Doe v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 202
| Decision Date | 19 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-cv-4460 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | JOHN and JANE DOE A, individually and as parents and next friends of DOE CHILD A, a minor; and JOHN and JANE DOE B, individually and as parents and next friends of DOE CHILD B, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. PLAINFIELD COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT 202; MICHAEL MODERHACK, individually and as an agent of District 202; JON PEREIRO, individually and as an agent of District 202; and VINCENT VASQUEZ, individually and as an agent of District 202, Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' Motion.
The following facts come from the Complaint and are assumed true for the purpose of this Motion. Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665-66 (7th Cir. 2013).
All reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiffs' favor. League of Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014).
On October 17, 2019, Doe Child A and Doe Child B (collectively the “Doe Children”) were sexually assaulted by members of their football team at Plainfield Central High School (“Plainfield Central”) in Plainfield Illinois. They were subjected to a longstanding, widespread and well-known hazing ritual referred among the Plainfield Central football community as “Code Blue, ” which has existed since at least 2014. Defendants Moderhack, Pereiro, and Vasquez (collectively, the “Defendant Coaches”) were coaches of the football team at the time, and despite knowing about “Code Blue” and prior incidents where players were sexually assaulted, failed to monitor the locker rooms or put a stop to the attacks.
On the day of the attacks, a student told Vasquez the Doe Children were being attacked. Vasquez informed Moderhack and Pereiro, and Vasquez and Pereiro went to the locker room but found it empty. After the attacks, the Doe Children told the Defendant Coaches they had been subjected to “Code Blue” and described the assaults. In a meeting with parents after the assaults, Defendant Plainfield Community Consolidated School District 202 (the “District”), through its athletic director, admitted that coaches were required by school policy to monitor the locker rooms whenever students were present.
Defendants move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on numerous bases. First, Defendants argue Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege willful and wanton misconduct. Second, Defendants assert they have immunity from Plaintiffs' state law claims under various sections of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. Third, Defendants contend the Doe Parents failed to allege any injuries of their own and their individual claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Tort Immunity Act. Fourth, Defendants argue Plaintiffs failed to allege facts that plausibly state a claim for a violation of their substantive or procedural due process rights, and further assert the Defendant Coaches have qualified immunity for the constitutional claims. Finally, Defendants contend Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to state a Monell claim against the District.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the case.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true well pled facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). The allegations in the complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
A plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations, but it must provide enough factual support to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The claim must be described “in sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, ” are insufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if the complaint contains sufficient alleged facts that allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
As detailed above, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on multiple bases. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
Section 1983 “provides a remedy for violations of federal rights committed by persons acting under the color of state law.” First Midwest Bank v. City of Chi., 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021). Thus, a Section 1983 claim requires that a constitutional injury exists. Here, Plaintiffs claim the Defendant Coaches violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.[1] Plaintiffs also pursue theories of liability against the District under Monell.
“In contrast with procedural due process, substantive due process bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them.” Doe v. Sch. Dist. U-46, 2021 WL 3849635, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2021). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is a restraint upon governmental action . . . [and] does not impose a duty on the state to protect against injuries inflicted by private actors.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at. at 987 (emphasis in original). Its purpose is “to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). “The state does not have a due-process duty to protect against acts of private violence.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 987.
Pertinent here, a narrow exception[2] to the rule in DeShaney applies when the state created the danger. See Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2015) (). Under the state-created danger exception, “a plaintiff must show that the state affirmatively placed him in a position of danger and that the state's failure to protect him from that danger was the proximate cause of his injury.” First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 988 (citing Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). “Only the most egregious official conduct will satisfy this stringent inquiry.” Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011).
The rule of DeShaney cannot be circumvented by broadly interpreting what is meant by “increase” so as to erase the distinction between endangering and failing to protect. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d at 917. “Rather, when courts speak of the state's ‘increasing' the danger of private violence, they mean the state did something that turned a potential danger into an actual one, rather than that it just stood by and did nothing to prevent violence.” Spruill as next friend of D.N.S. v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 2021 WL 1387949, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (cleaned up); see also Estate of Her v. Hoeppner, 939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019) () (emphasis added).
Even if the state-created danger exception to DeShaney applies, there is no violation of an individual's due process rights unless the state actor's conduct “shocks the conscience.” King ex rel. King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir. 2007). This means that the state actor's conduct must be truly “‘egregious'”; “[m]aking a bad decision, or even acting negligently, does not suffice to establish the type of conscience-shocking behavior that results in a constitutional violation.” Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)); see also Estate of Her, 939 F.3d at 876 ( ) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs cite Sandra T.E. v. Sperlik for the proposition that, notwithstanding DeShaney, “a substantive due process claim can stand where the plaintiff puts forth enough evidence to demonstrate that an individual defendant turned a blind eye to constitutional violations thereby allowing a climate to flourish where innocent students are victimized.” 639 F.Supp.2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2009), aff'd sub nom. T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 730 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990)). The key distinguishing factor in the cases[3] relied upon by Plaintiffs, however, is that the abuse in those cases was perpetrated by a state actor, not another student. Those cases must be limited to their facts. See Doe v. Riverside-Brookfield Twp. High Sch. Dist. 208, 1995 WL 680749, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
The Court finds persuasive Judge Feinerman's considered opinion in Spruill, a case with a similar...
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