Doe v. Doe

• Decision Date: 27 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. B233498.,B233498.
• Citation: 208 Cal.App.4th 1185,146 Cal.Rptr.3d 215
• Parties: John Me DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Defendant DOE 1 et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

208 Cal.App.4th 1185

146 Cal.Rptr.3d 215

John Me DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.Defendant DOE 1 et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. B233498.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8.

Aug. 27, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 2012.

Review Denied Nov. 14, 2012.

Law Offices of Anthony M. De Marco, Anthony M. De Marco, Beverly Hills; Jeff Anderson & Assoc., Michael Finnegan, Sarah Odegaard ; Kiesel Boucher Larson, and Raymond Boucher, Beverly Hills, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

McKool Smith Hennigan, Los Angeles, Lee W. Potts, and J. Michael Hennigan for Defendants and Respondents.

RUBIN, Acting P.J. Plaintiff John Me Doe appeals from the judgment dismissing his complaint against four Catholic Church entities for childhood sexual abuse by a parish priest in the 1980's after the trial court sustained the church entities' demurrers because the statute of limitations had expired. Because plaintiff alleged that he received psychological counseling paid for by one church entity's insurer, but did not receive notice of when the statute of limitations would run as required by Insurance Code section 11583, we hold that the statute of limitations was tolled, making the complaint timely. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2010, plaintiff John Me Doe sued four Catholic Church entities as Doe defendants, alleging that his local parish priest sexually molested him in 1987 and 1988.¹ Plaintiff alleged that he was born in 1975, and was between the ages of 12 and 13 when the abuse occurred. Plaintiff alleged that he did not discover that he had adult-onset psychological injuries that were caused by the childhood molestation until 2008, and that he first retained a lawyer that same year.

Plaintiff also alleged that the statute of limitations was tolled under Insurance Code section 11583 because in 1988, defendants Doe 1 and Doe 2 encouraged him and his parents to see a counselor for therapy to address the sexual abuse he had suffered, and that he attended one such session, which was paid for by Doe 1 and its insurance carrier. Plaintiff alleged that this therapy session, with a handpicked counselor who was sympathetic to the church, was part of a larger design to pacify the victims and shield the offending priest, whose activities were allegedly known by the church for some time, and who the church encouraged to flee before he could be arrested.

Respondents demurred to the complaint, contending it was barred by the statute of limitations because plaintiff did not sue in 2003 during the one-year revival period for claims that were barred under the previous statute of limitations. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subds. (b), (c).)² The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Insurance Code section 11583 could not toll the statute of limitations beyond plaintiff's 26th birthday, and that plaintiff missed his chance to sue during the one-year revival window for previously lapsed childhood sex abuse claims. The trial court then entered a judgment dismissing the complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant. Regardless of the label attached to the cause of action, we examine the complaint's factual allegations to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal theory. (Dutra v. Eagleson (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 216, 221, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 (Dutra ). ) However, the judgment will be affirmed if it is proper on any of the grounds raised in the demurrer, even if the court did not rely on those grounds. (Ibid. )

We do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact that may be judicially noticed. When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on that ground is proper. ( § 430.30, subd. (a) ; Dutra, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 221, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 788.)

To the extent issues of statutory interpretation are raised, we apply the rules of statutory construction and exercise our independent judgment as to whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1008, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 592.) Our first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature's intent in order to carry out the purpose of the law. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, no judicial construction is required. If the statute is ambiguous, the words must be construed in context in light of the statutory purpose. (Ibid. )

DISCUSSION

1. History of the Limitations Periods for Childhood Sex Abuse Claims

When the alleged molestations occurred, the statute of limitations for child victims was one year, which was tolled until the minor's 19th birthday. (Former § 340, par. 3, as amended by Stats.1968, ch. 150, § 1, p. 373, § 352, subd. (a); Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 960–961, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977 (Quarry ). ) The limitations period for actions against an actual perpetrator who was also a household or family member was three years if the victim was 14 or younger. (Former § 340.1, added by Stats.1986, ch. 914, § 1, pp. 3165–3166; Quarry, at p. 962, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977.) In 1990, the limitations period for actions against the actual perpetrator was extended in all cases to the later of three years from discovery that adult-onset psychological injury had been caused by the abuse, or the plaintiff's 26th birthday. (Former § 340.1, amended by Stats.1990, ch. 1578, § 1, p. 7550; Quarry, at p. 963, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977.)

Amendments to section 340.1 in 1998 and 1999 for the first time applied this extended limitations period to third party defendants—either individuals or entities whose wrongful or negligent conduct was a legal cause of the victim's molestation by the actual perpetrator. However, the limitations period was set at three years from discovery of the adult-onset psychological harm, with an absolute cutoff at age 26 regardless of whether such discovery occurred. The 1999 amendment revived all claims that had lapsed under the previous statute of limitations, but only as to victims who were still under age 26. (Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 965–967, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977.)

Effective January 1, 2003, the Legislature amended section 340.1 again, expanding the limitations period for certain childhood sex abuse claims against third parties to the later of the plaintiff's 26th birthday, or three years from discovery that the abuse caused adult-onset psychological injuries. This expansion applied to only a limited class of defendants, however: those who knew, or had reason to know, or were otherwise on notice of any unlawful sexual conduct by an employee or other agent and failed to take reasonable steps and to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct by that person in the future. As to all other third party defendants, the age 26 cutoff still applied. ( § 340.1, subd. (b)(2) ; Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 968–969, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977.)

This amendment also revived during the 2003 calendar year any claim for damages falling under section 340.1, subdivision (b)(2) that would otherwise have been barred solely because the applicable limitations period had expired. ( § 340.1, subd. (c).) The Quarry court interpreted this to mean that any plaintiff whose claim was time-barred as of January 1, 2003, had to sue during 2003 regardless of whether they had yet discovered a link between the childhood abuse and the adult-onset of psychological injuries. (Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 969–971, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 3, 272 P.3d 977.)

Therefore, unless some other tolling provision applied, plaintiff's claims became time-barred when he turned 19 in 1994. They were revived in 1999, but, absent tolling under Insurance Code section 11583, lapsed again when he turned 26 in 2001. At issue is whether they remained tolled after that time under Insurance Code section 11583, allowing plaintiff to take advantage of the newly expanded limitations period that went into effect in 2003, or whether they lapsed in 2001, obligating him to sue during the 2003 revival window that was part of that year's amendment of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.

2. Insurance Code Section 11583

Insurance Code section 11583 provides: "No advance payment or partial payment of damages made by any person, or made by his insurer under liability insurance as defined in subdivision (a) of [Insurance Code] Section 108, as an accommodation to an injured person or on his behalf to others ... because of an injury or death claim or potential claim against any person or insured shall be construed as an admission of liability by the person claimed against, or of that person's or the insurer's recognition of such liability.... Any person, including any insurer, who makes such an advance or partial payment, shall at the time of beginning payment, notify the recipient thereof in writing of the statute of limitations applicable to the cause of action which such recipient may bring against such person as a result of such injury or death.... Failure to provide such written notice shall operate to toll any such applicable statute of limitations or time limitations from the time of such advance or partial payment until such written notice is actually given. That notification shall not be required if the recipient is represented by an attorney."³ (Italics added.) The complaint alleges that plaintiff was not represented by an attorney when he attended the counseling session respondents provided, and that he was not given notice of the limitations period as required by ...