Doe v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist.

Decision Date29 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. WD 73800.,WD 73800.
PartiesJohn DOE, by and Through Guardian Ad Litem, Yvonne SUBIA, Appellant, v. KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Application for Transfer

Denied Aug. 14, 2012.

Amy K. Maloney, Anne W. Schiavone, Kirk D. Holman, and Matthew J. O'Laughlin, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Trina R. Leriche and Sara B. Anthony, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division Four: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Chief Judge Presiding, ALOK AHUJA, Judge and DALE YOUNGS, Special Judge.

LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Chief Judge.

John Doe, by and through his guardian ad litem, Yvonne Subia, appeals the dismissal of his petition for damages against the Kansas City, Missouri School District (School District) for violating the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Chapter 213, RSMo.1 On appeal, Doe contends he stated a claim under the MHRA because the School District's failure to protect him from sexual harassment and sexual assault by a fellow student constituted sex discrimination that deprived him of the full, free, and equal use and enjoyment of the School District's elementary school, a public accommodation. For reasons explained herein, we reverse the circuit court's dismissal and remand the case to the circuit court.

Factual and Procedural History

Doe is a student at Swinney Elementary School, which is part of the School District. In October 2009, he filed a charge of discrimination against the School District with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“the Commission”). Thereafter, Doe received a Notice of Right to Sue from the Commission and filed a petition against the School District in October 2010. In his petition, Doe alleged that, beginning in May 2009, he was sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by another student on multiple occasions during school hours on school grounds. Doe asserted the perpetrator climbed under the stalls in the boys' restroom to commit the sexual harassment and sexual assaults.

Doe further alleged that school administrators, as well as the teachers and paraprofessionals responsible for supervising him and the perpetrator, had knowledge of the perpetrator's inappropriate and sexualized behavior and his aggressive tendencies. Despite knowledge of the perpetrator's sexual tendencies, school personnel permitted the perpetrator to use the restroom at the same time as other male students. Consequently, the perpetrator had the opportunity to sexually harass and sexually assault him. Doe contended that, as a result of the sexual harassment and sexual assaults, he has experienced emotional distress in the form of anxiety, fear, and depression, among other manifestations.

Doe asserted the School District's acts and omissions violated the MHRA. Specifically, he alleged the sexual harassment and sexual assaults occurred on the basis of his gender and constituted sex discrimination. He further claimed that Swinney Elementary School, as part of the School District, is a public place of accommodation, and that he was deprived of the full, free, and equal use and enjoyment of the school and its services by way of the School District's actions and inactions. Doe asserted that the school personnel were agents, servants, and employees of the School District and, therefore, that the School District was liable for their actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Doe sought compensatory and punitive damages.

The School District moved to dismiss Doe's petition. Following a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the petition on the basis that Doe failed to state a cause of action under Missouri law against the School District. Doe appeals.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim is de novo. Lynch v. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d 834, 836 (Mo. banc 2008). We accept the plaintiff's allegations in the petition as true, and “no attempt is made to weigh any facts alleged as to whether they are credible or persuasive.” Keveney v. Mo. Military Acad., 304 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Mo. banc 2010). Indeed, we construe the petition liberally and accord it ‘all reasonable inferences deducible from the facts stated.’ Lakeridge Enters., Inc. v. Knox, 311 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Mo.App.2010) (citation omitted). “The petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.” Keveney, 304 S.W.3d at 101.

Analysis

In Point I, Doe contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition because the MHRA prohibits student-on-student sexual harassment that rises to the level of sex discrimination in a public accommodation, and he pled sufficient facts to state such a claim under Section 213.065 of the MHRA. The relevant portions of Section 213.065 provide:

1. All persons within the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri are free and equal and shall be entitled to the full and equal use and enjoyment within this state of any place of public accommodation, as hereinafter defined, without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability.

2. It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation, as defined in section 213.010 and this section, or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability.

No Missouri case has addressed whether this statute covers a claim against a public school district for sex discrimination based on student-on-student sexual harassment.

Whether Section 213.065 covers such a claim is a matter of statutory interpretation. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislature's intent from the language used and give effect to that intent. Ridinger v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 189 S.W.3d 658, 664 (Mo.App.2006). We must interpret statutes consistently with the legislature's obvious purpose. United Asset Mgmt. Trust Co. v. Clark, 332 S.W.3d 159, 167 (Mo.App.2010). In ascertaining that purpose, we do not read statutory provisions in isolation but, rather, we construe the provisions of a legislative act together and read a questioned phrase in harmony with the entire act.’ Id. (citation omitted).

Additionally, in determining the legislature's intent, we must keep in mind that Section 213.065 of the MHRA is a remedial statute. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d 161, 166–67 (Mo.App.1999). “A remedial statute is one ‘enacted for the protection of life and property, or which introduce[s] some new regulation conducive to the public good.’ State ex rel. Ford v. Wenskay, 824 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Mo.App.1992) (citation omitted). As we noted in Red Dragon, Section 213.065.1's mandate—that all persons are entitled to the full and equal use and enjoyment of public accommodations within this state without discrimination—was enacted in the interest of the public welfare and is conducive to the public good. 991 S.W.2d at 167. Therefore, because Section 213.065 is a remedial statute, we should interpret it ‘liberally to include those cases which are within the spirit of the law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.’ Id. at 166–67 (quoting Wenskay, 824 S.W.2d at 100).

A Public School is a Public Accommodation

Section 213.065 prohibits discrimination in “any place of public accommodation.” Section 213.010(15) defines “places of public accommodation” as “all places or businesses offering or holding out to the general public, goods, services, privileges, facilities, advantages or accommodations for the peace, comfort, health, welfare and safety of the general public or such public places providing food, shelter, recreation and amusement[.]

The statute provides a non-exclusive list of the types of places, businesses, and establishments the legislature intended to include within this definition. § 213.010(15)(a)(f). Doe argues that Swinney Elementary School fits under the type of establishment described in Section 213.010(15)(e), which is [a]ny public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision thereof, or any public corporation; and any such facility supported in whole or in part by public funds[.] We agree.

Missouri law vests title and control of school buildings in the school districts in which the property is located. § 177.011. Thus, school districts own, operate, and manage the school buildings within their districts. Although the legislature did not define the terms subdivision and “public corporations” in the statute, Missouri courts have long considered public school districts to be both subdivisions of this state and public corporations. See Sch. Dist. of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382 S.W.2d 688, 697 (Mo. banc 1964); Kansas City v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930, 933 (1947); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Whittle, 333 Mo. 705, 63 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Mo. banc 1933); and Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Jackson Co. v. Bond, 500 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Mo.App.1973). We presume that, when the legislature enacted Section 213.010(15)(e), it was aware that judicial opinions had interpreted the terms subdivision and “public corporation” to include public school districts and intended the terms to be construed in the statute consistently with those opinions. State v. Harris, 156 S.W.3d 817, 823 (Mo.App.2005). Moreover, public school districts are supported in part by public funds from the state. See Mo. Const. art....

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