Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3:11-CV-00291 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | JOHN DOE, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENT, JANE DOE, Plaintiff, v. EAST LYME BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant, KOTIN, CRABTREE, & STRONG LLP, Intervenor. |
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS TO APPORTION THE FEE AWARD, NULLIFY OR REDUCE THE ATTORNEY'S CHARGING LIEN, AWARD PRO SE FEES AND COSTS, AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
This case is brought by Plaintiff John Doe, by and through his parent Plaintiff Jane Doe, against Defendant East Lyme Board of Education for violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The Court found that Defendant had failed to provide John Doe with required services during the pendency of the case and awarded Ms. Doe her out-of-pocket expense for those services, a prospective compensatory education award, and attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiff Ms. Doe has filed several motions seeking to revisit the attorneys' fee award and prospective award. Plaintiff has moved [Doc. # 309] to “nullify and to void” the attorneys' charging lien her former counsel, Intervenor Kotin, Crabtree, & Strong LLP (“KCS”), has against the Court's fee award. She has also moved [Doc. # 311] to “articulate a division of any fee and cost award and to articulate a reasonable fee” in light of IDEA's feeshifting provision and moved[1] [Doc. # 347] for the “division of the attorneys' fee and cost award and for pro se costs.” Separately, Plaintiff moves [Doc. # 369] for Defendant to pay her pro se costs for her second and third appeals. Finally, Plaintiff moves [Doc. # 381] to supplement the record regarding the prospective award.
For the reasons articulated below, Plaintiff's motions are DENIED and KSC's motion to disregard portions of Plaintiff's reply is GRANTED.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and history of this case. The pertinent details are as follows. The Court found that Defendant had violated IDEA by failing to offer John Doe an individualized education plan (“IEP”), but Plaintiffs were not entitled to relief for this violation because the school that Ms. Doe placed John at was not an appropriate placement under IDEA. Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Ed., No. 3:11cv291, 2020 WL 7078727, *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 3, 2020). The Court also found that Defendant violated Plaintiff's “stay-put” rights under IDEA, which require that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section . . . the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.” Id. Following a partial remand from the Second Circuit, the Court ordered Defendant to reimburse Ms. Doe's out-of-pocket expenses for services that should have been provided by the Board during the pendency of proceedings and “place $203,478.101 for compensatory education into an escrow account for John Doe, to remain open for six years or until John graduates college, whichever occurs first” (“the prospective award”). Id. at *1.
KCS represented Plaintiff before this Court throughout this case. The total amount charged by KCS to Plaintiff is $758,133.92, of which $274,465.12 has already been paid. (Id. at 5.) Attorney Lawrence Joseph, who is not affiliated with KCS and represented Plaintiff in her first appeal, Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Ed., 962 F.3d 649 658 (“Doe I”), charged Plaintiff $60,000, all of which has been paid. (Pl.'s Mot. for Pro Se Costs (“Pl.'s Mot. 369”) [Doc. # 369] at 2 n.5.) Plaintiff has also incurred $4,780 in costs in her second and third appeals, Doe v. E. Lyme Board of Education, 747 Fed.Appx. 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Doe II”) and Doe v. East Lyme Board of Education, 962 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Doe III”). (Id. at 2.) On March 17, 2020, the Court awarded [Doc. # 301] Plaintiff $537,728.82 for attorneys' fees and costs.
Plaintiff has moved “to articulate how any fee award is to be divided and what is the effective ceiling on a reasonable fee award” (Pl.'s Mot. to Articulate Fee and Cost Award (“Pl.'s Mot. 311”) [Doc. # 311] at 1)[2] and to divide the fee award between Plaintiff and KCS (Pl.'s Mot. for Division of Fees and Costs Award and for Pro Se Costs (“Pl.'s Mot. 347”) [Doc. # 347] at 1). The Court construes Plaintiff's motions, which ask the Court to alter the substance of its judgment, to be Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend judgment. which may be done “to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”[3] Munafo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 381 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 2004). There are “classically four grounds” upon which a motion to amend may be granted: “to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based,” “so that the moving party may present newly discovered evidence or previously unavailable evidence,” “to prevent manifest injustice,” and “an intervening change in controlling law.” Schwartz v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 492 F.Supp.2d 308, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Furthermore, Rule 59(e) “ may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008).
Plaintiff first argues that the Court's reduction of KCS' requested fees was impermissible under IDEA. (Pl.'s Mot. 311 at 2.) Plaintiff bases her argument on 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G), which states that the reductions in attorney's fees outlined in § 1415(i)(3)(F) are not permitted “if the court finds that . . . there was a violation of [section 1415].” (Pl.'s Mot. 311 at 2-3.) As Defendant violated Plaintiff's stay-put rights, Doe v. East Lyme Board of Education, No. 3:11 CV 291(JBA), 2012 WL 4344304, *20 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2012), which are set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in reducing the attorney's fees award below the actual amount billed. (Pl.'s Mot. 311 at 2-3.) KCS opposes Plaintiff's interpretation of § 1415, arguing that IDEA only requires the reimbursement of reasonable fees, rather than all fees expended. (KCS' Consolidated Opp'n at 8-9.)
Plaintiff's objection to the Court's fee award is misplaced. IDEA does not require that litigation be “free to a prevailing party.” (Pl.'s Mot. 347 at 25.) While IDEA requires states, through their state and local education agencies, to provide a free and appropriate education to all children, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), it provides only for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). Plaintiff is correct that this divergence means a free education may nonetheless require an outlay of unreimbursed legal costs by parents, (Pl.'s Mot. 347 at 25), but that may be what the statute provides in some instances. Second, subparagraph G governs the fee reductions in subparagraph F; subparagraph G “does not mandate that the district court abandon its discretion to ensure that fees are reasonable.” M.M. v. N.Y. City. Dep't of Ed., 20 Civ. 6915 (ER), 2022 WL 3043218, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2022). As the Sixth Circuit explained in Somberg v. Utica Comm. Sch., 908 F.3d 162, 181 (6th Cir. 2018):
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) . . . -the provision enumerating the circumstances that warrant an award of attorney fees- specifically says that, in those circumstances, the court may award reasonable attorney fees in its discretion. If a court determines, therefore, that fees are warranted under subparagraph (B), then it may award only reasonable fees. One way for a court to ensure that fees are reasonable is to reduce the suggested award if the amount requested is found to be unreasonable. Subparagraph (G), when found applicable, does not mandate that the district court abandon its discretion to ensure that fees are reasonable.
The Court's reductions to Plaintiff's fee award from the amount billed by KCS were not based on subparagraph F but were instead based on the Court's obligation under subparagraphs B and C to only award reasonable fees and costs. (Ruling on Pl.'s Second Mot. for Att'y's Fees [Doc. # 291] at 9-10.) Thus, awarding less than the billed fees was proper.
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the Court should apportion the Court's fee award so that she is reimbursed for all fees and costs she paid and KCS receives the remaining portion of the fee award, asserting that this division is necessary in order to fulfill IDEA's guarantee of a free education. (Pl.'s Mot. 311 at 2.) Essentially, she is requesting that the Court apportion the award so KCS, not Plaintiff, bears the shortfall between the Court's fee award and her actual fees and costs. KCS argues that the Court should instead enforce Plaintiff's written agreement with KCS and apportion the award so KCS receives all its outstanding fees.[4] (KCS' Consolidated Opp'n at 3.) As discussed above, while IDEA guarantees a free and appropriate education, it does not guarantee complete reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs. Therefore, there is no basis for the Court to revisit the award or apportion it as Plaintiff requests.
KCS has an attorney's charging Lien against Plaintiff for $483,668.80, the remaining unpaid fee balance. (KCS' Consolidated Opp'n at 14). Connecticut recognizes common law attorney's charging liens, which are “founded on the equitable right of an attorney to recover fees and costs due for services out of the judgment obtained.” Olszewski v. Jordan, 315 Conn. 618, 624-25 (2015). The lien is placed on “any money recovered or fund due the client at the conclusion of the lawsuit.” D'Urso v. Lyons, 97 Conn.App. 253, 256 (...
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