some individuals required to register as sex offenders in North Carolina are subject to location restrictions under N.C. General Statute § 14–208.18, which restrict where these individuals can “knowingly be.”2 Section 14–208.18(a) makes it a crime for these individuals to “knowingly be at any of the following locations”:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.18(a) (2013) (emphasis added). A violation of any of these location restrictions is a Class H felony. Id. § 14–208.18(h).
This statute does allow some limited exceptions to these location restrictions. First, § 14–208.18 allows the following limited exceptions for those subject to the location restrictions who are parents or guardians of a minor:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–208.18(b), (d).
In addition to those limited exceptions for parents or guardians of minors, the following additional exceptions to the location restrictions are expressly provided for in § 14–208.18 :
Id. § 14–208.18(e) –(g). All five Plaintiffs are subject to the location restrictions of § 14–208.18.
Plaintiff John Doe 1 was convicted in 1995 to one count of receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and served five years in federal prison for that conviction. While in prison, John Doe 1 voluntarily completed the Sex Offender Treatment Program (“SOTP”), which consists of months-long intensive therapy. As of 2003, he was no longer under any type of probation, parole, or supervised release. Prior to 2011, John Doe 1 attended his local church, which contains a monitored child-care center within 300 feet of the main congregation hall. His pastor was “aware of his history” and “approved of” his church attendance. (Am. Compl. [Doc. # 28] ¶ 50.) In 2011, an anonymous caller reported John Doe 1's presence at his church's worship service, and he was arrested for violating a subsection of § 14–208.18(a). This charge was ultimately dropped the charge against John Doe 1, and the District Attorney allowed him to attend church, subject to an ad hoc list of restrictions, including a prohibition on “assisting” with the worship service and engaging in church activities other than attending the main service.
Plaintiff John Doe 2 was convicted in 2011 of misdemeanor sexual battery, in violation of N.C. General Statute § 14–27.5A, and was sentenced to 5 years of probation. “Per stipulation,” the terms of John Doe 2's probation do not include any restriction on his ability to attend his minor son's educational or recreational activities. (Am. Compl. [Doc. # 28] ¶ 62.) John Doe 2 desires to participate in these activities, but the State has informed John Doe 2 that § 14–208.18(a)'s proscriptions override the lack of restrictions in his probation terms. Furthermore, John Doe 2 is unsure of the meaning or extent of § 14–208.18(a)'s proscriptions. He has repeatedly asked his probation officer and the local sheriff's office for clarification, but they have pointed him to the verbatim text of § 14–208.18, “advis[ing] him not to participate in many activities” and to avoid many locations just “to be on the safe side.” (Am. Compl. [Doc. # 28] ¶ 67–68.) John Doe 2 has asked whether he can attend his son's activities remotely (e.g., via Skype), and received conflicting advice as to that question.
Plaintiff John Doe 3 was convicted in 2002 of committing indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of N.C. General Statute § 14–202.1, and served four years in prison in the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections. While in prison, John Doe 3 volunteered for, and successfully completed, the state-administered Sex Offender Accountability and Responsibility (“SOAR”) program, which consists of approximately 600 hours of therapeutic treatment.3 Since his release from prison, John Doe 3 has been steadily employed. As part of his current job, he is required to purchase office supplies. The local sheriff's office has advised him that he could be arrested for violating § 14–208.18 for shopping in an office supply store that is located within 300 feet of a fast food restaurant that has a children's play area. John Doe 3 is unsure whether he is in violation of the statute by just driving to work past locations that might be prohibited under § 14–208.18.
Plaintiff John Doe 4 was convicted in 2007 of attempted solicitation of a minor in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–202.3. He received a suspended sentence of 30 months, served 10 weekends in prison as an intermediate punishment, and completed a 30–month term of probation. John Doe 4 has undergone sex offender treatment and has maintained steady employment since his conviction. He currently wants to attend church, but is highly concerned that doing so could subject him to arrest and conviction under § 14–208.18, because the church has Sunday School classes for...
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