Doe v. Diocese Raleigh

• Decision Date: 07 July 2015
• Docket Number: No. COA14–1396.,COA14–1396.
• Citation: 776 S.E.2d 29,242 N.C.App. 42
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: John DOE 200, Plaintiff, v. DIOCESE OF RALEIGH, Michael F. Burbidge, Bishop of the Diocese of Raleigh, and Edgar Sepulveda, Defendants.

242 N.C.App. 42

776 S.E.2d 29

John DOE 200, Plaintiff,

v.DIOCESE OF RALEIGH, Michael F. Burbidge, Bishop of the Diocese of Raleigh, and Edgar Sepulveda, Defendants.

No. COA14–1396.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 7, 2015.

Copeley Johnson Groninger PLLC, Durham, by Leto Copeley, and Jeff Anderson & Associates, P.A., by Gregg Meyers, pro hac vice, for plaintiff-appellee.

Poyner Spruill LLP, Raleigh, by Andrew H. Erteschik, Charles F. Powers, III, and Thomas K. Lindgren, for defendants-appellants Diocese of Raleigh and Michael F. Burbidge, Bishop of the Diocese of Raleigh.

DAVIS, Judge.

The Diocese of Raleigh ("the Diocese") and Michael F. Burbidge, the Bishop of the Diocese ("Bishop Burbidge") (collectively "the Diocese Defendants") appeal from the trial court's 2 June 2014 order granting in part and denying in part their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, the Diocese Defendants argue that the adjudication of the remaining claims asserted against them would require a North Carolina civil court to impermissibly entangle itself in ecclesiastical matters and that these claims must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the First Amendment. After careful review, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Factual Background

On 12 November 2013, John Doe 200¹ ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint in Wake County Superior Court against the Diocese, Bishop Burbidge, and Edgar Sepulveda ("Sepulveda"). In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Sepulveda, a priest who was incardinated to the Diocese, sexually assaulted him on multiple occasions beginning in May of 2009 when Plaintiff was sixteen years old.² Plaintiff asserted that he was involved in youth activities at Sepulveda's parish and that Sepulveda had begun to "cultivate a special relationship with [him], and began to groom him for sexual assault by exhibiting frequent physical contact with [him] ... through hugs and embraces." Plaintiff alleged that the first sexual assault occurred when Sepulveda invited Plaintiff to spend the night at his home and that the second incident took place when Sepulveda, "using his stature as a priest," secured an invitation to spend the night at Plaintiff's home.

Plaintiff's complaint stated that he reported the sexual abuse in September of 2009, and, in response, Sepulveda was suspended by the Diocese. Plaintiff alleged that when he subsequently requested that the Diocese Defendants compel Sepulveda to undergo testing to determine whether he carried a sexually transmitted disease ("STD") that could have been passed to Plaintiff, this request was refused.

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted claims for assault and battery against Sepulveda and claims for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED"), and vicarious liability against the Diocese Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the Diocese Defendants failed to (1) protect Plaintiff from the danger they knew or should have known was posed by Sepulveda by negligently supervising him; (2) educate Plaintiff "about the proper boundaries a priest should observe as to physical touch"; and (3) compel Sepulveda to undergo STD testing and provide the results of such testing to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's NIED claims were likewise based on the Diocese Defendants' failure to protect him from Sepulveda and their refusal to require him to submit to STD testing. The vicarious liability claim against the Diocese Defendants was grounded in theories of respondeat superior, apparent agency, and the non-delegable duty doctrine. Plaintiff sought in his prayer for relief compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling Sepulveda to undergo STD testing.

On 24 January 2014, the Diocese Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). In support of their motion, the Diocese Defendants filed an affidavit from Bishop Burbidge setting out basic tenets from the Code of Canon Law, "the universal law of the Roman Catholic Church."³ In his affidavit, Bishop Burbidge explained that the role of priests, the relationship between a bishop and his priests, and the procedure for removing a priest from his clerical office are all informed by the Code of Canon Law. Bishop Burbidge further discussed policies and procedures that the Roman Catholic Church has enacted to ensure the protection of minors from sexual abuse.

The Diocese Defendants' motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Donald W. Stephens on 27 May 2014. On 2 June 2014, Judge Stephens entered an order dismissing (1) Plaintiff's vicarious liability claim; and (2) the portion of Plaintiff's negligence claim premised on the Diocese Defendants' failure to educate Plaintiff as to the proper boundaries concerning physical contact between priests and parishioners.⁴ The trial court's order denied the Diocese Defendants' motion as to the remaining claims asserted against them in the complaint. The Diocese Defendants timely appealed to this Court.

Analysis

I. Appellate Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, we note that the order from which the Diocese Defendants are appealing is interlocutory as it did not dispose of all of Plaintiff's claims.⁵ See Turner v. Norfolk S. Corp., 137 N.C.App. 138, 141, 526 S.E.2d 666, 669 (2000) ("An order or judgment is interlocutory if it is made during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case but requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the entire controversy." (citation and quotation marks omitted)). While a right to immediate appeal does not generally lie from an interlocutory order, appellate review of an interlocutory order is permissible if (1) the order constitutes a final determination as to some, but not all, of the claims between the parties, and the trial court certifies the order for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) ; or (2) "the order implicates a substantial right of the appellant that would be lost if the order was not reviewed prior to the issuance of a final judgment." Keesee v. Hamilton, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 762 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2014).

As noted above, the Diocese Defendants moved for dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint in the trial court on two grounds: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) ; and (2) failure to state a valid claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). The Diocese Defendants concede that the trial court's partial denial of their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) "does not involve immediately appealable issues." See Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 317 N.C. 623, 629, 347 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1986) ("A ruling denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A–1, Rule 12(b)(6) is ordinarily a nonappealable interlocutory order."). Therefore, the question of whether Plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to state a valid claim for relief against the Diocese Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) as to those claims left undisturbed by the trial court's order is not before us.

However, the Diocese Defendants do contend that appellate jurisdiction exists as to their appeal of the trial court's ruling on their Rule 12(b)(1) motion. It is this aspect of the trial court's ruling that forms the entire basis for this appeal.

It is well settled that an assertion that a civil court is precluded on First Amendment grounds from adjudicating a claim constitutes a challenge to that court's subject matter jurisdiction. Tubiolo, 167 N.C.App. at 326, 605 S.E.2d at 163 ; see also Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C.App. 666, 667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (explaining that "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question" and is conferred either statutorily or constitutionally).

In Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 643 S.E.2d 566 (2007), our Supreme Court addressed whether there is appellate jurisdiction over a trial court's interlocutory order denying a church's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the assertion that "a civil court action cannot proceed [against a church defendant] without impermissibly entangling the court in ecclesiastical matters." Id. at 270, 643 S.E.2d at 569. The Supreme Court concluded that the order was immediately appealable because the defendant would be "irreparably injured if the trial court becomes entangled in ecclesiastical matters from which it should have abstained." Id. at 271, 643 S.E.2d at 570. In so holding, the Court noted that "[t]he constitutional prohibition against court entanglement in ecclesiastical matters is necessary to protect First Amendment rights identified by the ‘Establishment Clause’ and the ‘Free Exercise Clause’ " and that "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Id. at 270, 643 S.E.2d at 569 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

As in Harris, the Diocese Defendants in the present case contend that the claims asserted against them in Plaintiff's complaint would require a civil court to delve into issues concerning "the Roman Catholic Church's religious doctrine, practices, and canonical law" in order to resolve the controversy between the parties—an intrusion that is prohibited by the First Amendment. See id. at 275, 643 S.E.2d at 572 ("[W]hen a party challenges church actions involving religious doctrine and practice, court intervention is constitutionally forbidden."). Consequently, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and proceed to address the merits of the Diocese Defendants' arguments. See id. at 270, 643 S.E.2d at 569–70 (" [W]hen First Amendment rights are threatened or impaired by an interlocutory order, immediate appeal is appropriate.").

II. Subject Matter...