Doe v. Princeton Univ.

• Decision Date: 16 December 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:19-CV-07853-BRM-TJB
• Parties: JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

JOHN DOE, Plaintiff, v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:19-CV-07853-BRM-TJB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

December 16, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss(ECF No. 39) filed by DefendantsMichele Minter, Regan Hunt Crotty, Joyce Chen Shueh, Walter Wright, Cole M. Crittenden, Kathleen Deignan, W. Rochelle Calhoun, Jill S. Dolan, Sarah-Jane Leslie(the "Individual Defendants") and the Trustees of Princeton University (the "University")(collectively, "Defendants") seeking to dismiss PlaintiffJohn Doe's ("Doe") Amended Complaint ("Amended Complaint" or "Am. Compl.") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).Doe opposes the motion.(ECF No. 42.)Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), this Court did not hear oral argument.For the reasons set forth herein and for good cause shown, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss(ECF No. 39) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I.BACKGROUND

A.Facts Relating to the Motion to Dismiss

The underlying facts are set forth in the Court's February 28, 2020 Opinion.(SeeECF No. 31).In the interest of judicial economy, the Court refers the parties to that Opinion for a full recitation of the factual background of this dispute.

B.Procedural History

On March 5, 2019, Doe filed a complaint alleging the University and several of its administrators violated two separate claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)("Title IX") and several state laws following the University's investigation and subsequent disciplinary action against Doe stemming from allegations of sexual abuse brought by Alex Roe("Roe") against Doe.(ECF No. 1.)On July 10, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss Doe's entire complaint for failure to state a claim.(ECF No. 18.)On August 19, 2019, Doe filed an opposition.(ECF No. 25.)On February 28, 2020, the Court dismissed both Title IX claims(Counts I and II) with prejudice¹ and denied without prejudice Defendants' motion to dismissthe state law claims.(SeeECF Nos. 31 and 32.)The Court ordered Doe to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.(Id.)²On March 13, 2020, Doe filed the Amended Complaint solely amending his jurisdictional allegations.(ECFNo. 33-1.)Thereafter, on March 23, 2020, the Court, following review of the parties' submissions (ECF Nos. 34 and 35) concerning the Court's order to show cause (ECF No. 32), Doe's declaration (ECFNo. 34-1), and the Amended Complaint (ECFNo. 33-1), found it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Doe's state law claims, and the portion of the Court's order (ECF No. 32) requiring Doe to show cause was discharged.(SeeECF No. 37.)On April 6, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint seeking dismissal of Doe's state law claims.(ECFNo. 39-1.)On June 4, 2020, Doe filed its opposition.(ECF No. 42.)The Court finds Doe's state law claims are now ripe for adjudication.

II.LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]."Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228(3d Cir.2008)."[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations."Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)(citations omitted).However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."Id.(citingPapasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286(1986)).A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'"Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009)(citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 570)."A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged."Id.This "plausibility standard" requires the complaint allege "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but it "is not akin to a probability requirement.'"Id.(quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556)."Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but "more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation" must be pled; it must include "factual enhancements" and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action.Id.(citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679."[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'"Id. at 679(quotingFed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).However, courts are "not compelled to accept 'unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,'"Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195(3d Cir.2007)(quotingSchuylkill Energy Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417(3d Cir.1997)), nor "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.

While, as a general rule, the court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that "a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss[to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56]."In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287(3d Cir.1999).Specifically, courts may consider any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint."In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426(quotingShaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220(1st Cir.1996)).

III.DECISION

Doe asserts a host of state law claims against Defendants.The Court will address each one in turn.

A.Common Law Due Process: Fundamental Fairness in School Disciplinary Proceedings against the University (Count 3)

Defendants argue Doe's Amended Complaint fails to state a common law due process or fundamental fairness claim because: (1) there is no freestanding common law due process or fundamental fairness claim against a private university under New Jersey law as it only exists within the context of a contract claim; and (2) even if New Jersey recognized a non-contract based common law due process or fundamental fairness claim against private universities, Doe has not pled facts showing he was denied due process or that the disciplinary proceedings were fundamentally unfair.(ECFNo. 39-1at 31-33.)

Initially, the Court notes Doe's "due process" claim could be duplicative of his breach of contract claim.Indeed, a common law fundamental fairness claim based on a contractual relationship between a private university student and the university does exist under New Jersey law.Moe v. Seton Hall University, No. Civ. A. No. 2:09-01424, 2010 WL 1609680, at *5(D.N.J.Apr. 20, 2010)(finding that, in context of private university student, "no traditional due process claim was viable, but the contract claim remained")(citingHernandez v. Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A.2d 365(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1999)andNapolitano v. Trustees of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1982));Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 216(3d Cir.2020)(finding university breached its contractual obligation to provide Doe fairness).The Court, however, finds Count 3 has an independent substantive basis and it will not be dismissed as duplicative at this stage.SeeloanDepot.com v. CrossCountry Mortg., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 226, 238(D.N.J.2019)(finding that where a claim "potentially has something to add,"the court would refuse to dismiss it "as duplicative at this [motion to dismiss] stage").

Doe contends the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the University violated his common law due process rights to a fundamentally fair proceeding.(ECF No. 42at 19.)Specifically, Doe alleges the disciplinary process failed to comply with the University's established policies, and was one-sided and biased.(Id. at 20.)Doe alleges certain evidence was withheld from him including "all of the witness identities and, on information and belief, some of the witness statements and Alex Roe's own initial statement, and that no real effort was undertaken to assess Roe's credibility."(Id. at 21.)³

"A common law fundamental fairness claim based on a contractual relationship between a private university student and the university does exist under New Jersey law."Sapp v. Premier Educ. Grp., LP, No. CV 15-8591(RMB/AMD), 2016 WL 6434137, at *12(D.N.J.Oct. 28, 2016).In this context, the scope of review of the University's actions is limited to a determination of "whether the procedures followed were in accordance with the institution's rules and regulations."Moe, 2010 WL 1609680, at *4(quotingNapolitano, 453 A.2d at 263)."In other words, a student in a private university contesting disciplinary proceedings, including expulsion, will not prevail if the university adhered to its own rules, the procedures followed were fundamentally fair, and the...