Doe v. Ray

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
Citation251 N.W.2d 496
Docket NumberNo. 2-59856,2-59856
PartiesJohn DOE et al., Appellants, v. Robert D. RAY, Governor of the State of Iowa, et al., Appellees.
Decision Date16 March 1977

Gordon E. Allen, Leslie Babich, Mark W. Bennett, and Robert J. Rhudy, Des Moines, for appellants.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore R. Boecker and Bruce Foudree, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees.

Heard en banc.

MOORE, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs, patients at the Mental Health Institute in Mount Pleasant and the Association for Mental Health, Inc., appeal trial court's judgment dismissing their class action which sought to permanently enjoin defendants from modifying Building 20 at the Institute for use as a medium security correctional facility. We affirm.

Trial of this case extended over a period of seven days. We believe the following is a reasonable summary of the record made below as well as the legislative history and statutes involved.

To assist in alleviating the critical shortage of prison facilities in Iowa, the Second Session of the 66th General Assembly, in June 1976, enacted chapter 1043 (H.F. 1539) which granted to the Governor of the State of Iowa the discretion to select, in consultation with the Commissioner of Social Services, one of three sites for use as a temporary medium security correctional facility. The Act specifically provided that if the Governor did elect to exercise one of these options the capacity of the facility was not to exceed 150 persons and its operations were limited to two years after the effective date of the Act (July 1, 1976) unless an extension was granted by a subsequent General Assembly. Section 1(5)(b) provided the following as one available option:

"Modification of Building 20 at the mental health institute at Mount Pleasant for use as a medium security correctional facility, and operation of the facility, without discontinuing any of the mental health programs now offered at that institute and without intent on the part of the general assembly to influence or to restrict the scope of the recommendations relative to future utilization, conversion or discontinuation of the state mental institute which the department is required by this Act to prepare; * * *."

After consultation with Kevin Burns, Director of the Iowa Department of Social Services and various other individuals, Governor Robert D. Ray elected to implement the Mount Pleasant option.

The Mental Health Institute at Mount Pleasant is one of four facilities serving respective quadrants of the State. The other three are located at Clarinda, Cherokee and Independence. It is classified as an "acute residential treatment center" and serves a wide variety of patients in this capacity. At trial, the parties stipulated that there are approximately 210 to 240 patients at the Institute. This population includes male and female patients who range in age from children and adolescents to the elderly. Voluntary admissions comprise 38 percent of all these patients. While the Institute is characterized as an "open campus" it does have two closed wards and "passes" are required before patients can leave their wards, circulate on the grounds or visit the Mount Pleasant Community.

The plan ultimately designed by the Department of Social Services in July 1976 entailed appropriating approximately 71/2 acres of the 165-acre site and one building, Building 20, for the medium security facility. Building 20 is a fairly large, modern, relatively new structure located on the far right-hand side of the semi-circle of buildings as one approaches the facility by the main entrance. The main entrance road leads directly into a parking lot in front of the administrative building. Building 20 was being used primarily for purposes not related to those of the Institute. The area was to be enclosed by a double row of 12-foot high chain link fences, eight feet apart, capped with an 18-inch roll of "razor ribbon wire" across the top. The fences would be situated 300 feet from the nearest mental patient residence. Between the two fences a silent electronic security alarm would be connected to the T.V. surveillance system. These fences would be continuously illuminated at night. Uniformed, armed correctional officers will man 12-foot high security towers and there will be a patrol vehicle around the perimeter of the medium security facility. Additionally, some remodeling was planned to modify Building 20 in such a manner as to accommodate the prisoners.

The two facilities will be separately staffed and the only mental health personnel used by the correctional facility will be the business and personnel manager and staff. There may be some other limited exchange of services, including X-Ray and dental, but nothing has been finalized. However, contact between the patients and prisoners could be minimized or even avoided through use of a tunnel system connecting Building 20 to parts of the Mental Health Institute.

Both Mr. Burns and Calvin Auger, Acting Director of the Bureau of Corrections, testified the type of individual who would be placed at Mount Pleasant would be property offenders with six months or less to serve on their sentences. Unlike as at previous times when some inmates from Fort Madison Penitentiary worked at the Mental Health Institute, it was anticipated the Reformatory at Anamosa will be the sending institution.

When the Department of Social Services moved to implement this plan, on July 27, 1976, plaintiffs filed their petition in six divisions seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Trial commenced on August 23, 1976 in Polk County District Court. Plaintiffs called as witnesses several prominent psychiatrists and psychologists who testified the construction of a prison on the same location as a mental health clinic would be detrimental to the "open campus" concept and adversely affect utilization of "milieu therapy" to assist the mental health patients. Defendants' experts took a contrary position and stated they foresaw no such detrimental effect.

The trial court prepared and filed detailed findings of fact and squarely met and decided the issues raised in each division of plaintiffs' petition. Three divisions alleged violation of constitutional rights. The other three raised questions of statutory construction and proper implementation of the statutes involved. The trial court specifically held adversely on each of plaintiffs' six contentions.

In its decree filed September 10, 1976 the trial court denied injunctive relief and dismissed plaintiffs' action. On this appeal plaintiffs have expressly limited their appeal to claimed erroneous holdings including statutory construction and proper implementation of the statutes. Alleged violation of constitutional rights is not pursued on this appeal.

I. This action for injunctive relief is a civil suit standing in equity. City of Des Moines v. Harvey, Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 606, 610; Sound Storm Ent., Inc. v. Keefe, In & For Fayette Cty., Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 560, 565. Thus our review is de novo. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure. Especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, but are not bound by them. Rule 344(f)(7), R.C.P; White v. Board of Review of Polk County, Iowa, 244 N.W.2d 765, 772; Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Company, Iowa, 214 N.W.2d 126, 128.

II. The first of plaintiffs' three propositions raised for reversal asserts the trial court erred when it failed to find implementation of 66 G.A. chapter 1043, section 1(5)(b), (1976 Session) was in conflict with 66 G.A. chapter 139, section 23, (1975 Session). That section, one portion of a comprehensive Act relating to the hospitalization of the mentally ill, sets forth a "Bill of Rights" for hospitalized persons as follows:

"Every person who is hospitalized or detained under this Act shall have the right to:

"1. Prompt evaluation, emergency psychiatric services, and care and treatment as indicated by sound medical practice.

"3. In addition to protection of his constitutional rights, enjoyment of other legal, medical, religious, social, political, personal and working rights and privileges which he would enjoy if he were not so hospitalized or detained, so far as is possible consistent with effective treatment of that person and of the other patients of the hospital. * * *."

The crux of plaintiffs' argument is that while chapter 1043 was intended to remedy the overcrowded prison conditions in Iowa it was to do so consistent with the rights of mental patients. They contend the implementation of the Department of Social Services' blueprint modifying Building 20 and the immediate surrounding area is "inconsistent with sound medical practice" and in conflict with the clear intent of the legislature; it thus constitutes an illegal act and cannot stand.

In interpreting these statutes we are guided by familiar principles of statutory construction. Of course, the polestar is legislative intent. Iowa Dept. of Rev. v. Iowa Merit Employ. Com'n., Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 610, 614; Cassady v. Wheeler, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 649, 651. Our goal is to ascertain that intent and, if possible, give it effect. State v. Prybil, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311; Isaacson v. Iowa State Tax Commission, Iowa, 183 N.W.2d 693, 695. Thus, intent is shown by construing the statute as a whole. In searching for legislative intent we consider the objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied in reaching a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it. Peters v. Iowa Emp. Security Com'n., Iowa,235 N.W.2d 306, 310; Iowa Nat. Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State, Etc., Iowa,224 N.W.2d 437, 440. However, we must avoid legislating in our own right and placing upon statutory language a strained, impractical or absurd construction. Cedar Mem. Park Cem. Ass'n v. Personnel Assoc., Inc.,...

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