Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

• Decision Date: 05 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-6560.,No. 03-6261.,No. 03-6490.,No. 03-6517.,03-6261.,03-6490.,03-6517.,03-6560.
• Citation: 407 F.3d 755
• Parties: John DOE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants-Appellees. John Doe et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pam Miller et al., Defendants-Appellees. Keith Rene Guy, Sr. et al. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 755

407 F.3d 755

John DOE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

John Doe et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Pam Miller et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Keith Rene Guy, Sr. et al. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-6261.

No. 03-6490.

No. 03-6517.

No. 03-6560.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 16, 2005.

Decided and Filed: May 5, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED:

James M. Morris, Morris & Morris, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Sheryl G. Snyder, Frost, Brown & Todd, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellees.

ON BRIEF:

James M. Morris, Sharon K. Morris, Morris & Morris, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellants. Sheryl G. Snyder, David S. Kaplan, Frost, Brown & Todd, Louisville, Kentucky, Michael Harris Baker, Baker, Kriz, Jenkins & Prewitt, Lexington, Kentucky, Leslye M. Bowman, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Department of Law, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees.

Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; POLSTER, District Judge.^*

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

In 1969, Ronald Berry founded a summer program for disadvantaged youth called Micro-City Government. This program was funded in part by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG). Numerous former teenagers who participated in Micro-City Government now claim that LFUCG continued to support the program even after learning that Berry was sexually molesting them, and that LFUCG knowingly concealed Berry's conduct for political reasons.

These appeals arise from the plaintiffs' attempt to maintain a class-action lawsuit against LFUCG. Although several procedural issues are raised, the key issue is whether to vacate two orders dismissing earlier class-action lawsuits against LFUCG brought by Berry's victims. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court in Guy et al. v. LFUCG, No. 98-431-KSF, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

From 1969 until 2000, LFUCG provided funding for Micro-City Government, a summer program founded by Ronald Berry. The purpose of the program was to provide part-time summer employment for disadvantaged area youth. According to many of the program's participants, however, Berry physically, mentally, and sexually abused them, with the latest acts of abuse occurring in May of 1995. Berry was subsequently convicted on 12 counts of sodomy and abuse of minors in criminal proceedings brought by the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

The plaintiffs in the present case, 96 former Micro-City Government participants, claim that LFUCG knowingly concealed and facilitated the abuse. Specifically, they allege that LFUCG officials were informed of the abuse on a number of occasions, and that at least one LFUCG official actually witnessed "one of Berry's sexual outings." Nevertheless, LFUCG continued to fund Micro-City Government and is alleged to have actively concealed Berry's behavior. The plaintiffs further allege that LFUCG retained Berry as the director of the program even after LFUCG officials were aware of the abuse, and that at least one Mayor of Lexington refused to cut off funding or expose Berry because doing so would not have been "politically sustainable."

B. Procedural background

1. Guy

On October 15, 1998, the four victims who initiated the criminal charges against Berry (Keith Rene Guy Sr., Barry Lynn Demus Jr., Octavius Gillis, and Christopher Andrew Williams) filed a class action lawsuit against LFUCG, alleging that it had been both aware of and deliberately indifferent to the abuse. (This suit, Guy et al. v. LFUCG, No. 98-431-KSF, is hereinafter referred to as Guy.) But in January of 2000, before any determination was made as to the certification of the class, the Guy plaintiffs (with the exception of Guy himself) settled with LFUCG and joined in the defense motion to dismiss the case. On January 12, 2000, Craig Johnson and David Jones, two victims who were not among the Guy plaintiffs, moved to have notice of the dismissal provided to the putative class members pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This request for notice was rejected by the district court in an April 4, 2000 order that provides the following rationale:

Four named plaintiffs brought the instant case and Jones and Johnson moved to intervene. Considering that this lawsuit was filed in October 1998 and that there has been an enormous amount of publicity about the case, the Court believes that it is unlikely that many more alleged victims will come forward. Accordingly, the Court finds that the class is not so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Since the class fails to meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), notice to putative class members is not warranted.

As demonstrated by the later filings related to this case, however, the district court's reasoning was based on faulty assumptions. Nearly 100 putative class members came forward within two years after the district court's April 4, 2000 Guy order that dismissed the case. Guy, Johnson, and Jones all appealed.

As discussed in greater detail below, Johnson and Jones eventually settled. Guy's appeal, however, was considered by a prior panel of this court in Guy v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, Nos. 00-5434 & 00-5569, 2003 WL 133037 (6th Cir. Jan.15, 2003) (unpublished). The panel concluded that Guy lacked standing to pursue the claim with respect to the notice requirement. Similarly, the panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Guy to his earlier agreement to settle his case. It therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court in Guy.

2. Doe I

On May 3, 2000, Johnson, Jones, and seven other "John Does" filed a second class-action complaint that contained the same allegations as in Guy. (This action, Doe v. LFUCG, No. 00-166-KSF, is hereinafter referred to as Doe I.) Doe I was settled some two years later, on June 28, 2002. The district court again failed to provide any notice to putative class members when the parties settled, and the case was dismissed. No one, however, requested that notice be provided, and there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the district court even considered the applicability of Rule 23(e). Johnson, Jones, and LFUCG subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss Johnson's and Jones's outstanding appeal in Guy. The motion was granted by this court in January of 2003.

3. Doe II

On September 25, 2002, 38 John Does (who are included in the present appeal) filed a third class action case, making the same allegations as in Guy and Doe I, as well as various claims under federal racketeering laws. (This action, Doe # 1-33 v. LFUCG, No. 02-436-JMH, is hereinafter referred to as Doe II.) The district court, on April 23, 2003, dismissed Doe II as being barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

4. Discovery and attorney fees

At a scheduling conference in Doe II, the district court gave both parties 30 days to conduct discovery on the issue of whether the case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Although the Does did not initially object to the 30-day deadline, and even failed to depose certain parties "out of professional courtesy," they subsequently moved for an extension of time to conduct more discovery on LFUCG's alleged concealment of Berry's abuse. The district court denied the motion, noting that extensive discovery had already been conducted on the concealment issue and chastising the Does for "permitt[ing] the opportunity to depose the desired parties to slip through their fingers even as they held that opportunity in their hands."

After successfully opposing the Does' motion to compel during this discovery period, LFUCG moved to recover its attorney fees on that motion. The district court held that the Does' motion to compel had not been "substantially justified," and thus awarded LFUCG $5,841.80 in attorney fees.

5. Doe III

On the same date that Doe II was dismissed, 58 new John Does (who are also included in the present appeal) filed still another class-action case, again repeating the same allegations as in Guy, Doe I, and Doe II. (This action, Doe # 1-44 v. LFUCG, No. 03-12-JMH, is hereinafter referred to as Doe III.) Doe III was dismissed over a year later by the district court on November 21, 2003 as being time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

6. Doe v. Miller

The 58 new Does also filed a separate action, Doe v. Miller, No. 00-166-KSF, in which they moved to intervene in the earlier Guy and Doe I cases pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They contend that the lack of notice to the putative class members violated their right to the due process of law, making the judgments in those cases void. The Does' claims in Doe v. Miller were rejected by the district court in an order entered on October 7, 2002.

Three related appeals have arisen from this procedural morass. Doe v. Miller has been consolidated with Guy v. LFUCG. The third appeal is Doe v. LFUCG.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

1. Summary judgment

The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is proper where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The central issue is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must...