Doe v. Princeton Univ.

Decision Date31 March 2022
Docket Number21-1458
Citation30 F.4th 335
Parties John DOE, Appellant v. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Michael P. Bowen [Argued], Edward E. Shapiro, Glenn Agre Bergman & Fuentes LLP, 55 Hudson Yards, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10001, Counsel for Appellant

Stephen J. Kastenberg [Argued], Ballard Spahr LLP, 1735 Market Street, 51st Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599, Christopher Kelly, Cozen O'Connor, 1650 Market Street, One Liberty Place, Suite 2800, Philadelphia, PA 19103, Counsel for Appellee

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

MATEY, Circuit Judge.

There are two sides to every story. But a complaint need not tell both. John Doe's Complaint plausibly tells his side, alleging that Princeton discriminated on the basis of sex while investigating Title IX claims filed against him. Discovery might not bear out Doe's account, but he has satisfied his burden at this early stage. So we will vacate the District Court's order dismissing the matter and remand for the rest of the story to develop.

I.

On a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc. , 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). Following that rule, we recount only the facts described in the Complaint.

A. The Beginning

John Doe and Jane Roe attended Princeton University where, after meeting during the fall of their freshman year, they began a steady, and steadily volatile, relationship. Arguments, sometimes violent, were common. During their first summer vacation, for example, Roe scratched and grabbed Doe's arm while traveling with Doe's family. And in what became part of Princeton's investigation, the couple's penchant for physical altercations extended to intimacy, including "consensual choking." (App. at 43.)1 Soon enough, bad went to worse and, when Roe informed Doe she was dating others, Doe called the whole thing off. Except, it turned out, Doe had also been unfaithful. A revelation that did not sit well with Roe, so she began spreading rumors about Doe on campus. One such accusation: that Roe ended the relationship because Doe was physically abusive. And she threatened Doe directly: "take a year off and nothing will happen to you." (App. at 48.)

B. Princeton Intervenes

Concerned, Doe went to the Director of Student Life, Garrett Meggs. In an email, Doe complained that he was being harassed by his ex-girlfriend, who was "spreading false information." (App. at 48.) Doe explained that he "simply" did not "feel safe" and Meggs recommended that Doe seek mental health services. (App. at 48.) He did not recommend that Doe file a Title IX complaint.

Meanwhile, Roe met with Princeton's Director of Gender Equity and Title IX Administration, Regan Crotty. Roe told Crotty that she was a victim of "Intimate Relationship Violence" under the Princeton Policy2 and described certain incidents of abuse by Doe. Roe explained that she was not interested in pursuing further action. But Crotty advised that Princeton wanted Roe to press charges against Doe. Soon after, when Doe began a new relationship, Roe agreed to Crotty's suggestion, and approved an order ("Order") prohibiting Doe and Roe from any contact. Still, on the day the Order issued, Roe approached Doe on a campus running trail, attempting to apologize. Doe notified Meggs of the incident, and the violation of the Order, and Princeton simply told Roe not to let it happen again.

A few months later, Roe notified Crotty that she would cooperate with Princeton's inquiry. A formal notice was issued, and Princeton barred Doe—but not Roe—from campus during the investigation. Then, several months later, Doe accidentally "liked" one of Roe's social media posts, in violation of the Order. Doe immediately self-reported the mistake but, unlike with Roe's violation, Princeton launched another disciplinary process that resulted in a reprimand and a written warning from a dean.

C. The Investigation and Report

Princeton appointed a three-person panel ("Panel") to investigate Roe's allegations against Doe,3 review the evidence they gathered, weigh the testimony they allowed, and then decide whether the facts they found violated the Princeton Policy. At one of Doe's meetings with the Panel, he mentioned an interest in pursuing counterclaims against Roe. Unlike with Roe, who was urged to pursue an investigation, Princeton offered Doe no guidance. Later, when Doe formally asked the Panel to consider his claims, the Panel expanded its investigation.4

The Panel's investigation culminated in a "Report" finding evidence to support the incidents of physical abuse alleged by Roe,5 but nothing sufficient to confirm any of Doe's claims. Doe received a letter with the Panel's punishment: expulsion from Princeton.6 Vindicated, Roe tweeted "my life is good again ... worked out boy problems that were never real problems just things I created." (App. at 56.)

D. The Federal Complaint

In April 2020, Doe filed a Complaint against Princeton alleging violations of Title IX, and state law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and denial of due process. The District Court granted Princeton's motion to dismiss all of Doe's claims without prejudice, offering Doe an opportunity to amend. See Doe v. Princeton Univ. , 2021 WL 194806, at *12 (D.N.J. Jan 20, 2021). Doe declined, so the District Court dismissed his action with prejudice. Doe filed this timely appeal.7 For the reasons below, we will vacate.

II.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. See Doe v. Univ. of Scis. , 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020) (" USciences "). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That requires "plausibly suggesting" facts sufficient to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Our review must accept Doe's factual allegations as true and consider those facts in the light most favorable to Doe. See USciences , 961 F.3d at 208, 210 n.3. But we "disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Davis v. Wells Fargo , 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016).

A. The Princeton Report

We note two complications that may arise when evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) : whether a district court may consider documents outside of the pleadings and, if so, whether the district court may disregard the well-pleaded facts of a complaint in favor of facts in an external document. Doe alleges that the District Court impermissibly credited findings in the Report as true, despite his Complaint's assertions to the contrary. These findings included the Report's statements that "[t]he Panel found Jane credible," there were "significant concerns" with Doe's credibility, and all other witnesses were "generally credible." ( App. at 13.)

Generally, "a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). But where a document is "integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," it "may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment" under Rule 56. USciences , 961 F.3d at 208 (quoting Burlington , 114 F.3d at 1426 ). Because the Panel Report was "integral to" and "explicitly relied upon in the [C]omplaint," consideration is appropriate. But consideration only goes so far. When the truth of facts in an "integral" document are contested by the well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the facts in the complaint must prevail.

To see why, start with Twombly and Iqbal . They direct courts to "accept[ ] as true" the factual assertions of a complaint. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This guidance remains "even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts alleged is improbable and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The proper place to resolve factual disputes is not on a motion to dismiss, but on a motion for summary judgment. See Flora v. Cnty. of Luzerne , 776 F.3d 169, 175–76 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2015).

We have held, for example, that "we may take judicial notice of another court's opinion—not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion." S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd. , 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999) ; see also Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc. , 918 F.3d 102, 118–19 (3d Cir. 2019). So, too, with a public record, which may be considered "not for the truth of its contents, but rather as evidence of the information provided [that was relevant to the dispute]." Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, Dep't of Pub. Health , 503 F.3d 256, 273 n.11 (3d Cir. 2007) ; see also Oran v. Stafford , 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, concessions by counsel may not be used in a motion to dismiss to decide disputed issues of material fact. See Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC , 935 F.3d 187, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2019). And neither may testimony given at a hearing. See Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh , 824 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 2016).

USciences reflects this approach. There, we accepted facts in the university's Title IX investigator's report as true when they were not disputed by the complaint. But not facts challenged by the plaintiff. For example, we credited the report's assertion of how many drinks Doe and Roe consumed on the...

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