Doe v. Evanchick

Decision Date10 January 2019
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 16-6039
Parties John DOE I, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Colonel Robert EVANCHICK, in His Official Capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

James W. Porter, III, John Parker Sweeney, Amanda D. Warriner, Tara Sky Woodward, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Washington, DC, Jonathan Shae Goldstein, Britain Henry, Shawn M. Rodgers, Goldstein Law Partners, LLC, Robert McNelly, McNelly & Goldstein LLC, Hatfield, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Barry N. Kramer, Kathy Le, Office of the Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, John J. Herman, Office of Chief Counsel, PA State Police, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION

Slomsky, District Judge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION...201

II. BACKGROUND...202

A. Emergency Involuntary Commitment Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA")...202

B. Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act...205

C. MHPA Reporting Requirements to the Pennsylvania State Police...206

D. State Statutory Remedies...207

E. Plaintiffs' Section 302 Commitments...210

1. John Doe I...210

2. John Doe II...212

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW...213

IV. ANALYSIS...215

A. An Individual Committed Under Section 302 of the MHPA has a Protected Liberty Interest in the Right to Bear Arms...216

B. Defendant's Enforcement of Section 6105(c)(4) of PUFA Does Not Deprive Section 302 Committees of Their Right to Bear Arms Without Due Process...218

1. A Section 302 Committee is not Entitled to Additional Pre-Deprivation Procedures Before the Pennsylvania State Police Enter His Mental Health Record in the PICS and NICS Databases...219

2. PUFA's Post-Deprivation Remedies Adequately Safeguard a Section 302 Committee's Due Process Rights...223

V. CONCLUSION...227

I. INTRODUCTION

The parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment present a single issue: whether Defendant's enforcement of a Pennsylvania law prohibiting an individual who has been temporarily committed for mental health reasons from owning a firearm violates the United States Constitution by depriving that individual of his right to bear arms without due process of law. (Doc. Nos. 61, 65.)

On November 17, 2016, Plaintiffs John Doe I and John Doe II ("Plaintiffs") filed this procedural due process claim against Defendants Governor Thomas W. Wolf, Attorney General Bruce R. Beemer, Colonel Tyree V. Blocker, and the Pennsylvania State Police.2 Plaintiffs are individuals who attempted to purchase firearms for self-defense in their homes, but were prohibited from doing so by Section 6105(c)(4) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act ("PUFA"), which bans individuals who have been temporarily committed under Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MPRA") from possessing firearms. In this procedural due process action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to Section 6105(c)(4), alleging that it deprives them, and all other similarly-situated individuals committed under Section 302, of their right to bear arms without due process of law. (Doc. No. 1.)

Governor Wolf, the Attorney General, and the Pennsylvania State Police were dismissed from this action at the Motion to Dismiss stage. (Doc. No. 34.) Now, only one Defendant remains: Colonel Robert Evanchick ("Defendant"), who replaced Colonel Blocker as Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police. (Doc. Nos. 61, 65.)

On March 12, 2018, several months after the Court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the parties filed a stipulation in which Defendant Colonel Evanchick consented to substitute the original John Doe II with a new John Doe II. (Doc. No. 41.) That same day, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged facts pertaining to the new John Doe II. (Doc. No. 42.)

On October 29, 2018, the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 61, 65). On November 19, 2018, both parties filed Responses in Opposition to the respective Motions for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 69, 70). Finally, on November 26, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Reply to Defendant's Response in Opposition to their Motion. (Doc. No. 72.)

The Motions are now ripe for review.3 For reasons discussed infra, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) will be denied, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65) will be granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs mount a facial challenge to Section 6105(c)(4) of the PUFA. As such, they do not merely assert that Section 6105(c)(4) is unconstitutional as it applies to them; rather, they contend that, on its face, the statute denies every individual committed under Section 302 of his right to bear arms without procedural due process.4 (Doc. No. 61.) To address this contention, the Court will first set forth the relevant statutory scheme, and then discuss Plaintiffs' respective Section 302 commitments and mental health history.

A. Emergency Involuntary Commitment Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA")

In Pennsylvania, an individual may be subjected involuntarily to a temporary emergency commitment for up to 120 hours under Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA") if "the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment." 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302. This is known as a Section 302 commitment. Section 301, which defines persons subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment under Section 302, provides as follows:

Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.

50 Pa. Stat. § 7301. Section 301 also sets forth the standard for determining whether an individual presents a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself:

Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated.... For the purpose of this section, a clear and present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.

50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(b)(1). Under Section 301(b)(2), "clear and present danger" can be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days:

(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act; or
(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this subsection, a clear and present danger may be demonstrated by the proof that the person has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide; or
(iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that there is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless adequate treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this subsection, a clear and present danger shall be established by proof that the person has made threats to commit mutilation and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit mutilation.

50 Pa. Stat. § 7301(b)(2).

A Section 302 commitment is initiated in one of two ways. First, a "physician or responsible party"5 may make a written application to the county administrator "setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of medical treatment." 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(a)(1). Upon receipt of the written application, "the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant."Id. Second, "a physician or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county administrator may take such a person to an approved facility for an emergency examination" upon "personal observation of the conduct ... constituting reasonable grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment." 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(a)(2). If an individual is taken to a treatment facility without a warrant, the person transporting the individual must "make a written statement setting forth the grounds for believing the person to be in need of such examination." Id.

An individual transported to a treatment facility under Section 302 must be examined by a physician within two hours of his arrival to determine if he poses a clear and present danger to himself or others and if he is in need of immediate treatment. 50 Pa. Stat. § 7302(b). If the physician determines that the person is "severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment," the treatment shall begin immediately. Id. If instead the physician finds that there is no need for emergency treatment, or if at any time it appears that emergency treatment is no longer required, the individual must be discharged. Id. Additionally, Section 302 requires the physician to make a record of the examination and his findings. Id.

An individual temporarily committed under Section 302 must be notified of his rights. Section 302...

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