Doe v. Lee
Decision Date | 08 February 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 3:16-cv-02862, No. 3:17-cv-00264,3:16-cv-02862 |
Citation | 518 F.Supp.3d 1157 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Parties | John DOE #1, Plaintiff, v. William B. LEE, et al., Defendants. John Doe #2, Plaintiff, v. William B. Lee, et al., Defendants. |
Edward M. Yarbrough, J. Alex Little, Walter Justin Adams, Bone, McAllester & Norton, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Dianna Baker Shew, Gabrielle C. Mees, Miranda H. Jones, Robert W. Mitchell, Stephanie A. Bergmeyer, Tennessee Attorney General's Office, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.
Pending before the Court in these consolidated actions are the following motions: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against John Doe #1 (Doc. No. 73); and (2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against John Doe #2 (Doc. No. 79) (collectively, "Defendants’ Motions"). Pending also is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 66, "Partial Summary Judgment Motion"). Responses and replies have been filed as to each motion, and the motions are ripe for review. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will rule as follows.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against John Doe #1 (Doc. No. 73) will be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Against John Doe #2 (Doc. No. 79) will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 66) will be granted in part and denied in part.
The parties do not dispute the material facts in this case. Plaintiffs John Doe and John Doe ("Doe #1" and "Doe #2") (collectively "Plaintiffs") each brought a separate action against the Governor of the State of Tennessee and the Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") (collectively "Defendants"), each in their official capacity only.2 In their respective complaints, Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia , that the retroactive application3 of the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Violent Sexual Offender Registration Verification and Tracking Act of 2004 (hereinafter "SORA"), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201 – 40-39-218 (2018), (1) is an unconstitutional violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution,4 (2) violates the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, and (3) imposes oppressive restrictions in violation of the rights to parent, work, and travel under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment.5 The two cases have been consolidated for the purposes of case management, discovery, and pretrial motions.
In 1994, Doe #1 was convicted of two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery committed in 1990. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 17; Doc. No. 67 at 3). He pleaded either guilty or no contest6 to both counts and received five years’ probation. (Doc. No. 94 at ¶ 2).
Doe #1 is a retired airline pilot who currently runs a real estate development and rental company that owns various properties. (Doc. No. 94 at ¶¶ 1, 2). His business includes various properties located throughout Davidson County, adjacent counties, and a resort property in Honduras. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 4). In 2012, after Metro police officers told him he could not reside at his first residence, Doe #1 moved to another property that he owns. (Id. at ¶ 9). Although the matter with Metro was resolved, Doe #1 has not moved back to his first residence, and instead actively keeps an office at that location. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11).
Doe #1 has ten children. (Id. at ¶ 12). One of his children is a minor, and Doe #1 shares parenting responsibilities for that child with his ex-wife. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14). Doe #1 also has a number of grandchildren. (Id. at ¶ 26).
Doe # 2 was indicted on three counts of sexual battery committed in 1992 or 1993 against his ex-wife's niece who was twelve years of age or younger at the time. (Doc. No. 92 at ¶ 2; Doc. No. 95 at ¶ 1). He pled either guilty or nolo contendere (he does not remember which)7 to all counts of sexual battery in 2000. (Doc. No. 92 at ¶ 2; Case 3:17-cv-00264, Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 17). Doe #2 was sentenced to six years’ probation and was required to register as a sex offender under Tennessee's 1994 Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Laws, ch. 976. (Doc. No. 95 at ¶ 2).
Currently, Doe #2 operates an accounting services company and owns a residence in Nashville. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5). As part of his job, Doe #2 attends networking meetings and goes to client meetings at his clients’ offices. (Id. at ¶ 6). Doe #2 has one minor biological daughter. (Id. at ¶ 7). Currently, Doe #2's daughter lives with Doe #2's wife in Bowling Green, Kentucky, and attends school there. (Id. at ¶ 11). Doe #2 additionally has four adult stepchildren (who live in Bowling Green and Washington State) and three minor step-grandchildren. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14).
In the Court's Order denying in part and granting in part Defendants’ motions to dismiss ("November 9 Order"),8 Chief Judge Crenshaw set forth a helpful recounting of Tennessee's adoption and amendment of its sexual offender registration statutes:
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