Doe v. Marshall
| Decision Date | 14 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:15-CV-606-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | JOHN DOE #1, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, Attorney General of the State of Alabama in his official capacity, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
With an eye toward protecting its citizenry from recidivist sex offenders, Alabama imposes a registration scheme on all state residents who have been convicted of certain sex crimes. The Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA," or the "Act"), Ala. Code § 15-20A-1 et seq., is one of the most "comprehensive, debilitating" sex offender statutes in the country. McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2015). Protecting the vulnerable from the depredations of sexual predators is a laudable legislative goal—this much is beyond cavil. But the State, in setting out to achieve this goal, must stay within the boundaries of liberty and dignity enshrined in our constitutional tradition. Plaintiffs, five anonymous ASORCNA registrants, brought this action to challenge the portions of the Act that allegedly trespass on their constitutional protections.
Before the court is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Steven Marshall, Charles Ward, Hal Taylor, John Richardson, and Stan Stabler (collectively, the "State").1 (Doc. # 87.) The State seeks, for the second time, total dismissal of Plaintiffs' challenge to ASORCNA. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. Given this resolution, Plaintiffs' motions for leave to file a third amended complaint are due to be denied at this time. (Docs. # 118, 119.)
Subject-matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2201. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard articulated by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 provides thatthe complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2012). The court need not, however, accept mere legal conclusions as true. Id. at 1325.
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The complaint is facially plausible when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
The facts, procedural history, and statutory scheme at issue were spelled out in depth in the Order disposing of Defendants' first motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 51.) The court will not rehash all the facts of this case, which, save for a few exceptions to be discussed below, remain largely the same. After the State's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint was granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiffs obtained leave to again amend their complaint. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on August 22, 2016, adding three claims to the threethat survived Defendants' first motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 81.) Four weeks later, on September 12, 2016, Defendants filed their second Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, asking the court to dismiss all six counts of the operative complaint. (Doc. # 87.)
While this second motion to dismiss awaited resolution, the statutory landscape shifted dramatically. On March 14, 2017, the Alabama Senate introduced SB 301, a far-reaching rewrite of the challenged ASORCNA provisions. Once it passed both chambers of the Alabama Legislature, the bill was christened Alabama Act No. 2017-414 (the "Amendment") and signed into law by Governor Kay Ivey. The parties filed supplemental briefs regarding the Amendment's impact on the State's pending motion to dismiss. (Docs. # 110, 113, 114.)
A brief overview of these statutory and factual changes is in order before addressing the parties' legal arguments.
ASORCNA inserts the State into various aspects of registrants' daily lives. The current version of ASORCNA applies to adult offenders convicted of any of thirty-three infractions designated as sex offenses under Alabama law. Ala. Code § 15-20A-5. It also makes its provisions applicable to any adult offender convicted in another jurisdiction of a crime that, "if it had been committed in[Alabama] under the current provisions of law, would constitute" an enumerated offense. Id. § 15-20A-5(35). The statute applies retroactively such that it sweeps offenders under its control regardless of when the conviction occurred or the duty to register arose. Id. § 15-20A-3(a). Unless they are relieved from its requirements due to medical need or through one of the Act's other narrow exceptions,2 qualifying offenders are subject to the statute's requirements for life. Id. § 15-20A-3(b).
A sex offender must register with certain law enforcement agencies upon (1) release from incarceration (or at the time of conviction if not incarcerated), or (2) upon entering the state. Id. § 15-20A-10. ASORCNA requires an in-person appearance before local law enforcement of the county in which the sex offender resides, accepts employment, or attends school. Id. When registering, sex offenders must provide law enforcement with their residential address, the name and address of their employer and/or the school they attend, the license number and registration for any vehicle they own, and all telephone numbers they use. Id. § 15-20A-7(a)(4)-(8). Registrants must also provide information relating to their internet communications. Namely, email addresses, instant-messageusernames, "designations or monikers used for self-identification in Internet communications or postings," and "any and all Internet service providers used by the sex offender" must be reported. Id. § 15-20A-7(a)(9), (18). The Amendment carves out a small exception: An internet identifier need not be reported if "used exclusively in connection with a lawful commercial transaction." Id. § 15-20A-7(a)(9). ASORCNA does not define "lawful commercial transaction," or how such internet use differs from a registrant's typical internet access.
Registrants have an enduring obligation to update their registration, in person, at the time of any change in residence, employment, or educational enrollment. Id. § 15-20A-10(b), (c). Changes to phone numbers, internet identifiers, or internet service providers ("ISPs") may be reported in person, online, or over the telephone, "as required by the local law enforcement agency." Id. § 15-20A-10(e). All updates must be made "immediately," which the Act defines as within three days. Id. § 15-20A-4(9). ASORCNA further requires homeless registrants to report in person to local law enforcement on a weekly basis. Id. § 15-20A-12(b).
Law enforcement uses this information to establish a registry, which it makes available to the public.3 Id. § 15-20A-8. ASORCNA also requires locallaw enforcement to notify the community of a sex offender's presence by distributing flyers to nearby residents. Id. § 15-20A-21. If a registrant intends to leave his county of residence for a period of three or more consecutive days, he must complete a travel permit4 request and provide the details of his travel plans. Id. § 15-20A-15.
ASORCNA strictly limits the areas in which sex offenders may live and work. The residency provision proscribes the establishment or maintenance of a residence within 2,000 feet of a school, childcare facility, or resident camp.5 Id. § 15-20A-11(a). ASORCNA also prohibits sex offenders from establishing or maintaining a residence within 2,000 feet of the property on which a victim's immediate family members reside. Id. § 15-20A-11(b). The 2,000-foot exclusion zone6 is measured in a straight line from nearest property line to nearest propertyline. Id. § 15-20A-11(h). Those sex offenders who were released or convicted and established a residence within an exclusion zone prior to ASORCNA's effective date were not required to relocate. See, e.g., id. § 15-20A-11(a) . Plaintiffs contend that the geographical residency restrictions preclude registrants from residing in over eighty percent of the available housing in Montgomery, Alabama.
In addition to imposing geographical limitations on living arrangements, ASORCNA prevents sex offenders from residing with certain minor children (the "minor-cohabitation rule"). No sex offender may "reside or conduct an overnight visit with a minor." Id. § 15-20A-11(d). The Act defines "overnight visit" as "[a]ny presence between the hours of 10:30 p.m. and 6:00 a.m." Id. § 15-20A-4(14). The minor-cohabitation rule generally does not apply if the sex offender is the parent, grandparent, sibling, stepparent, or stepsibling of the minor. Id. § 15-20A-11(d). Under certain circumstances in which the sex offender's victim was a child, however, even these familial exceptions do not apply. Id. § 15-20A-11(d)(1)-(5).
Deciphering the statutory meaning of "residence" is no small feat—it takes four statutory cross-references to pin down the...
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