Doe v. Purdue Univ.
| Docket Number | 4:18-CV-89-JEM |
| Decision Date | 07 November 2023 |
| Parties | NANCY ROE, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on a Joint Motion for Indicative Ruling on Vacatur Pending Settlement [DE 218], filed on November 4, 2023.
On November 13, 2018, two female students filed an eight count Complaint against Defendants, their former University and several of its administrators, alleging that they were assaulted in unrelated incidents by male students at Purdue University and were then wrongfully expelled, with the expulsions later reduced to suspensions. Plaintiffs separately reported the incidents to Purdue. According to the Complaint, Purdue investigated and found that Plaintiff Mary Doe had “fabricated” her allegation and Plaintiff Nancy Roe had “reported [her] assault maliciously.” Plaintiffs allege that Purdue “implemented a policy . . . wherein women who cannot prove their claims to the satisfaction of Purdue decisionmakers face discipline up to expulsion at Purdue,” and assert that both Plaintiffs were wrongly suspended.
After a motion to dismiss was granted in part, the remaining counts alleged violations of Title IX, retaliation under Title IX deprivation of civil rights under § 1983 against the individuals in their official capacity, and individual § 1983 liability. Plaintiff Mary Doe and Defendants resolved the case on August 31, 2022, and the case proceeded to a jury trial as to Plaintiff Nancy Roe only. On September 23, 2022, the five-day jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Roe against Defendant Purdue pursuant to Title IX, with a damages award of $10,000, and a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Roe against Defendants Sermersheim and Rollock pursuant to § 1983, with no damages awarded.
On July 12, 2022, the Court entered an order denying Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Damage Claims (Counts VII and VIII) for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and on September 21, 2022, denied in part a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law brought at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case. Defendants timely filed a motion seeking relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b), 59(a)(1)(A), and 60(a), which this Court denied on March 31, 2023. The Court also granted in part Plaintiff's Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, awarding attorneys' fees totaling $124,860 and taxing costs totaling $10,710.93 [DE 189, 190], and entered judgment against Defendants on the attorney fee award [DE 191] and ordered an injunction against Purdue [DE 192]. On May 18, 2023, this Court granted Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees [DE 201] and entered an additional judgment against Defendants for $32,215 [DE 202].
Defendants appealed each of these orders, and those appeals remain pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the instant Motion, the parties represent that they have reached a conditional settlement of all disputes between them and seek vacatur of this Court's judgments of September, 2022, March, 2023, and May, 2023.
The parties filed forms of consent to have this case assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings and to order the entry of a final judgment in this case.
Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) grants district courts the authority to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b), and in particular its “catch-all” clause 60(b)(6), “vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949).[1] In exercising its discretion to determine whether or not to vacate the judgments in this case, the Court is guided by the array of equitable factors of justice and hardship traditionally balanced by district courts in considering requests for Rule 60(b) relief and presented in this case, including the public interests in precedent, preclusion, and judicial economy and the circumstances, hardships, and interests of the private parties. Mayes v. City of Hammond, 631 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
The parties seek relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) and 62.1(a)(3) and argue that the Court should “appl[y] a balance of the equities test” to determine whether to grant vacatur in furtherance of a settlement agreement, Smith v. Saul, No. 1:19-CR371-HAB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14654, at *8-9 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 22, 2021),considering “the public interests in precedent, preclusion, and judicial economy” as well as “the circumstances, hardships, and interests of the private parties,” Mayes v. City of Hammond, 631 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
The parties represent that they all agree it is in their own personal best interests to have the judgments vacated, and the Court agrees that they are in the best position to assess their own best interests. The Court also agrees that the toll of the trial, the uncertainty of ongoing litigation, and the ability to move on without this matter weighing on them weighs heavily in favor of granting vacatur in order to effectuate a settlement.
The parties also represent that they have limited the relief they request to alleviate as much as possible harm to the public interests in precedent, preclusion and judicial economy. The parties do not request vacatur of the jury's findings only the resulting and related judgments. They rely on the analysis in Mayes, 631 F.Supp.2d at 1090, that “judgment based on a jury verdict ... in and of itself has no precedential value,” so vacating the judgments does not...
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