Doe v. LaFleur

Decision Date10 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-3290,98-3290
Parties, John DOE, Appellant, v. Gothriel LAFLEUR, in his official capacity as Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections; William Finney, sued as William K. Finney, Appellees. . Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

BEFORE: MCMILLIAN, HEANEY and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

MCMILLIAN, Circuit J.

John Doe, a Minnesota prisoner, appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granting summary judgment in favor of the Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections (Commissioner) and holding that the Minnesota Community Notification Act (MCNA) does not violate the ex post facto clause as applied to him. Doe v. LaFleur, No. CV 97-1936 (D.Minn. Aug. 3, 1998) (adopting magistrate judge's report and recommendation, id. (July 2, 1998) (hereinafter Report & Recommendation)). For reasons stated below, we dismiss the case.

Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction is proper in this court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a).

The MCNA permits notification of a convicted sex offender's release into the community to certain members of the public in areas where the individual is anticipated to live or work. The individual's classification as a level I, II, or III sex offender determines the scope and degree of the community notification. Under the MCNA, community notification is permitted regardless of whether the individual was convicted before or after the enactment of the MCNA, which became effective on January 1, 1997.

Doe pled guilty in 1992 to multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct involving minors. He served approximately five and one-half years in prison and was scheduled for release into the community in 1997, upon completion of a residential program at a halfway house located in St. Paul, Minnesota. Prior to his release from prison to the halfway house, he was classified as a level III sex offender (i.e., in the highest risk classification) for purposes of determining the applicable community notification standards under the MCNA. Doe challenged his level III classification administratively and, upon being denied relief, brought the present action in federal district court, alleging that the MCNA violates the ex post facto clause as applied to him.

While this matter was pending in the district court and Doe was still residing at the halfway house, he violated the rules of the residential program by having contact with minors and failing to account for his time going to and from work. Doe's supervised release was revoked, and he was returned to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence, which expires in May of 2000.

Notwithstanding Doe's return to prison, his constitutional challenge to the MCNA was not dismissed as moot. The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred explained: "Neither party believes that the issue presently before the Court is moot even though the Plaintiff has been reconfined to serve out his sentence. The Court agrees that, given the Plaintiff's eligibility for release in November of 1998, the issue is not moot." Report & Recommendation at 5 n. 3 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).

At oral argument in the present appeal, which took place on May 10, 1999, the parties confirmed that, as of that time, Doe had not been released from prison nor was he scheduled to be released from prison prior to the expiration of his sentence in May of 2000. We now hold that the present case is moot.

"Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies." "It is of no consequence that the controversy was live at earlier stages in this case; it must be live when we decide the issues." "Mootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)."

A moot case calls into question Article III's case or controversy requirement; therefore, we must first "consider and rule upon the mootness question this case presents." Further, if this case is indeed moot, we must refrain from reaching the merits because any opinion issued would be merely "advisory" and rest on hypothetical...

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    ...cognizable interest in the outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Doe v. LaFleur, 179 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir.1999). "The case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate." Lewis ......
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    ...... crimes. The Court has no authority to prosecute alleged. violations of federal law under these statutes. See Doe. v. LaFleur, 179 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1999). (“Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts. may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases ......
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