Doe v. Manson
| Decision Date | 17 February 1981 |
| Citation | 183 Conn. 183,438 A.2d 859 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | John DOE v. John R. MANSON. |
Lee Bezanson, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).
Sue L. Wise, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was John R. Williams, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, SPEZIALE, HEALEY and PARSKEY, JJ.
The primary issue in this appeal is the scope of the phrase "court records" in General Statutes § 54-142a(d) 1 which provides for the erasure of police, court, and state's or prosecuting attorney records pertaining to an individual who has been pardoned. The plaintiff, who was pardoned after completion of a prison term, contends that the term "court records" includes all records in the custody of the department of corrections pertaining to the plaintiff's imprisonment. We disagree.
After conviction and completion of his sentence, the plaintiff was granted an absolute pardon by the Connecticut board of pardons in 1977. As required by General Statutes § 54-142a(e), the clerk of the Superior Court notified several state agencies, including the Connecticut correctional institution at Somers, that the plaintiff had been pardoned and had requested physical destruction of "all information pertaining to the ... offense." The defendant, commissioner of the department of corrections, refused to destroy the records in his possession. The plaintiff brought this mandamus action to compel destruction of those records. At trial the commissioner conceded that the presentence investigation report is a court record within the meaning of § 54-142a, but he argued that other records maintained by the department of corrections are not court records. The trial court concluded otherwise, and the defendant appealed. On appeal the commissioner concedes that the mittimus is also a court record.
General Statutes § 54-142a(d) provides, in pertinent part, that persons pardoned before October 1, 1974, may petition the court Erasure alone does not mean the physical destruction of the documents. Erasure involves sealing the files and segregating them from materials which have not been erased and protecting them from disclosure, except that disclosure is permitted in a few, very limited circumstances described in the statutes. See General Statutes §§ 54-142a(e) and (f), 54-142c, 54-142g, 54-142h(c), 54-142k(c) and (d), 54-142m.
In the case of court records the legislature has provided the additional protection of physical destruction of the records upon request of the pardoned person who is the subject of the records: General Statutes § 54-142a(e).
The plaintiff essentially makes two arguments: (1) the mittimus is a court record because it is issued by a court; a mittimus is required for the department of corrections to lawfully receive and detain a person; but for the mittimus, the department of corrections would not need to create and maintain records about an individual; therefore, all such prison records flow from the mittimus and become court records within the meaning of the erasure statute; and (2) physical destruction of prison records furthers the intent of the legislature to eliminate all traces of the conviction after a person has been pardoned.
The intent of the legislature is to be found in the meaning of the words of the statute; that is, in what the legislature actually did say, not in what it meant to say. Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 642, 410 A.2d 475 (1979); State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 20, 404 A.2d 873 (1978). Where those actual words are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction of the statute. Board of Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. Freedom of Information Commission, --- Conn. ---, ---, 436 A.2d 266 (1980); Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 175 Conn. 504, 509, 400 A.2d 721 (1978). The words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and common meaning. General Statutes § 1-1(a); Winchester v. Connectard of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 358-59, 402 A.2d 332 (1978). Where a statute does not define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries. Ziperstein v. Tax Commissioner, 178 Conn. 493, 497, 423 A.2d 129 (1979).
The parties do not dispute that the documents at issue are "records." The question is whether they are "court records." In that phrase "court" is used as an adjective to modify "records." In its adjectival form "court" is defined as "of or appropriate to a legal court." Webster, Third New International Dictionary. Today, court records may not be limited solely to the "memorials or remembrances, in rolls of parchment, of the proceedings and acts of a court of justice." Davidson v. Murphy, 13 Conn. 213, 217-18 (1839) (quoting Lord Coke). Nevertheless, ordinary understanding of the word "court" does limit "court records" to those created or maintained by or for a court with respect to all court proceedings from commencement to termination. See Lathrop v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 164 Conn. 215, 219, 319 A.2d 376 (1973); In re Application of Dodd, 131 Conn. 702, 703, 42 A.2d 36 (1945); Smith v. Jewell, 71 Conn. 473, 476, 42 A.2d 657 (1899).
Where the legislature has intended a statute to affect a broader class of records, it has inserted additional language to indicate that coverage. The erasure statute for youthful offenders provides for the removal of "all references including arrest, complaint, referrals, petitions, reports and orders" from "all agency, official and institutional files." General Statutes § 54-76o. That section was first enacted in 1972 as part of an act which also amended § 54-142a. Public Acts 1972, No. 20. It is presumed that ...
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