Doe v. Grinnell Coll.

Decision Date09 July 2019
Docket NumberNo. 4:17-cv-00079-RGE-SBJ,4:17-cv-00079-RGE-SBJ
Citation473 F.Supp.3d 909
Parties John DOE, Plaintiff, v. GRINNELL COLLEGE, Sarah Moschenross, Angela Voos, and Bailey Asberry, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Andrew T. Miltenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Kara Gorycki, Pro Hac Vice, Tara J. Davis, Pro Hac Vice, Philip Arwood Byler, Pro Hac Vice, Nesenoff & Miltenberg, LLP, New York, NY, David Harris Goldman, Amy Kathryn Davis, Babich Goldman, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Frances M. Haas, Nyemaster Goode PC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Frank B. Harty, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTSMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

John Doe was a student at Grinnell College when, during his sophomore year, a fellow student reported Doe had engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact with her. Several months later, another student reported Doe had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her. Grinnell eventually investigated both reports, found Doe responsible for sexual misconduct, and dismissed Doe from Grinnell.

Doe claims Grinnell and Grinnell employees discriminated against him on the basis of sex during the disciplinary proceeding that led to his dismissal. He also claims various aspects of the proceedings violated Grinnell's policies and promises made to him by Grinnell employees. Doe has sued Defendants Grinnell College, Grinnell's former Dean of Students Sarah Moschenross, Grinnell's former Title IX Coordinator Angela Voos, and Grinnell's former Title IX Deputy for Case Management Bailey Asberry, alleging violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and negligent misrepresentation. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Doe's claims.

The Court holds Doe has demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether gender bias was a motivating factor that caused an inaccuracy in his sexual misconduct disciplinary proceeding. The Court also concludes there is a dispute of material fact regarding whether Grinnell substantially performed its contract with Doe. The Court thus denies Defendantsmotion for summary judgment on Doe's Title IX and breach of contract claims. As for Doe's promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims, the Court concludes there are no material facts in dispute and these claims fail as a matter of law. The Court thus grants Defendantsmotion for summary judgment on Doe's estoppel and negligent misrepresentation claims.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

In presenting the facts relevant to the Defendantsmotion for summary judgment, the Court first outlines the social climate at Grinnell at the time Doe was accused of sexual misconduct. Next, the Court sets forth Grinnell's sexual misconduct policy. The Court then recounts the sexual misconduct complaints brought against Doe and the subsequent disciplinary process that resulted in his dismissal. The following facts are either uncontested or, if contested, viewed in the light most favorable to Doe. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587–88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

1. Campus climate

Doe enrolled at Grinnell College in the fall of 2014. Pl.’s Br. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 129-1. In late 2014 and early 2015, a Grinnell student group called Dissenting Voices advocated for reform of Grinnell's process for handling complaints filed under Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex at educational institutions. Defs.’ Unsealed Resp. Pl.’s Statement Add'l Facts Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 16, 19, 23–33, 36, 38, 40–41, ECF No. 136; Pl.’s Unsealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 161–69, ECF No. 129-5; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The focus of Dissenting Voices's criticism was the treatment by Grinnell of alleged victims of sexual assault. Among other forms of activism, Dissenting Voices wrote opinion pieces in Grinnell's student newspaper calling upon Grinnell's administrators to make Grinnell a place "where sexual assault is taken seriously" and to more proportionally punish "students who commit violent sexual assaults." See, e.g. , Pl.’s Unsealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 170–79, ECF Nos. 129-5 &129-6; see also ECF No. 136 ¶ 31–33, 36, 38–41.

In March 2015, The Huffington Post published an article criticizing Grinnell's handling of Title IX complaints. ECF No. 136 ¶ 49; ECF No. 129-5 at P-APP 127–36. Shortly before The Huffington Post piece was published, Grinnell President Raynard Kington contacted the Office for Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Education and asked for assistance in reforming Grinnell's Title IX process. ECF No. 136 ¶ 48; ECF No. 129-6 at P-APP 182–83. That same month, Kington cancelled an interview with U.S. News and World Report , citing reservations about speaking publicly at that time. ECF No. 136 ¶ 55; Pl.’s Sealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 609, ECF No. 131-3. The Office of Civil Rights denied Kington's request for assistance. Pl.’s Sealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 485, Voos Dep. 75:25–76:4, ECF No. 131-2. Several months later, the Office of Civil Rights opened an investigation of Grinnell based on complaints from Grinnell students. ECF No. 136 ¶ 66; ECF 129-6 at P-APP 189–95. The case against Grinnell was eventually resolved and the students withdrew their complaints. Defs.’ Sealed Resp. Pl.’s Statement Add'l Facts Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 73–74, ECF No. 140-1; Pl.’s Sealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 1685–86, ECF No. 131-19.

2. Grinnell's Sexual Misconduct Policy

Three different versions of Grinnell's Sexual Misconduct Policy applied at different times while Doe was a student at Grinnell. Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Statement Undisputed Facts Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. ¶¶ 65–67, ECF No. 129. One version of the policy was in place in 2014, another version was in place in 2015, and a third version was in place in 2016. Id. ; see Pl.’s Unsealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 49–120, ECF Nos. 129-4 to 129-5 (the 2014 policy); Pl.’s Unsealed App. Supp. Resp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at P-APP 236–85, ECF Nos. 129-6 to 129-7 (the 2016 policy).1 Events relevant to Doe's claims occurred during times when each of these versions of the sexual misconduct policy applied.

Grinnell generally made changes to the sexual misconduct policy during the summer, between academic years. See Voos Dep. 21:2–5, ECF No. 131-2 at P-APP 477.2. However, in February 2015—at the time Dissenting Voices was advocating for reform—Grinnell updated its policy during the academic year. ECF No. 136 ¶¶ 34–35; see also ECF No. 129-5 at P-APP 141–44; ECF No. 129-7 at P-APP 347–49. Notably, Grinnell shifted from the use of "hearing boards" in adjudicating complaints to using an "external adjudicator." Compare ECF No. 129-4 at P-APP 95–98, with ECF No. 129-7 at P-APP 278–82. From 2014 to 2016, however, the definitions of sexual assault, nonconsensual sexual contact, nonconsensual sexual intercourse, consent, and coercion remained identical or substantively the same. ECF No. 129 ¶ 67; compare ECF No. 129-4 at P-APP 61, 63–64, with ECF No. 129-7 at P-APP 249, 251–52. The 2016 sexual misconduct policy governed Doe's disciplinary proceeding and thus is most relevant here. The Court will refer to the 2016 sexual misconduct policy as "the Policy" throughout.

The Policy defines sexual assault as "having or attempting to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact with another individual without consent." ECF No. 129-7 at P-APP 249. Nonconsensual sexual contact is defined as "[h]aving or attempting to have sexual contact with another individual without consent." Id. Similarly, nonconsensual sexual intercourse is defined as "[h]aving or attempting to have sexual intercourse with another individual without consent." Id. The Policy includes the following definition of consent:

Consent to engage in sexual activity must be given knowingly, voluntarily, and affirmatively. Consent to engage in sexual activity must exist from the beginning to end of each instance of sexual activity and for each form of sexual contact. Consent is demonstrated through mutually understandable words and/or clear, unambiguous actions that indicate a willingness to engage freely in sexual activity. Consent is active, not passive.... Consent to one form of sexual contact does not constitute consent to engage in all forms of sexual contact. Consent consists of an outward demonstration indicating that an individual has freely chosen to engage in sexual activity.... Consent may not be inferred from silence, passivity, lack of resistance, or lack of an active response alone. A person who does not physically resist or verbally refuse sexual activity is not necessarily giving consent.... Consent may be withdrawn by either party at any time. Withdrawal of consent must also be outwardly demonstrated by mutually understandable words or clear, unambiguous actions that indicate a desire to end sexual activity. Once withdrawal of consent has been expressed, sexual activity must cease.... Consent is not affirmative if it results from the use of threat of physical force, intimidation, or coercion, or any other factor that would eliminate an individual's ability to exercise his/her/hir [ ] own free will to choose whether or not to have sexual contact.

Id. at P-APP 251–52. It also includes the following definition of coercion:

Coercion is direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to persuade a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibility to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or acquiesce in an act to which one would not have submitted. Coercion can include unreasonable and sustained pressure for sexual activity. Coercive behavior differs from seductive behavior
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • United States v. Devries
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • July 16, 2020
  • Olson v. Macalester Coll.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • July 5, 2023
    ... ... , 831 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2016)). A plaintiff may ... show, for example, that a federal-funding recipient: (1) ... disciplined similarly situated men and women differently, ... see, e.g., Doe v. Dordt Univ. , 616 F.Supp.3d 872, ... 899 (N.D. Iowa 2022); Moe v. Grinnell Coll. , 556 ... F.Supp.3d 916, 929-30 (S.D. Iowa 2021); (2) held ... “[b]iases based on stereotypes about women's and ... men's sexual behavior,” Dordt Univ. , 616 ... F.Supp.3d at 899; Doe v. Grinnell Coll. , 473 ... F.Supp.3d 909, 927 (S.D. Iowa 2019); (3) ... ...
  • Moe v. Grinnell Coll.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • August 23, 2021
    ...about women's and men's sexual behavior may provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate sex bias in a Title IX adjudication. In Doe v. Grinnell College , this Court held a reasonable jury could find the college discriminated on the basis of sex. 473 F. Supp. 3d 909, 922 (S.D. Iowa 2019). The......
  • Doe v. Dordt Univ.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • July 20, 2022
    ...that gender bias was a motivating factor in the erroneous outcome of Doe's Title IX proceedings. See Moe, 556 F.Supp.3d at 933; Doe, 473 F.Supp.3d at 930-31; see also Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715; Does 999 F.3d at 578-79; Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d at 865. To start, a reasonable jury cou......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT