Doe v. Gallinot

• Decision Date: 10 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-5658,80-5658
• Citation: 657 F.2d 1017
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary GALLINOT, et al., Defendants, Dale H. Farabee, Director of the State Department of Mental Health; Harry Jones, M.D., S. E. Stephens, M.D., and David Edwards, M.D., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1017

657 F.2d 1017

John DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary GALLINOT, et al., Defendants Dale H. Farabee, Director of the State Department of Mental Health; Harry Jones, M.D., S. E. Stephens, M.D. and David Edwards, M.D., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 80-5658.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 3, 1981.

Decided Sept. 10, 1981.

Paul D. Fogel, Deputy State Public Defender, Los Angeles, Cal., Joel Franklin, Deputy Public Defender, Monterey County, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.

Donald A. Robinson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WRIGHT, POOLE and NELSON, Circuit Judges.

NELSON, Circuit Judge:

Officials and employees of the California State Department of Mental Health appeal from the district court's decision declaring certain provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-Short ("LPS") Act ¹ unconstitutional on their face and entering injunctive relief. Under the relevant provisions, persons judged to be "gravely disabled" due to mental disease may be committed to a mental institution for 72 hours on an emergency basis, and up to 14 more days for involuntary treatment, with no requirement that the state initiate a hearing before an independent tribunal to determine whether adequate cause for commitment exists. We affirm the district court's conclusion that these provisions violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and further hold that the injunctive relief entered to enforce its judgment was within its discretion.

FACTS ²

This is a case in which a person with apparent mental problems was committed by well-intentioned officials in reasonable accordance with the LPS Act. ³

On February 27, 1975, Officer Gallinot observed appellee acting apprehensively in a hospital parking lot. After speaking with him, Gallinot determined he was unable to care for himself and had him transported to a nearby mental health facility.

There, a psychiatric nurse examined and interviewed Doe and concluded he was "gravely disabled." On her certification pursuant to the Act, he was committed for 72 hours and sent to Camarillo State Hospital. ⁴ While there, he received regular, large doses of sedatives and psychotropic drugs.

A staff physician certified Doe for an additional 14 days of treatment and confinement on March 4. Having been informed of his right to judicial review of the commitment decision by habeas corpus, he requested review.

Doe appeared in court on March 7 and again on March 11, when his writ was granted. He was released 14 days after his detention began.

Since then, Doe has been confined involuntarily pursuant to the LPS Act on six occasions.

He filed suit for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief in April, 1976. In September, 1979, on a motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the Those efforts were unsuccessful. They drafted legislation to amend the LPS Act which failed to pass both houses of the state legislature. Other efforts were also unavailing.

term "gravely disabled" was not unconstitutionally vague and that the lack of a mandatory hearing for persons certified "gravely disabled" violated due process. It provided defendants a chance to develop a satisfactory program.

In June, 1980, Doe moved for a preliminary injunction barring confinement of "gravely disabled" persons beyond the 72-hour period without a mandatory probable cause hearing. The court granted it ⁵ after a hearing and the injunction took effect on November 1, 1980.

DISCUSSION

The appellants press two challenges to the district court's action under review: first, that a mandatory probable cause hearing is not constitutionally required in connection with the 14-day commitment called for in the statute; and second, that the relief granted by the district court was inappropriate and beyond its jurisdiction. We shall address both contentions. ⁶

I. Requirement for a Hearing.

Involuntary commitment to a mental treatment facility implicates an important, constitutionally-protected liberty interest of the person committed. " '(A) State cannot constitutionally confine ... a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends' without good cause." Schlette v. Burdick, 633 F.2d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1980), (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2494, 45 L.Ed.2d 396, 407 (1975)).

The state may not infringe on this protected liberty interest without complying with minimum requirements of due process. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1262-63, 63 L.Ed.2d 552, 564 (1980). As the Vitek Court summarized the law:

We have recognized that for the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces "a massive curtailment of liberty," Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394) (1972), and in consequence "requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (99 S.Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d 323) (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (95 S.Ct. 2486, 2496, 45 L.Ed.2d 396) (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement.

It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" and that "(w)hether we label this phenomena (sic) 'stigma' or choose to call it something else ... we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual." Addington v. Texas, supra, (441 U.S.) at 425-426 (99 S.Ct. at 1809). See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (99 S.Ct. 2493, 2503, 61 L.Ed.2d 101) (1979).

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 491-92, 100 S.Ct. at 1263, 63 L.Ed.2d 564.

The appellants do not take issue with these basic propositions. They argue, rather, that the procedures spelled out in the LPS Act satisfy minimum constitutional requirements of due process. Appellants argue that habeas corpus review on demand adequately protects against erroneous 14-day certifications. Thus, they point out:

The statutory habeas corpus remedy provided by sections 5275 and 5276 guarantees a judicial hearing, with court-appointed counsel if necessary, to any person who either requests that a writ be filed or who simply indicates a desire to be released. The request may also be made by any person acting on behalf of the patient. Assistance of counsel is available for preparation of the petition. The hearing is required to be held within two judicial days after the filing of the petition.

The district court, however, found this procedure deficient because "the heavy burden of contesting the 14-day certification rests entirely with the patient." 486 F.Supp. at 988. The person on whom this burden rested would often be "under the effects of tranquilizing medication," leaving him to "rely on the hospital treatment staff or other hospital employees for an explanation of his rights and for access to the superior court." Id. While some procedural safeguards did exist in the Act, its provisions for notice and explanation of a detainee's right to counsel and a habeas corpus hearing

(did) not assure that a person will not be certified without probable cause. The State's determination may still be unreviewed. Habeas corpus is difficult to understand. The individual may not request a hearing because of the influence of drugs or great emotional distress.

Conditioning a probable cause hearing on the request of the individual reverses the usual due process analysis in cases where potential deprivation is severe and the risk of error is great. It is inconceivable that a person could be arrested on criminal charges and held for up to 17 days without a hearing unless he requested it. Even in civil cases where the deprivation is of property rather than liberty, the State must initiate the hearing and justify the deprivation....

The initial 72 hours of detention is justified as an emergency treatment. It is recognized that a probable cause hearing cannot be arranged immediately. This emergency commitment should continue, however, only for the length of time necessary to arrange for a hearing before a neutral party so that the existence of probable cause for detention may be determined.

Id. at 993.

Our review of the adequacy of the disputed procedures is guided by well-established precedent. As the Supreme Court noted in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2502, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17 (1979):

(O)ur prior holdings have set out a general approach for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim. Assuming the existence of a protectible property or liberty interest, the Court has required the balancing of a number of factors:

"First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative Reviewing the LPS procedure in light of the first two factors, we think that the district court's concern is well-founded. The private interest of individuals committed under the LPS Act provisions is substantial, because of both the "massive curtailment of liberty" and the "adverse social consequences" resulting from commitment. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-92, 100 S.Ct. at 1262-63, 63 L.Ed.2d at 564. The district court found, with ample support in the record, that commitment decisions under the LPS Act were highly error-prone, especially where review of those decisions depended on the initiative and competence of the persons committed. Statistics cited by the district court showed that a substantial number of...