Doe v. Dallas Independent School District

• Decision Date: 24 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-10612,99-10612
• Citation: 220 F.3d 380
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) DOE, Mrs, on behalf of John Doe, on behalf of Jack Doe, on behalf of James Doe; ET AL Plaintiffs JOHN DOE; JOE DOE; MS ROE, as next friend on Jack Roe; MS SMITH, as next friend of James Smith Plaintiffs - Appellants v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL Defendant DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 380

220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000)

DOE, Mrs, on behalf of John Doe, on behalf of Jack Doe, on behalf of James Doe; ET AL Plaintiffs JOHN DOE; JOE DOE; MS ROE, as next friend on Jack Roe; MS SMITH, as next friend of James Smith Plaintiffs - Appellants v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL Defendant

DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant - Appellee

No. 99-10612

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

July 24, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

KING, Chief Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Dallas Independent School District on their claims brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Earl McGrew, a third-grade teacher and Boy Scout troop leader at Joseph J. Rhoades Elementary School ("J.J. Rhoades"), sexually molested numerous male students between 1983 and 1987. He was subsequently convicted in state court on one count of aggravated sexual assault and two counts of indecency with a child. McGrew was sentenced to one life sentence and two twenty-year sentences.

After McGrew's criminal conviction, a number of his victims brought this action against the Dallas Independent School District ("DISD"), John Earl McGrew, the Boy Scouts of America, Circle Ten Council, Inc. Boy Scouts of America, J.J. Rhoades, Linus Wright, Marvin Edwards, and Barbara Patrick.¹ Mrs. Doe on behalf of John Doe, Joe Doe, Jack Doe, and James Doe² originally filed the case in state court. The case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The complaint alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and Texas tort law. The plaintiffs in this action later amended their complaint to add a claim under the Constitution of the state of Texas.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' Title IX claim because it concluded that same-sex sexual harassment was not actionable under Title IX. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims brought under Texas tort law and claims for damages under the Texas Constitution, leaving only the § 1983 claim intact. On November 24, 1995, a second lawsuit was filed in federal district court by other minor victims of McGrew. This second lawsuit, brought by or on behalf of Plaintiffs-Appellants Bob Black, Bill Black, William White, and George Green, alleged the same facts and asserted identical claims as that brought by the Does, Ms. Roe, and Ms. Smith. On February 20, 1996, it was consolidated with the first-filed action.³

On July 30, 1996, defendants DISD and Barbara Patrick, who was the principal of J.J. Rhoades at the time of the alleged abuse (collectively, "Defendants"), filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' remaining § 1983 claims, arguing that (1) no grounds existed upon which DISD could be held liable for McGrew's misconduct, and (2) Patrick was entitled to qualified immunity. On October 29, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. The court entered a final judgment on all claims in favor of Defendants on March 5, 1997. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this court.

We affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Doe I"). This court held that DISD neither delegated to school principals the authority to create policies to address allegations of sexual abuse nor acted with deliberate indifference towards its students' constitutional rights by failing to adopt an official policy to protect against the sexual abuse of students. See Doe I, 153 F.3d at 216-17. We also affirmed the district court's determination that Patrick was entitled to qualified immunity because although she had notice of the abuse as of the spring of 1986,⁴ she did not act with deliberate indifference. See id. at 218-19. With respect to Plaintiffs' Title IX claim, we decided that pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the Plaintiffs' complaint had stated a valid Title IX claim against DISD. See id. at 219. However, because we determined that there was insufficient evidence in the record to permit an adjudication on the merits of that claim, we remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. See id. at 219-220. In so doing, we noted in dicta that

we in no way intend to suggest that summary judgment would be inappropriate if Defendants are able to demonstrate, as they did with respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs' Title IX claim. Indeed, given the factual development that took place in this case with respect to the § 1983 claims against DISD and Patrick, we can say that if Plaintiffs can produce no additional evidence, Defendants will be entitled to summary judgment on the Title IX claim.

See id. at 220 n.8.

On September 30, 1998, DISD filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Title IX claim. DISD argued that it could not be held liable under Title IX because Patrick was not a supervisory official, did not have actual notice of abuse, and did not act with deliberate indifference. In response, Plaintiffs contended that Patrick was a supervisory official with the power to stop the abuse, had actual notice of abuse both in 1984 and in 1986, and responded with deliberate indifference in both instances. In support of their opposition, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that had been submitted for the previous summary judgment motion and new evidence in the form of (1) a 1999 affidavit from D.D.P., a plaintiff; (2) a 1999 deposition by Bettye Burrell, Patrick's former secretary; (3) a 1999 affidavit by John McGrew; and (4) a 1999 deposition of Robert Johnston, Special Assistant to the Superintendent for Administration of DISD.

The district court granted DISD's motion on April 20, 1999. In its memorandum decision, the district court assumed without deciding that Patrick was the appropriate person to be notified in order for DISD to be liable under Title IX. The court then discounted D.D.P.'s 1999 affidavit as a subsequent affidavit contradicting prior testimony without explanation, and held that Plaintiffs had offered insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Patrick had actual notice of McGrew's misconduct in 1984. Furthermore, the court found that there was no evidence that any of the DISD officials and staff members who had allegedly been told of abuse prior to 1986 had communicated this information to Patrick. Finally, the court, citing our finding for the purposes of § 1983 in Doe I, held that Patrick's actions in response to the 1986 report of abuse did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. On the same day, the district court entered a final judgment in favor of DISD and awarded it costs. Plaintiffs timely appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court improperly disregarded a 1999 affidavit, and incorrectly concluded that Plaintiffs' evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Patrick's deliberate indifference. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria employed by the district court in the first instance. See Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994). To prevail on summary judgment, a movant must demonstrate that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). If the movant succeeds in making that showing, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and not rest upon the allegations or denials contained in its pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986). We review the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1993).

B. Title IX

Title IX provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Although the statute provides for administrative enforcement of this mandate, the Supreme Court has held that Title IX is also enforceable through an implied private right of action. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), the Supreme Court subsequently established that monetary damages are available in such an action. See 503 U.S. 60. Franklin further stated that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher constitutes actionable discrimination for the purposes of Title IX. See id. at 75.

In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998), the Supreme Court set forth the standard under which a school district may be held liable for damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. The Court held that

in cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the recipient entity, . . . a damages remedy [against the school district] will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on...