Doe v. Ohio State Univ.

• Decision Date: 07 November 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:15–cv–2830
• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 645
• Parties: John DOE, Plaintiff, v. The OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

219 F.Supp.3d 645

John DOE, Plaintiff,

v.The OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:15–cv–2830

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed November 7, 2016

Joshua A. Engel, Engel & Martin, LLC, Mason, OH, for Plaintiff.

Christina Louise Corl, Plunkett Cooney, Michael Cannon McPhillips, Reid T. Caryer, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Employment Law Section, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

JAMES L. GRAHAM, United States District Judge

The Ohio State University ("OSU") expelled one of its students, John Doe¹ , for sexual misconduct. A university hearing panel found that Doe engaged in sexual misconduct by having sex with a classmate who lacked the capacity to consent because she was inebriated. John Doe claims OSU expelled him because of a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process. He argues that, among other things, OSU and some of its personnel knew that his accuser had a reason to fabricate her charge of sexual misconduct, but they failed to provide him with this information before the hearing and instead permitted her to make false or misleading statements to the hearing panel. Doe sued OSU and five of its administrators (the "Administrators") alleging they violated his procedural due process rights. Doe alleges claims against two of the Administrators in their official capacity and alleges claims against all five in their individual capacity. Now, OSU and its administrators (collectively, "Defendants") move to dismiss Doe's claims based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity.

I. Background

A. Factual allegations

John Doe was a joint degree M.D./M.B.A. student at OSU. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 3, Doc. 44). The woman who accused him of sexual misconduct, Jane Roe² , is a female medical student at OSU. (Id. at ¶ 40). OSU is a public university created by the Ohio Legislature. (Id. at ¶ 4). The five Administrators each have different roles at OSU.

Defendant Javaune Adams–Gaston is the Vice President for Student Life at OSU. (Id. at ¶ 5). Doe alleges that Adams–Gaston is responsible for OSU's Student Code of Conduct and Judicial System and made the ultimate decision to expel Doe from OSU. (Id. ).

Defendant Matthew Page is the Associate Director for Student Life at OSU. (Id. at ¶ 6). Doe alleges Page "has responsibility for helping to enforce and manage the disciplinary hearings" at OSU, and he "is also a Deputy Title IX Coordinator at OSU." (Id. ).

Defendant Jeff Majarian is an Associate Director for Student Life at OSU. (Id. at ¶ 7). Doe alleges Majarian was responsible for the investigation into Jane Roe's allegations that ultimately led to Doe's expulsion. (Id. ).

Defendant Kellie Brennan is the Title IX Coordinator for OSU. (Id. at ¶ 8). Doe alleges that Brennan was responsible for OSU's Title IX compliance, including providing education and training and ensuring the "university responds appropriately, effectively and equitably to Title IX issues." (Id. ). Doe alleges that Brennan is responsible for "helping alleged victims obtain accommodations from OSU" and must serve "as consultant to any disciplinary hearing panel." (Id. at ¶ 27).

Defendant Natalie Spiert is the Sexual Violence Support Coordinator in OSU's Office for Student Life. (Id. at ¶ 9). Doe alleges Spiert "provides support and resources for students who have experienced sexual violence" in her capacity as the Sexual Violence Support Coordinator at OSU. (Id. ). Doe alleges that Spiert knew that Doe's accuser made a false or misleading statement to the hearing panel. (Id. at ¶ 67).

The factual background of this case is laid out in great detail in Magistrate Judge Kemp's Report and Recommendation ("R & R"). (See Doc. 66 at 2–10). For purposes of this motion, a summary of the factual allegations will suffice.

John Doe was enrolled at OSU in a joint M.D./M.B.A. program. He was set to graduate from the program in May 2016, but OSU expelled him on September 10, 2015. He was expelled following a hearing before OSU's Conduct Board where he responded to an allegation that he had engaged in sexual misconduct with a medical student, Jane Roe. At the hearing, Doe testified that his sexual encounter with Jane Roe was consensual; Jane Roe testified that she had no memory of the encounter. Other witnesses testified about Doe and Roe's characters and the events of that night, including their perception of Jane Roe being intoxicated. Ultimately, the hearing panel found Doe had violated the OSU Code of Conduct or Sexual Misconduct Policy.

Doe alleges that throughout the investigation, hearing, and appeal process, the Defendants denied him procedural due process in a number of different ways. The basis for many of his due process claims is that OSU denied him the opportunity to present his story: that he and Jane Roe had consensual sex, and she fabricated the no-consent story when she faced failing out of medical school for the second time. Key to John Doe's allegations is a timeline of events.

On July 12, 2014, John Doe and Jane Roe had sex at John Doe's apartment. On March 23, 2015, Jane Roe received a copy of a letter informing her that she was being "referred to the ABRC [Academic Behavioral Review Committee] for consideration of her dismissal from the OSU Medical School." (Am. Compl. at ¶ 47). Dr. Danforth, the chair of the ABRC, made it clear to Jane Roe that "[h]er expectation that she will be permitted to continue in the curriculum is unrealistic." (Id. ). Doe alleges that on March 25, 2015, for the first time, Jane Roe contacted the Office of Student Life at OSU to report that she was the victim of a sexual assault. (Id. at ¶¶ 48–49). Doe met with the ABRC on April 15, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 51). On April 17, 2015, Jane Roe scheduled an appointment to meet with Majarian as part of the process of reporting the incident to another university body, the Student Conduct Office. (Id. at ¶ 53). On April 21, 2015, the ABRC granted Jane Roe the opportunity to repeat the first year of medical school. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 54).

Doe alleges that the Administrators knew that Jane Roe received this accommodation—the chance to repeat the first year of medical school—and knew that she didn't report the incident until after facing the prospect of failing out of medical school for the second time. OSU failed to turn over this key piece of evidence before Doe's disciplinary hearing. Further still, at the disciplinary hearing, Jane Roe indicated she only reported the sexual misconduct after OSU's decision to allow her to again repeat the first year of medical school. (Id. at ¶ 67).

Doe argues he would have been able to use evidence of Roe's accommodation at the hearing to impeach Roe's credibility, to refute her statement that she only reported the incident after the university's decision to allow her to repeat her first year of medical school again, and to answer one of the panel member's questions about Jane Roe's incentive to fabricate her story. Since the outcome of the hearing appeared to turn on a question of credibility, by denying Doe this critical evidence, Doe argues that OSU denied him procedural due process.

B. Procedural Background

In September 2015, John Doe filed a verified complaint seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, arguing that OSU and the Administrators violated his due process rights and Title IX. (Doc. 1). Doe also moved for a Temporary Restraining Order, (Doc. 2), which the Court denied in October 2015, (Doc. 20). After a first motion to dismiss from Defendants, (Doc. 28), Doe filed an amended complaint, (Doc. 44). Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims in the amended complaint. (Doc. 55). Later that month, Magistrate Judge Kemp recommended that the motion for preliminary injunction be denied. (Doc. 66). Judge Frost adopted the R&R in April 2016. (Doc. 75). Judge Frost noted, in his order denying the motion for preliminary injunction, that "Plaintiff has introduced evidence that has given this Court significant pause as to many of the practices that the university employs and the rules it has established to govern its investigative and disciplinary hearing process." (Id. at 6). However, for Judge Frost, "not even these concerns—taken together or viewed individually—suggest that Plaintiff can prevail on his due process claim." (Id. ). The Court stayed discovery pending the outcome of the present motion to dismiss.

Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of plaintiffs. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). However, "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" need not be accepted as true. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Plaintiffs' obligation to provide the "grounds" for their claimed entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. The factual allegations must "raise the right to relief above the speculative level." Id. The complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face, i.e., the court must be able to draw a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This "plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief." ’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127

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