Doe v. Lincoln Pub. Sch.
Decision Date | 07 June 2021 |
Docket Number | 4:20-CV-3102 |
Parties | JANE DOE, individually and as next friend of JOHN DOE, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. LINCOLN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, is the mother of John Doe, and has alleged in her complaint a claim pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Filing 1. The defendant, Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), moves to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the defendant's motion at this initial stage of the proceedings.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For the purposes of a motion to dismiss a court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The facts alleged must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to substantiate the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim. See id. at 545. The Court must assume the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations, and a well-pleaded complaint may proceed, even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely. Id. at 556.
According to the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, between April 3 and 5, 2019, John Doe, and an individual identified here as B.A., attended the same LPS middle school. They were approximately the same age, and in the same grade in school. Filing 1 at 2. As part of an educational program, John Doe and B.A., along with several other students from the same middle school, took a trip to Washington, D.C. The trip was arranged, sponsored, and chaperoned by the defendant. John Doe, B.A., and two other boys were assigned to share the same hotel room. On the night of April 3, or in the early morning hours of April 4, while John Doe was asleep, B.A. made a recording of himself masturbating and ejaculating onto John Doe's face. Filing 1 at 2. B.A. told Doe what he had done the morning of April 4.1
The defendant's chaperones, some of whom were the defendant's employees, learned about the incident involving John Doe and B.A. on April 4. Filing 1 at 3. The incident was also reported to the defendant's administration in Lincoln, including the Principal of the students' middle school, no later than April 5. On April 8, the first Monday following the incident, John Doe was removed from all classes that he shared with B.A. On April 9, a person representing John Doe contacted the Lincoln Police Department (LPD) to report the incident. LPD responded by removing B.A. from school. Filing 1 at 3-4. Even with B.A. removed from school, the plaintiff alleged that John Doespent a substantial part of the 2019 spring semester completing coursework in the school's administrative office. Filing 1 at 3.
In the fall of 2019, John Doe and B.A. were both freshmen and planned to attend the same LPS high school. Filing 1 at 4. The defendant allowed B.A. to enroll in the same school as John Doe despite its knowledge of the April incident. B.A. was also allowed to participate in football camp prior to the start of the school year. B.A.'s participation in the football camp caused John Doe to not participate. Later, after B.A. transferred to another high school, John Doe started participating in football.
In pertinent part, Title IX provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Individuals whose Title IX rights have been violated have a private right of action. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
Here, the plaintiff alleges a claim of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment and sexual abuse constitute discrimination under Title IX. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). Peer-on-peer, or student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can rise to the level of discrimination actionable under Title IX. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). Recipients of federal funding are properly held liable in damages only where, with actual knowledge, they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be viewed as depriving the victim of access to educational opportunities or benefits that the school provides. Id.
The defendant's first argument for dismissal is that the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege facts showing that B.A.'s patently offensive conduct was "motivated by sexual desire." Filing 8 at 4. But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
Liability under Title IX cannot, however, be imposed absent evidence showing that an appropriate person had actual knowledge of discrimination, which in a peer-to-peer harassment claim ordinarily requires more than after-the-fact notice of a single instance that a plaintiff experienced a sexual assault. K.T. v. Culver-Stockton Coll., 865 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2017). But under certain narrow circumstances, a single-incident sexual assault may be pervasive for the purposes of a Title IX claim concerning sexual harassment. See Davis, 556 U.S. at 650; Doe 1 v. Howard Univ., 396 F. Supp. 3d 126, 136 n.2 (D.D.C. 2019); Weckhorst v. Kansas State Univ., 241 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1175 n.93 (D. Kan. 2017); Roe ex rel. Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2009); T.Z. v. City of N.Y., 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
The plaintiff's complaint does not contain specific factual allegations regarding whether the defendant had prior knowledge that B.A. had a history of similar behavior, or was at risk for the kind of conduct that the plaintiff alleged occurred only on the night of April 3. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to anticipate that discovery may (or may not) lead to evidence substantiating the necessary elements of this aspect of the plaintiff's claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. Dismissal of the complaint is not an appropriate disposition at this pre-discovery stage of the proceedings.
The plaintiff's complaint, as well as her argument responding to the defendant's motion, seem more focused on the defendant's response, or the absence of a response, to B.A.'s conduct. According to the plaintiff, the defendant's response after obtaining actual knowledge of B.A.'s conduct subjected John Doe to further harassment. Filing 9 at 5-7. The question then becomes whether the defendant's response reflects a deliberate indifference to sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be viewed as depriving John Doe of access to educational opportunities or benefits that the defendant provides. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
A funding recipient such as the defendant, who does not directly engage in harassment, may not be liable for damages unless its deliberate indifference, at a minimum, causes a student such as John Doe, to undergo harassment or makes the student liable or vulnerable to it. Id. at 644-45. The defendant here could be deemed deliberately indifferent to B.A.'s alleged act of student-on-student harassment only if its response to the harassment, or lack thereof, was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Id. at 648; Roohbakhsh v. Bd. of Tr. of Neb. State Coll., 409 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 2019).
The injury in a Title IX action is a denial of an equal educational opportunity. Farmer v. Kansas St. Uni., 918 F.3d 1094, 1105 (10th Cir. 2019). It is not necessary to allege physical exclusion to plead that a student has been deprived of an educational opportunity due to the actions of another student. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. But the alleged harassment must have had a concrete, negative effect on the student/victim's education or access to school-related resources. Id. at 654.
The plaintiff listed several of the defendant's alleged actions, or inactions, which she asserts are clearly unreasonable and deliberatelyindifferent. Filing 1 at 5-7. The plaintiff's list included inactions that have little discernable connection to John Doe's education or access to school-related resources. For example, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant failed to promptly and equitably resolve her complaint, failed to immediately contact her upon learning about the incident, and failed to contact law enforcement. The Court understands how these alleged inactions cause concern, but the plaintiff does not allege facts showing that these alleged inactions led to a concrete negative effect on John Doe's education or access to school-related resources.
The plaintiff's list also identified actions, or inactions, that are connected to John Doe's education or access to education outside of school and the classroom environment. In this regard, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant allowed or required John Doe to stay in the same hotel room with B.A. the night after the incident, and failed to ask the plaintiff whether John Doe and B.A. should stay in the same room the day after the incident. Filing 1 at 5-6. The options for separating John Doe and B.A. while on the trip were likely limited. However,...
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