Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
| Docket Number | 1:01-cv-1357-RCL |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2022 |
| Parties | JOHN DOE 1, et al., Plaintiffs, v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I INTRODUCTION.......................................................................2
II BACKGROUND........................................................4
1. The Acehnese Conflict......................................................................4
3. Locations And Roles Of Indonesian Military Assigned To Arun Field........................10
III. LEGAL STANDARDS..............................................14
IV. DISCUSSION.......................................................................14
1. The Applicable Statute of Limitations....................................................15
2. Relation Back ...........................................................................18
3. Equitable Tolling ...................................................20
1. Standard for Determining Foreign Law................................25
2. Direct Liability for Negligence under Articles 1365 and 1366 .....................26
3. Indirect Liability Claims under Article 1367.................29
4. Applying These Causation Standards To Plaintiffs' Claims....................33
(i) Jane Doe I........................................................33
(ii) Jane Doe II......................37
(iii) Jane Doe III............................42
(iv) Jane Doe IV....................................................45
(v) Jane Doe V.....................................47
(vi) Jane Doe VI......................................53
(vii) Jane Doe VII.................................55
(viii) Jane Doe VIII........................................................ .......60
(ix) John Doe II.......................................63
(x) John Doe IV....................................................................66
(xi) John Doe VII.................. .....68
1. EMC's Vicarious Liability Under Article 1367 ................72
2. EMC's Direct Liability For Its Own Negligence.....................75
1. Indonesian Law Permits Recovery For Immaterial Losses...................77
2. Plaintiffs Have Provided Sufficient Evidence Of Cognizable Losses.....................79
1. Due Process Right To Cross-Examine Witnesses.............81
2. Defendants' Opportunity To Respond To Plaintiffs' Claims................83
V CONCLUSION..................................85
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs-eleven villagers from Aceh, Indonesia-allege that between 1999 and 2003, they (or their deceased next of kin) were the victims of human rights violations committed by the Indonesian military. Plaintiffs aim to hold defendants Exxon Mobil Corporation ("Exxon Mobil" or "EMC") and its subsidiary Exxon Mobil Oil Indonesia ("EMOI") responsible for the abuses inflicted by Indonesian soldiers providing security for defendants' natural gas operations.
The case comes before the Court with an extensive procedural history. The parties have litigated motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions for judgment on the pleadings, contentious discovery disputes, and appeals to both the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court. The record in this case is now closed. Plaintiffs' remaining claims, which are the focus of this opinion, are governed by Indonesian law and can be separated into two categories. In the first, plaintiffs aim to hold defendants directly liable for their negligence in hiring, retaining, or supervising the members of the Indonesian military providing security at defendants' operations. In the second, plaintiffs aim to hold defendants vicariously liable for the intentional torts-like assault, battery, and unlawful detention-committed by these same soldiers.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 819; Defs.' Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary J. ( ), ECF Nos. 818-1, 819.[1] First, they contend that there is insufficient proof linking the soldiers who engaged in wrongdoing to defendants and their activities. Defs.' Mem. 13-29. Thus, defendants argue, plaintiffs cannot prove causation. Id. at 30-34. Next, defendants allege that plaintiffs'claims fail because plaintiffs have provided insufficient evidence of "quantifiable loss." Id. at 30-34. Third, defendants state that even if the claims against EMOI may proceed, EMC is too far removed from the events to be held liable. Id. at 34-38. Fourth, defendants characterize these proceedings as a violation of then-due process rights warranting dismissal. Id. at 39-43. Finally, defendants assert that several of plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 43-45. Plaintiffs oppose. Pls.' Opp'n, ECF Nos. 826, 828. They concede a handful of the claims at issue, but otherwise reject defendants' arguments. Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment. Defs.' Reply, ECF Nos. 830-1, 832.
Upon consideration of the parties' filings, applicable law-including the prior decisions in this case, and the record as a whole, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' motion for summary judgment. A handful of plaintiffs' claims are time-barred. But with only limited exceptions, defendants' remaining arguments-about causation, quantifiable loss, EMC's liability, and due process-are entirely meritless.
II. BACKGROUND
1. The Acehnese Conflict
The facts of this case took place during a brutal civil war between a militant group seeking Aceh's independence and the central Indonesian government. Periods of conflict between groups seeking Aceh's independence and the central government existed since the 1950s-with major resurgences of the independence movement taking place in 1976 and 1989. See generally Defs.' Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute ("SOF") ¶¶ 22-27; Pls.' Counterstatement of Material Facts ("CSMF") ¶¶ 22-27.[2]
In 1989, the independence movement resurfaced, led by a militant group known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM. SOF ¶ 25. By the mid-1990s, GAM and Indonesian forces were engaged in a civil war in the Aceh region. Id. Then, in 1998, the President of Indonesia resigned, and there was a pause in the violence that lasted approximately seven or eight months. SOF ¶ 26. This peace was short lived. By early 1999-when the events in this case began to take place-hostilities had resumed. SOF ¶ 27.
Thousands of civilians were killed or injured during this conflict. See, e.g., CSMF ¶ 25; SOF ¶ 25. There is no dispute among the parties that, among other abuses, the Indonesian military executed villagers to deter them from supporting GAM, engaged in "routine" torture, and would punish entire villages for GAM attacks. SOF ¶ 29; see PX-36, Human Rights Watch 2001 Report at 15, 18. GAM also committed human rights abuses. See CSMF ¶ 29.
While defendants suggest that their knowledge of the Indonesian military's human rights record is immaterial to the issues raised in their present motion,[3] plaintiffs present evidence that defendants were aware of the Indonesian military's conduct. For example, in 1998, the editor of Business Week's Singapore Bureau investigated and wrote a story about atrocities committed by the Indonesian military in the early 1990s. See, e.g.,CSMF ¶¶ 176-80; RCSMF ¶¶ 176-80. These human rights abuses occurred near defendants' operations and purportedly involved defendants' equipment. See, e.g., CSMF ¶¶ 176-80; RCSMF ¶¶ 176-80. Contemporaneous State Department reports warned of wrongdoing by the military during the time period relevant to this case-several of these reports were even produced from EMC's records during discovery. See CSMF ¶ 182; PX-206; PX-208. And defendants' executives have acknowledged their awareness of the military's human rights abuses. CSMF ¶ 183; see, e.g., PX-18, Neil W. Duffin Dep. ("Duffin Dep.") 45:12-46:20, 191:7-12; PX-210 (risk assessment sent to executives describing recent detentions, killings, and torture by Indonesian military operating in Aceh).[4]
2. The Arun Field Natural Gas Facilities And The Indonesian Military's Security Role
In 1971, Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. ("MOI") discovered gas reserves in North Aceh, Indonesia. SOF ¶ 1. The government of Indonesia and MOI worked together to develop extraction facilities, which later became known as Arun Field. Id. ¶ 2. From the 1970s until 2015 MOI- and later EMOI (the Court will refer to these entities collectively as "EMOI")[5]-operated the Aran Field as a contractor for Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"), a 100% Indonesian state-owned entity. SOF ¶ 3, CSMF ¶ 3. There is no dispute that Aran Field and the connected remote locations where defendants operated with Pertamina were profitable, even while operating in the middle of war-torn Aceh. See, e.g., CSMF ¶ 185; PX-65 at . CA0001174655; PX-211, Defs.' 2008 Statement of Material Facts ¶ 20 (reflecting $295 million in earnings from these operations in 1998, and $500 million in...
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