Doe v. Dept. of Public Health
Decision Date | 06 April 1999 |
Docket Number | (AC 17520) |
Citation | 52 Conn. App. 513,727 A.2d 260 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | JOHN DOE v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL. |
Louis B. Blumenfeld, with whom, on the brief, were Rodd J. Mantell and Lorinda S. Coon, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Paul J. Lahey and Hugh Barber, assistant attorneys general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court that dismissed his administrative appeal as premature. In that appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant Connecticut medical examining board (board) improperly refused to dismiss a statement of charges brought against the plaintiff by the defendant department of public health (department).
The first question before us is whether this court has jurisdiction to review this appeal. If we determine that we have jurisdiction, we must then decide whether the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of General Statutes § 4-183 (b), which authorizes appeals from the interlocutory rulings of administrative agencies. Section 4-183 (b) provides that "[a] person may appeal a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling to the Superior Court if (1) it appears likely that the person will otherwise qualify under this chapter to appeal from the final agency action or ruling and (2) postponement of the appeal would result in an inadequate remedy." The defendants concede that subdivision (1) is satisfied here.
The plaintiff claims that the requirements for such an appeal were met here because the agency remedy is inadequate in two respects. First, the department's failure to complete its investigation in a timely manner, as required by General Statutes § 20-13e (a),2 deprived the board of jurisdiction and, therefore, the proceedings before the board constitute a continuing violation of the plaintiffs constitutional right to due process. Second, the agency record will be available to the public prior to a final decision by the board, thereby depriving the plaintiff of the confidentiality that is necessary to protect his professional reputation.
The defendants assert that this court lacks jurisdiction because the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs administrative appeal is not a final judgment. In the event that we disagree with their jurisdictional claim, the defendants posit two reasons why the trial court's dismissal should be affirmed. They first assert that a claim that an agency action violates a person's constitutional rights must await the final agency decision, unless the agency remedy is demonstrably futile. Here, the plaintiff has shown neither a colorable claim of a violation of his constitutional rights nor that the agency remedy is demonstrably futile. They further assert that the agency proceeding provides an adequate remedy to the plaintiff because any damage to the plaintiffs reputation is simply an indirect result of the proceeding itself. We first conclude that this court has jurisdiction to review this appeal. We further conclude that the plaintiff has an adequate administrative remedy and, therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff is a physician licensed by the department. On or about July 16, 1993, a petition was filed with the department pursuant to General Statutes § 20-13e (a),3 alleging certain misconduct in the plaintiffs care and treatment of a patient between September 7, 1989, and November 5, 1990. The department did not complete its investigation of the petition until April 15, 1996. On that day, the department filed charges against the plaintiff that alleged that the plaintiff had engaged in illegal, incompetent or negligent conduct in the practice of medicine in violation of General Statutes § 20-13c (4),4 and requested that the board take appropriate action, including the revocation of the plaintiff's medical and surgical license.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the charges. He alleged that in concluding its investigation thirty-three months after the petition was filed, the department failed to comply with the eighteen month time limitation of § 20-13e (a), thereby depriving the board of jurisdiction over the matter. The board denied the motion to dismiss the charges because it concluded that the eighteen month time limit set out in § 20-13 (e) was not jurisdictional in nature and that the department's failure to comply with it did not, therefore, prevent the board from hearing the matter. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, pursuant to § 4-183 (b),5 from the board's denial of his motion to dismiss. The department then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's administrative appeal, in which it claimed that the plaintiffs failure to exhaust all available administrative remedies deprived the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion because it determined that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy in the administrative proceeding. This appeal followed.
Because the defendants challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of this court, we must first address that claim. Gallant v. Cavallaro, 50 Conn. App. 132, 134, 717 A.2d 283, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 936, 722 A.2d 1216 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S. Ct. 500, 145 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1999).
The plaintiffs appeal arises from a decision of an administrative agency and is governed, therefore, by the requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. Under the UAPA, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reardon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 37 Conn. App. 694, 696-97, 657 A.2d 702 (1995).
In Reardon, this court determined that Reardon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, supra, 37 Conn. App. 697. While in Reardon, this court recognized that both Lewis and Cannata involved dismissal by the trial court pursuant to § 4-183 (a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the court nevertheless saw no reason why a failure to satisfy the requirements of § 4-183 (b) would require a different result. Id. The Reardon court stated: Reardon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, supra, 697-98.
Here, as in Reardon, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby concluding the plaintiffs right to appeal under § 4-183 (b). We agree with the rationale of the Reardon court that any right the plaintiff has to an interlocutory appeal will be lost if it is not now determined. We, therefore, reject the defendants' request that we overrule Reardon and conclude that the plaintiff has properly appealed from a final judgment. We now address whether the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs interlocutory appeal.6 We agree with the trial court that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy in his administrative hearing before the board with Superior Court review available pursuant to § 4-183 (j).7 Thus, an appeal pursuant to § 4-183 (b) is not warranted.
Section 4-183 (b)8 reflects the principle that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required except in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545, 558, 630 A.2d 1304 (1993); Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 420, 610 A.2d 637 (1992). Our Supreme Court has "recognized such exceptions only infrequently and only for narrowly defined purposes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 561, quoting Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346, 353, 542 A.2d 672 (1988).
The defendants do not dispute that the plaintiff satisfies the first prong of § 4-183 (b). The plaintiff asserts that he also satisfies the second prong of § 4-183 (b) in that "postponing the present appeal provides an inadequate remedy because the agency's decision adversely impacts upon an entrenched property right, [his] medical license, without proper statutory authority, thereby depriving [him] of due process." We disagree.
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