Doe v. LYFT, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-19-1328,1-19-1328 |
| Citation | 176 N.E.3d 863,448 Ill.Dec. 326,2020 IL App (1st) 191328 |
| Parties | Jane DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LYFT, INC. ; Angelo Mccoy; and Sterling Infosystems, Inc., d/b/a Sterling Talent Solutions, Defendants (Lyft, Inc., Defendant-Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
J. Timothy Eaton, Jonathan B. Amarilio, Allison E. Czerniak, and Ioana M. Guset, of Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, and Timothy S. Tomasik, Patrick J. Giese, and Patrick M. Grim, of Tomasik Kotin Kasserman, LLC, both of Chicago, for appellant.
Anthony J. Carballo and Martin Syvertsen, of Freeborn & Peters, LLP, of Chicago, and Beth A. Stewart (pro hac vice), of Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Leslie J. Rosen, of Leslie J. Rosen Attorney at Law, PC, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
Joshua D. Yount, of Mayer Brown LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.
¶ 1 This appeal presents two questions certified by the trial court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017) regarding the scope and constitutionality of section 25(e) of the Transportation Network Providers Act (or Act) ( 625 ILCS 57/25(e) (West 2018)), which declares that ridesharing companies like Uber and Lyft (called transportation network companies or TNCs under the statute) "are not common carriers, *** as defined by applicable State law." Under the common law, a common carrier owes its passengers the highest duty of care and is subject to vicarious liability if its agent commits an intentional tort against a passenger, even if the agent's conduct falls outside the scope of the agency relationship. The questions we address here are (1) whether section 25(e) exempts ridesharing companies from the heightened duty of care and standard of vicarious liability that apply to common carriers and (2) if so, whether section 25(e) violates the Illinois Constitution's ban on special legislation ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13 ) or whether the Act itself was passed in violation of the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8 (d)). For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative.
¶ 3 Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) is a ridesharing company that provides an alternative to traditional taxicab service. It operates an on-demand transportation network that uses a smartphone application (or "app") to connect individuals in search of rides with drivers willing to provide them using their personal vehicles. In July 2017, after an evening out with friends, plaintiff Jane Doe used the Lyft app on her smartphone to hail a ride home.1 The app matched Doe with Angelo McCoy, a driver in the Lyft network. A short time later, McCoy arrived at Doe's location, and Doe got in the back seat of McCoy's vehicle. At some point during the ride, Doe fell asleep. McCoy then drove to a secluded alley, where he brandished a knife, zip-tied Doe's hands, and repeatedly sexually assaulted her. After the attack, McCoy drove away with Doe still in the back seat of his vehicle. Doe eventually escaped when McCoy stopped briefly for a traffic light.
¶ 4 Doe sued McCoy, Lyft, and Sterling Infosystems, Inc. (Sterling), the company Lyft uses to conduct background checks of its drivers. Doe's complaint included claims of assault and battery and false imprisonment against McCoy and a claim of negligence against Sterling. As to Lyft, Doe alleged that it was directly liable for negligently hiring, retaining, and supervising McCoy and for fraudulently representing itself as a safe transportation option. (Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.) Doe also alleged that, as McCoy's principal or employer, Lyft was vicariously liable for his intentional torts against her.
¶ 5 Lyft moved to dismiss the vicarious liability claims as legally insufficient under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018) ). It acknowledged that a principal or employer may be held vicariously liable for its agent's or employee's conduct if the conduct fell within the scope of the agency or employment relationship.2 See Wilson v. Edward Hospital , 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18, 367 Ill.Dec. 243, 981 N.E.2d 971. But Lyft argued that it cannot be held vicariously liable for McCoy's attack on Doe because acts of sexual assault, as a matter of law, fall outside the scope of an agency or employment relationship. See Doe v. Lawrence Hall Youth Services , 2012 IL App (1st) 103758, ¶ 30, 358 Ill.Dec. 867, 966 N.E.2d 52.
¶ 6 In response, Doe argued that Lyft can be held vicariously liable for its agent's or employee's intentional tort against a passenger, even if the relevant conduct fell outside the scope of the agency or employment relationship, because Lyft is a common carrier that owes its passengers a heightened and nondelegable duty of care. See Dennis v. Pace Suburban Bus Service , 2014 IL App (1st) 132397, ¶¶ 13-16, 385 Ill.Dec. 527, 19 N.E.3d 85. Doe argued that, like a traditional taxicab company, Lyft is a common carrier because it provides transportation services to the general public. See Browne v. SCR Medical Transportation Services, Inc. , 356 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646, 292 Ill.Dec. 594, 826 N.E.2d 1030 (2005) ; Anderson v. Yellow Cab Co. , 28 Ill. App. 3d 656, 657, 329 N.E.2d 278 (1975) ().
¶ 7 Even if Lyft is not a common carrier, Doe argued, it should nonetheless be held to the same standard of care as a common carrier. Doe noted that the heightened duty of care and principles of vicarious liability applicable to common carriers have been extended to non-common carrier school bus operators on the ground that they perform the same basic function and exercise the same control over their passengers' safety as common carriers. See Green v. Carlinville Community Unit School District No. 1 , 381 Ill. App. 3d 207, 214, 320 Ill.Dec. 307, 887 N.E.2d 451 (2008) ; Doe v. Sanchez , 2016 IL App (2d) 150554, ¶¶ 27-35, 402 Ill.Dec. 697, 52 N.E.3d 618. The same considerations, Doe argued, support the extension of common carrier liability to ridesharing companies, such as Lyft, even if they are not otherwise deemed common carriers.
¶ 8 In reply, Lyft invoked section 25(e) of the Transportation Network Providers Act, which declares that transportation network companies (or TNCs) and their drivers "are not common carriers, contract carriers or motor carriers, as defined by applicable State law, nor do they provide taxicab or for-hire vehicle service." 625 ILCS 57/25(e) (West 2018). .) In light of section 25(e), Lyft argued, it is not a common carrier as a matter of law and thus not subject to the standards of liability applicable to common carriers, including vicarious liability for the torts of its agents, such as sexual assault, that fall outside the scope of the agency relationship.
¶ 9 Lyft argued that section 25(e) would be rendered meaningless if ridesharing companies could be treated as though they were common carriers for liability purposes despite that section's declaration that they are not common carriers. Regardless, Lyft argued, the decisions in Green and Sanchez extending common carrier standards of liability to non-common carrier school bus operators rest on the unique safety concerns presented by the transportation of school children and do not support the extension of common carrier liability to other non-common carriers.
¶ 10 In a surreply, Doe argued that section 25(e) is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, she argued that section 25(e) violates the Illinois Constitution's ban on special legislation because it arbitrarily treats ridesharing companies more favorably than similarly situated entities such as taxicab companies. Second, Doe argued that in passing the Transportation Network Providers Act, including section 25(e), the General Assembly did not adhere to the Illinois Constitution's three-readings rule, which mandates that "[a] bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house" before passage. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8 (d).
¶ 11 After hearing oral argument, the circuit court issued a written opinion dismissing Doe's vicarious liability claims without prejudice. The court recognized that a common carrier may be held vicariously liable for an intentional tort committed by its agent against a passenger even if the agent's conduct fell outside the scope of the agency relationship. And the court noted that, absent section 25(e), ridesharing companies would likely be deemed common carriers. But the court concluded that section 25(e) plainly exempts ridesharing companies from common carrier status, meaning that Lyft may not be deemed a common carrier as a matter of law. And treating Lyft as though it were a common carrier, the court explained, would undermine the legislative intent of section 25(e).
¶ 12 The circuit court next addressed Doe's constitutional challenges. In rejecting her special legislation challenge, the court held that section 25(e) does not arbitrarily discriminate between ridesharing companies and their competitors. Although the court recognized that one purpose of the Transportation Network Providers Act is to ensure the safety of ridesharing passengers, the court found that section 25(e)'s exemption of ridesharing companies from common carrier status...
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