Doe v. Harlan County School Dist.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 99-508.,CIV.A. 99-508.
• Citation: 96 F.Supp.2d 667
• Parties: Sarah DOE and Thomas Doe, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, Jan Doe, Plaintiffs, v. HARLAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Don Musselman, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Harlan County School District, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

96 F.Supp.2d 667

Sarah DOE and Thomas Doe, on behalf of themselves and their minor child, Jan Doe, Plaintiffs, v. HARLAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Don Musselman, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Harlan County School District, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 99-508.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, London Division.

May 5, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Everett C. Hoffman, Segal Stewart Cutler Catlett, Linsay & Janes, David A. Friedman, American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, Kathleen M. Flynn, Sales, Tillman & Wallbaum, C. Laurie Griffith, Griffith Law Offices, PSC, ACLU Cooperating Attorney, Louisville, KY, for Jane Doe(s), Suing as Sarah Doe, John Doe(s), Suing as Thomas Doe, Individually, Jane/John Doe(s), Suing as Sarah Doe and Thomas Doe, on behalf of their minor child, Jan Doe nfr Jane Doe(s), plaintiffs.

Theodore H. Amshoff, Jr., Amshoff & Amshoff, PSC, Louisville, KY, Johnnie L. Turner, Johnnie L. Turner, PSC, Harlan, KY, Ronald D. Ray, Colonel, Cty. Sch. Dist., et al., Crestwood, KY, for Harlan County School District, Don Musselman, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Harlan County School District, Official Defendants.

ORDER

COFFMAN, District Judge.

This matter, which presents a First Amendment challenge to multiple displays of the Ten Commandments and other documents,¹ is before the court upon the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (No. 2), the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order (No. 4), the defendants' motion to dismiss (No. 12), the defendants' motion for a more definite statement (No. 14), and the defendants' motion to strike the affidavit of Sarah Doe (No. 16).² This court held a hearing on April 20, 2000 and, having reviewed the arguments of counsel and being otherwise sufficiently advised, will grant the plaintiffs' motions and will deny the defendants' motions.

Motion to Dismiss

For the reasons explained below, the plaintiffs have stated a claim for a First Amendment violation. The defendants also have raised two procedural grounds for their motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring their claims and that they were ineffectually served.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring these actions because they have not alleged "injuries in fact." The injury-in-fact component of standing requires a plaintiff to have a personal stake in the matter to be adjudicated. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The defendants correctly note that abstract or hypothetical injuries are insufficient. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). The plaintiffs in this lawsuit, however, have suffered and are under the threat of suffering concrete injuries.

In Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Sch., 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994), the court considered a challenge to a public school's display of a portrait of Jesus. A former student was determined to have standing because he would come into unwelcome direct contact with the display while visiting the school to attend sporting events or meet former teachers. Id. The court held that even a member of the PTA or of the public would have standing if she attended events in the school and "took the portrait as a serious insult to her religious sensibilities." Id. Like the plaintiff in that case, the plaintiffs here—a current Harlan County school student and her parents— have standing because they must come into contact with the displays of the Ten Commandments whenever they enter the Harlan County schools to attend classes, parent-teacher conferences, or other meetings. Their contact with the displays of the Ten Commandments is far more regular than that of the former student in Washegesic.

The defendants cite several Seventh Circuit cases holding that in order to have standing in an Establishment Clause challenge, a plaintiff must undertake a special burden or alter his or her normal routine to avoid the offensive object. In Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, Ind., 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir.1993), for example, the plaintiffs challenged the presence of a crucifix in their city's park. The plaintiffs' discontinued use of an area within the park conferred standing. Id. at 1417. Here, the plaintiffs have not specifically alleged that the displays have forced them to alter their normal routines. The necessary alterations would be highly impractical, however, because the plaintiff student in this action must attend her middle school, and therefore, the individual plaintiffs have met the standing requirement for their First Amendment claim.

The defendants next claim that they were not properly served under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Rule 4(j)(2) provides that a county may be served "by serving the summons and complaint in the manner prescribed by law of that state for the service of summons." The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure allow a summons to be served by mail. Ky. R. Civ. P. 4.01(a). Under the Kentucky rule, the clerk of court actually mails the summons. Here, the plaintiffs placed the summons in the mail themselves, and the defendants argue that the service was ineffective because the clerk of court did not place the summons in the mail. The federal clerks of court do not, however, place summons in the mail for plaintiffs. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit service "in the manner" allowed by their state counterparts —here, mailing. That the plaintiffs rather than a clerk of court mailed the summons does not render it ineffective. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied.

Motions for a Protective Order, for a More Definite Statement, and to Strike the Affidavit of Sarah Doe

The plaintiffs have moved for a protective order permitting them to proceed under the pseudonyms Sarah, Thomas, and Jan Doe. The defendants ask the court to order a more definite statement and to strike the affidavit of Sarah Doe based on the anonymity of the plaintiffs. For the reasons stated below, the court will grant the plaintiffs' motion and will deny the defendants' motions.

Generally, a complaint must state the names of all parties. Fed. R.Civ.P. 10(a). However, the court may recognize an exception to this rule and permit plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Several factors guide the analysis of whether a plaintiff's privacy interest substantially outweighs the presumption of open judicial proceedings. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir.1981); Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y.1996). These factors include: (a) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are suing to challenge governmental activity, (b) whether prosecution of the suit will compel the plaintiffs to disclose information "of the utmost intimacy," and (c) whether a child plaintiff is involved. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185. In this case, these factors justify the plaintiffs' anonymity.

Plaintiffs Sarah and Thomas Doe, adult citizens residing in Harlan County, Kentucky, are the parents of the minor child Jan Doe, who attends a middle school in the Harlan County School District. By challenging the school district's practice of hanging the Ten Commandments in classrooms, the plaintiffs are challenging governmental activity. The anonymity of the plaintiffs will not adversely affect the defendants. The plaintiffs seek only an injunction, not individual damages. Because of the public's interest in this issue, the plaintiffs may be subjected to humiliation and harassment if their identities are disclosed.

In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit held that the showing of possible harm, the risk of serious social ostracization based upon religious attitudes, and the fundamentally private nature of religious beliefs required that a child litigant remain anonymous. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185. Because this case also involves a religious matter, a child litigant, and a community which is highly interested in this issue's resolution, a balancing of interests justifies the plaintiffs' continued anonymity. Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to a protective order permitting them to proceed pseudonymously, and the defendants' motion for a more definite statement will be denied.

The defendants also contend that Jan Doe is not a necessary and indispensable party to this action. The court rejects this argument because as a Harlan County student, Jan Doe has daily contact with the challenged displays.

Having concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to proceed pseudonymously, the court will deny as moot the defendants' motion to strike the affidavit of Sarah Doe on the basis of her anonymity.

Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction preserves the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). To receive a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) that others will not suffer substantial harm if the injunction is granted; and (4) that an injunction will serve the public interest. Connection Distrib. Co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 288 (6th Cir.1998). These four factors guide the discretion of the court and are not unbending prerequisites. Id.

A party need not prove his or her case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830. The court must, however, make findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are not binding on a trial on the merits, United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 277 (6th Cir.1995), when deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court need not make specific findings of fact regarding each of the four factors if fewer are dispositive. G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1076 (6th Cir.199...