Doe v. Piper
| Decision Date | 25 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 15-2639 (JRT/SER) |
| Citation | 165 F.Supp.3d 789 |
| Parties | Jane Doe and John Doe, individually, and on behalf of Baby Doe, Plaintiffs, v. Emily Johnson Piper, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Lori Swanson, in her official capacity as Minnesota Attorney General, and Samuel Moose, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Health and Human Services for the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Jeffrey S. Storms, NEWMARK STORMS LAW OFFICE, 100 South Fifth Street, Suite 2000, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Mark D. Fiddler, FIDDLER LAW OFFICE, P.A., 6800 France Avenue South, Suite 190, Edina, MN 55435; and R. Daniel Rasmus, HOVLAND AND RASMUS, PLLC, 6800 France Avenue South, Suite 190, Edina, MN 55435, for plaintiffs.
Scott H. Ikeda, Assistant Attorney General, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, Human Services Division, Bremer Tower, Suite 1100, 445 Minnesota Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 for defendants Piper and Swanson.
Todd R. Matha, MILLE LACS BAND OF OJIBWE, Office Of The Solicitor General, 43408 Oodena Drive, Onamia, MN 56359, for defendant Moose.
JOHN R. TUNHEIM
This case is about the validity of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (“MIFPA”), a law enacted by the Minnesota State Legislature for the purpose of addressing historic wrongs to American Indian (“Indian”) tribes and families. Plaintiffs Jane and John Doe are themselves Indian, but they view the statute as an infringement on their rights to equal protection and due process. The Does are not the first to challenge a statute like this one, but their complaint is unique because they have decided to challenge only MIFPA's notice and intervention provisions and not its preference provisions, which were the subject of a recent Supreme Court case decided on other grounds. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 186 L.Ed.2d 729 (2013)
. Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint either for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear the Does' complaint, but only against the government defendants. The Court will dismiss Commissioner Moose from the case because he is a tribal officer and not a state officer; does not enforce MIFPA; and is not restricted by the constitutional clauses at issue here. But even though the Court may proceed to the merits of the Does' complaint against the government defendants, the Court will not decide the merits now. The parties necessarily and understandably devoted nearly all of the briefs to the numerous preliminary issues. Although the jurisdictional questions were well briefed, the Does' equal protection and due process claims received less attention than they deserved. Accordingly, in deciding these motions the Court will express no opinion on the merits—only on the preliminary matters. It may be that Defendants' positions on the merits are correct—or incorrect—but those questions will be decided another day.
In the mid-1970s the nation experienced “rising concern ... over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.” Adoptive Couple , 133 S.Ct. at 2557
(quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield , 490 U.S. 30, 32, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) ). Congress as a result passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (“ICWA”) after finding “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being] broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies.” 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
ICWA, in short, creates procedures for Indian tribes to push state courts to place Indian children with Indian families when those children are put up for adoption. ICWA accomplishes this goal through a “preferences” provision:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
Id. § 1915(a). But crucially, the relevant ICWA provisions apply only to involuntary adoption proceedings where the parent or parents are not choosing to give their child up for adoption. See id. § 1912(a) (); Adoptive Couple , 133 S.Ct. at 2557
(). These provisions do not apply in voluntary proceedings.
After Congress passed ICWA, the Minnesota State Legislature followed the federal government's lead and in 1985 passed MIFPA, a state-law ICWA analogue with a broader reach. MIFPA expanded on ICWA's principles to regulate not only involuntary proceedings but also voluntary proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 260.761, subdiv. 3
(“In any voluntary adoptive ... proceeding ...”).
Only a few of MIFPA's provisions are relevant here, the first being the statute's notice requirement. MIFPA requires that certain parties provide relevant Indian tribes with notice of a MIFPA-applicable adoption proceeding:
Once armed with notice of an adoption, MIFPA's intervention provision becomes relevant: “In any state court proceeding for the voluntary adoptive or preadoptvie placement of an Indian child, the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.” Id. , subdiv. 6.
Intervention is significant because if a tribe utilizes its right to intervene, it may petition the state court to transfer the case to “the jurisdiction of the tribe,” and the court must grant the petition absent findings of “good cause” unrelated to “[s]ocioeconomic conditions” or “the perceived adequacy of tribal ... social services or judicial systems.” Minn. Stat. § 260.771, subdiv. 3(a)
, 3a(a). If the case is transferred to the tribe, the tribe's decision on placement is binding. Id. , subdiv. 4.
Alternatively, even if the state court does not transfer the case, a tribe that intervenes may offer an alternative out-of-home placement plan, id. § 260.762, subdiv. 2, and the state court then must generally follow ICWA's preferences in deciding where to place the child, id. § 260.771, subdiv. 7
; see 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
Baby Doe was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in April 2015 to biological parents Jane and John Doe. The Does have been a couple since 2003, are unmarried, and live together. They have borne other children together that they are currently raising. Jane is enrolled in the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe (“Mille Lacs Band” or “the Band”) but does not keep her domicile or residence on the Mille Lacs Band or any other Indian tribe's reservation. John is also enrolled in an Indian tribe, although his tribe is not named in the complaint. Like Jane, John does not domicile or reside on an Indian reservation. The Does kept Jane's pregnancy and Baby Doe's birth secret from the Mille Lacs Band.
For reasons not described in detail in the complaint, the Does decided that they would voluntarily give Baby Doe up for adoption and relinquish their parental rights. The Does state this decision was “difficult” but in Baby Doe's best interests.
To facilitate Baby Doe's adoption, the Does engaged a private agency that would allow the Does to choose the couple that would become Baby Doe's adoptive parents. The couple the Does selected (“Adoptive Parents”) are parents to a boy older than Baby Doe and are “good people” and “excellent parents” in the eyes of the Does. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Neither of Adoptive Parents is of Indian descent, and neither is enrolled in a federally recognized Indian tribe. The Does and Adoptive Parents have agreed that after the adoption the couples will “share pictures, text each other, and meet with Baby Doe from time to time.” (Id. ¶ 35.) The couples have also agreed that Adoptive Parents will ensure Baby Doe learns about Indian culture and history.
On May 8, 2015, a Hennepin County district judge entered an ex parte preadoptive custody order, granting Adoptive Parents custody over Baby Doe while adoption proceedings were ongoing, subject to the Does' continuing right to custody. The judge's order included findings of fact indicating that the Does supported the adoption and the placement of Baby Doe with Adoptive Parents. (Aff. of Dan Rasmus, Ex. A. at 1-2, June 5, 2015, Docket No. 10.) The Does had 60 days from the date of the state court custody order—until July 8, 2015—to provide the state court with formal consent to Baby Doe's adoption. (Compl. ¶ 41.) And before the Does provided the state court with their consent, MIFPA required that they first give notice of the state court proceeding to the Mille Lacs Band, because Baby Doe was eligible for enrollment in the tribe. See Minn. Stat. § 260.761, subdiv. 3
(requiring notice while “[i]n” the adoption proceeding).
On June 3, 2015, the Does filed a complaint in this Court naming as defendants Samuel Moose, the Commissioner of the Mille Lacs Band's Department...
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