Doe v. N. Lakes Cmty. Mental Health Auth.

• Decision Date: 02 February 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 20-CV-12997
• Parties: JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN LAKES COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, CHRISTINE M. SMITH, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN LAKES COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY, CHRISTINE M. SMITH, Defendants.

Case No. 20-CV-12997

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

February 2, 2021

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT NORTHERN LAKES COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH AUTHORITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCESS PAGES FOR REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT

On November 6, 2020, Plaintiff John Doe filed a complaint against Defendants Northern Lakes Community Mental Health Authority ("NLCMHA") and Christine M. Smith alleging that he was sexually abused in violation of federal and state law. ECF No. 1. On December 4, 2020, NLCMHA moved to dismiss the Compliant for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Plaintiff responded on December 18, 2020. ECF No. 10. Shortly thereafter, NLCMHA concurrently filed a reply brief and motion for leave to file excess pages in support. ECF Nos. 12, 13. Defendant Smith has not moved to dismiss but has instead filed an answer to the Complaint. ECF No. 11. For reasons explained below, Defendant NLCMHA's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages will be granted.

I.

Plaintiff, a resident of Ogemaw County, suffers from major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. ECF No. 1 at PageID.3. In 2007, he began receiving mental health services from Defendant NLCMHA, "a multi-county community mental health authority created pursuant to MCL 330.1205 of the Michigan Public Health Code." Id. at PageID.2. In addition to mental health services, Defendant NLCMHA also provided Plaintiff with housing assistance. Id. at PageID.3.

Around midway through 2017, Plaintiff began receiving mental health services from Defendant Smith, a licensed social worker employed by NLCMHA. Id. Plaintiff claims that by the fall of 2017, Defendant Smith was behaving in a "sexually suggestive manner towards [him]," sending him gifts and nude images of herself. Id. at PageID.3-4. Plaintiff alleges that on several occasions, he awoke at home to find Defendant Smith in his bed. Id. at PageID.4. When he asked how she got there, "Defendant Smith would change the subject and tell Plaintiff that she wanted him to feel loved." Id.

According to Plaintiff, this pattern of sexual harassment—and, eventually, sexual abuse—continued until July 2018, when he disclosed Defendant Smith's behavior to Sean Kelly, "a peer support specialist employed by Defendant NLCMHA." Id. at PageID.5. A subsequent investigation by Defendant NLCMHA concluded that, according to Michigan law, Defendant Smith had sexually abused Plaintiff. Id. at PageID.5-6. The Complaint suggests that Defendant Smith is no longer employed with Defendant NLCMHA. Id. at PageID.5 (referring to Defendant Smith as "now-former NLCMHA case manager").

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff alleges seven counts: quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Counts I and II); violation of the right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III); abuse in violation of M.C.L. § 330.1722 (Count IV); quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in violation of Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (Counts V and VI); and assault and battery (Count VII). ECF No. 1 at PageID.7-25. Count VII is alleged only against Defendant Smith.

II.

As mentioned previously, Defendant NLCMHA filed its Reply Brief along with a motion seeking a four-page extension of the Reply Brief. ECF Nos. 12, 13. Defendant NLCMHA explains that Plaintiff's Response Brief relies on facts and documents not attached to or referenced in the Complaint. ECF No. 12 at PageID.141. Defendant NLCMHA is presumably referring to Plaintiff's reliance on public records relating to Defendant Smith's driving record and alcohol dependency, discussed in Section IV.A.1., infra. The preferred method of seeking a page extension is to file a motion for leave to file excess pages before filing the brief in question so that the Court may first rule on the motion. Nonetheless, Defendant NLCMHA has demonstrated good cause for the four-page extension. The Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages will be granted.

III.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading fails to state a claim if it does not contain allegations that support recovery under any recognizable theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the pleading in the non-movants' favor and accepts the allegations of facts therein as true. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). The pleader need not provide "detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, but the "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In essence, the pleading "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" and "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-79 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV.

A.

Counts I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against state or local officials who deprive a person of a federal right while acting under the color of state law." Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). The parties seem to agree that Defendant NLCMHA is a local governmental unit rather than a state agency.¹ This position appears consistent with Michigan law. See M.C.L. § 330.1100a(16) (defining "community mental health authority" as "a separate legal public governmental entity created under [M.C.L. § 330.1205] to operate as a community mental health services program"); see also In re Blackshear, 686 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that community mental health authority was legally distinct from Michigan Department of Community Health); Greene v. Crawford Cty., No. 18-11008, 2020 WL 3469172, at *11-12 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2020) (holding that Defendant NLCMHA was not an "arm of the state" for purposes of sovereign immunity). Accordingly, Defendant NLCMHA will be treated as a municipality for purposes of § 1983.

"[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue. Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978)) (emphasis original). "To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or custom." Thomas, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.2005). To prove an unlawful custom or policy, "[t]he plaintiff can look to (1) the municipality's legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations." Id.

Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated as a result of Defendant NLCMHA's (1) "policy of inadequate training or supervision of its case managers," and (2) "custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations." ECF No. 1 at PageID.9. Neither theory is adequately pled.

1.

To prevail on a failure to train or supervise theory, "the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality's deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury." Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. In other words, the risk of a constitutional violation arising as a result of the inadequacies in the municipal policy must be plainly obvious." Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff does not describe the training or supervision that Defendant NLCMHA provides to case managers like Defendant Smith. He instead suggests that the facts outlined in the Complaint "demonstrate a plausible claim that Defendant NLCMHA failed to supervise Defendant Smith or subject her to greater supervision in light of foreseeable consequences that would result from the lack of such supervision." ECF No. 10 at PageID.95. Specifically, Plaintiff relies on (1) thefrequency and duration of the abuse and (2) public records showing that Defendant Smith was arrested for operating while intoxicated in December 2017, diagnosed with alcohol dependency, and sentenced to 120 days probation after operating while intoxicated again in January 2018. Id. at PageID.95-96.

In Pecsi v. City of Niles, 674 F. App'x 544 (6th Cir. 2017), an inmate alleged that the City of Niles failed to supervise an arresting officer who sexually abused him. The inmate pointed to the officer's record of bad conduct as evidence that the City was deliberately indifferent. Id. at 547. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that "none of [the officer's] actions put the City on notice that he had the propensity to commit sexual assault." Id. "Three of the four incidents identified by [the arrestee]—passing bad checks, speeding and driving on a suspended license, and lying to a superior officer—had nothing to do with this kind of incident." Id. Indeed, "[...