Doe v. Jindal
Decision Date | 19 August 2011 |
Docket Number | NO. 11-554-BAJ-SCR,11-554-BAJ-SCR |
Parties | JOHN DOE v. BOBBY JINDAL, ET AL |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") filed by plaintiff, John Doe, on August 15, 2010 (doc. 2). Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff seeks to prevent defendants, Bobby Jindal, Governor of Louisiana, and James D. Caldwell, Attorney General of Louisiana, from applying or enforcing Louisiana Act No. 26, set forth at LSA—R.S. §14:91.5, also known as the Unlawful Use or Access of Social Media Law, pending a preliminary injunction hearing. Plaintiff asserts that the Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §1331.
On June 14, 2011, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal signed into law LSA—R.S. §14:91.5, "Unlawful Use or Access of Social Media" (doc. 1, ¶ 8). The Act took effect on Monday, August 15, 2011 (doc. 1, ¶ 15). Pursuant to the statute, registered sex offenders who have been previously convicted of crimes involving minors or juveniles are prohibited from "[t]he using or accessing ofsocial networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks." LSA—R.S. §14:91.5(A)(1).
The Act, however, does not define "use" or "access," but does provide the following definitions:
(1) "Chat room" means any Internet website through which users have the ability to communicate via text and which allows messages to be visible to all other users or to a designated segment of all other users.
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Plaintiff, a registered sex offender1 , describes himself as:
a disabled veteran of the United States armed forces, a compliance officer and computer technician at a Louisiana company, an active member of his church, a board member of a local nonprofit that helps paroled prisoners transition to civilian life, a political blogger, a community volunteer and a Veterans Association member.
Plaintiff alleges that the statute not only bans affected registrants from Facebook and MySpace, but also "make[s] it a felony for registrants to browse the rest of the Internet" (doc. 1, ¶13). Plaintiff further alleges that, pursuant to the new law, he will no longer be allowed to legally access, inter alia: NOLA.com, CNN.com, FoxNews.com, ESPN, BBC or Reuters, NYTimes.com, Politico.com, Newsweek, The Economist, National Geographic, YouTube, Getagameplan.org (Louisiana's official hurricane preparedness website), Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, AOL, LinkedIn, Monster, USAJOBS.gov (the federal government's employment database), eBay, Zagat, Amazon, because they "offer a mechanism for communication among users" in the form of comments and content forwarding (doc. 1, ¶14(a); LSA—R.S. §14.91.5(C)(3)(b)).
Plaintiff asserts that, under the Act, will he will immediately suffer irreparable injuries in that: (1) his employment will be terminated as he will be unable to perform his jobs as a compliance officer and a computer repair technician; (2) he will have to shut down his online Veterans Association profile; (3) he will have to terminate his Gmail account, which will limit his ability to communicate with friends and family from the privacy of his own home; and (4) he will have to disable his blog, on which he regularly posts social and political commentary (doc. 1, ¶21).
Plaintiff, accordingly, filed the present motion for a temporary restraining order "restraining and enjoining Defendants and/or any of their agents,representatives, or anyone acting on their behalf from applying or enforcing Louisiana Act No. 26, set forth as La. R.S. §14:91.5" (doc. 2, p. 1).
"Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,' and should only be granted when the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion." Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1974)). "The party seeking such relief must satisfy a cumulative burden of proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction can be granted." Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). "Specifically, the movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest." Holland Am. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d at 997 (quoting, Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)).
However, jurisdiction "is a threshold issue that must be resolved before any federal court reaches the merits of the case before it." Perez v. U.S., 312 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 2002). A federal district court is a court of limited jurisdiction and can only exercise that jurisdiction which is statutorily conferredupon it by Congress. Margin v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 812 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1987). As the Fifth Circuit has noted:
Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 425 (5th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs have named as defendants in this matter only the governor and the attorney general of the State of Louisiana. Though plaintiff asserts that the governor of Louisiana is "responsible" for the execution of LSA—R.S. §14:91.5 (doc. 1, ¶ 6), plaintiff has not directed the Court to any provision of Louisiana law that empowers the governor to provide the relief plaintiff seeks through the present motion. Plaintiff does argue that...
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