Doe v. Lee
| Decision Date | 31 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:99CV0314 (RNC).,3:99CV0314 (RNC). |
| Citation | 132 F.Supp.2d 57 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | John DOE, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Henry C. LEE, et al., Defendants. |
Shelley R. Sadin, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT, Philip D. Tegeler, Connecticut Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, Hartford, CT, for plaintiffs.
Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Attorney General's Office, Margaret Quilter Chapple, Attorney General's Office, Employment Rights, Hartford, CT, for defendants.
RULING AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff brings this action challenging the constitutionality of the Connecticut sex offender registry act ("CT-SORA"), which requires registration by, and public disclosure of information concerning, persons designated as "sexual offenders." Plaintiff claims that the statute, commonly referred to as Connecticut's Megan's Law, deprives him of a protected liberty interest in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and, as applied to him, violates the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. Cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed on potentially dispositive legal issues regarding liability.1 The parties agree that two issues can be decided on the record presented at this stage: (1) whether the CT-SORA imposes a "stigma" on registrants for purposes of the "stigma plus" test used to establish a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause; and (2) whether the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.2
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the due process claim is granted essentially because the undifferentiated nature of the registry stigmatizes nondangerous registrants by grouping them together with dangerous registrants.3 Plaintiff alleges that he is not dangerous; the registry system alters his legal status (thereby satisfying the "plus" element of the stigma plus test); and the State provided no procedure to determine whether plaintiff is currently dangerous before including him in the registry. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ex post facto claim is granted because the legislature did not enact the CT-SORA with punitive intent and the law's effects are not so punishing as to render it punitive in fact. Because the parties have not yet addressed remedies, no ruling is made as to remedy at this time.
In 1998 and 1999, the Connecticut legislature revised the State's version of Megan's Law in ways that spawned this lawsuit. See Public Acts No. 98-111 & 99-183 (codified at C.G.S. §§ 54-250 to -261) (collectively referred to as the "CT-SORA").4
Under the CT-SORA, persons who have been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of enumerated offenses must register with the Commissioner of Public Safety ("Commissioner") within three days of their release into the community. All registrants must provide the same information: name, residence address, criminal history record, fingerprints, a photograph, and a description of such other identifying characteristics as the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") requires (such as scars and tattoos). If a registrant moves, he must notify the Commissioner in writing of the new address within five days.5 Registrants must also complete and return address verification forms sent to them by the Commissioner and submit to the retaking of a photograph at least every five years. Failure to comply with the requirements of the CT-SORA is a class D felony, punishable by up to five years in jail.
The statute applies to persons convicted of four types of offenses: criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor; nonviolent sexual offenses; violent sexual offenses; and felonies committed for sexual purposes. The burdens imposed on registrants vary depending on the type of offense committed. Some offenders are obligated to maintain their registrations for life,6 while others must do so for ten years.7 Registrants must complete and return address verification forms either annually8 or every ninety days.9
The DPS is required to maintain a central registry of the information submitted by sex offenders. On receipt of an individual's information, the DPS is required to provide it to local law enforcement officials with jurisdiction over the registrant's address.10
The DPS must make the registry available to the public in a number of ways.11 First, the central registry maintained at the DPS must be available to the public during regular business hours. Second, local law enforcement agencies must make the information that DPS has transmitted to them available during business hours. Third, the DPS is required to make the registry information available over the Internet. Finally, the DPS must annually remind the state's media that the registry exists and provide them with information on how it can be accessed. See C.G.S. § 54-258(a)(1).
An uncodified provision of P.A. 99-183 requires that any dissemination of the registry be accompanied by the following warning: "Any person who uses information in this registry to injure, harass or commit a criminal act against any person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal prosecution." P.A. 99-183 § 10.
Two narrow classes of offenders may be completely exempted from the obligation to register if a court finds that registration is not necessary to protect the public. See C.G.S. § 54-251(b), (c).12
The registry data of select other offenders may be restricted by court order to use for law enforcement purposes only.13 For any of these offenders, the court may enter an order restricting dissemination of registry information only after finding that public safety does not require general public access to the information.
Finally, a person's registration is suspended if he becomes incarcerated or civilly committed or takes up residence in another state. See C.G.S. § 54-257(b).
The DPS has a procedure in place to respond to challenges to the accuracy or completeness of registry information, but otherwise has no discretion in determining whether individuals must register. Moreover, none of the agencies involved in the registration process (i.e., the DPS, the Department of Corrections, or the Office of Adult Probation) conducts any individualized assessment of the public safety threat posed by an individual when deciding whether he must register.
The DPS Sex Offender Registry web site permits any Internet user visiting the site to search and display the information contained in the registry database. The database can be searched by last name, the first letter of a last name, a town name, or a zip code. Searching by a town or zip code provides a list of the names of all registrants living in that area.
Clicking on a listed name brings up a web page entitled "Registered Sex Offender." If the registrant has complied with the CT-SORA's requirements, there have been no technical difficulties, and the DPS has had time to process and post the registrant's information, this page contains the registrant's name, offense, current residence address, physical description and photograph.
At the time the parties filed their briefs, the front page of the web site included the following language:
This information is made available for the purpose of complying with Connecticut General Statutes § 54-250 et seq., which requires the Connecticut Department of Public Safety to establish and maintain a registry of persons who are required to register under sections 54-250 through 54-254 of the General Statutes. Those statutes require that certain individuals be included in the registry because of their conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a specified criminal offense and subsequent release into the community on or after October 1, 1988. The registry is based on the legislature's decision to facilitate access to publicly-available information about persons convicted of sexual offenses. The Department of Public Safety has not considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense with regard to any individual prior to his or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no determination that any individual included in the Registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data on the Internet is to make the information more easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific individual. Anyone who uses this information to injure, harass, or commit a criminal act against any person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal prosecution.14
Plaintiff is required to register under the CT-SORA. He alleges in the Fourth Amended Complaint that he is not a dangerous sexual offender and does not pose a threat to the safety of the community. Defendants contend that all the information on the CT-SORA web site regarding plaintiff is accurate and that he provided the information regarding his birth date, address, physical description, criminal offenses, and other identifying information. Plaintiff does not contend that any piece of data is inaccurate.
Plaintiff claims the CT-SORA violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To succeed on this procedural due process claim, plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the CT-SORA deprives him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest; and (2) that the procedures attending the deprivation are inadequate. See Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). To establish a protected liberty interest, plaintiff must satisfy the "stigma plus" test applied in the Second Circuit. See ...
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Young v. State
...easily be remediable." Id. at 100. A similar concern is reflected in the due process challenge to Internet posting mounted in Doe v. Lee, 132 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Conn), aff'd, Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2nd Cir.2001), cert. granted Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, ___ U.S. ___,......
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...neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history evinced a punitive purpose. Id., at 493–94, 825 A.2d 63 ; see Doe v. Lee, 132 F.Supp.2d 57, 67–68 (D.Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir.2001), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dept.......
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...same law that neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history evinced a punitive purpose. Id., 493-94; see Doe v. Lee, 132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67-68 (D. Conn.), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dept......
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U.S. District Court: SEX OFFENDER.
...v. Lee, 132 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Conn. 2001). A purportedly non-dangerous sex offender brought due process and ex post facto challenges to the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry Act. The district court held that the act violated due process since it provided no procedure to be heard prior to infr......
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U.S. District Court: SEX OFFENDER.
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