Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: WILLIAM M. RAY, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 688 F.Supp.3d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2023)
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:21-cv-04278-WMR
• Decision Date: 10 August 2023
• Parties: Jane DOES 1-4, Plaintiffs, v. RED ROOF INNS, INC., et al., Defendants.

688 F.Supp.3d 1247

Jane DOES 1-4, Plaintiffs, v. RED ROOF INNS, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:21-cv-04278-WMR

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

Signed August 10, 2023

Amanda Kay Seals, John Earl Floyd, Juliana Mesa, Manoj Sam Varghese, Michael Rosen Baumrind, Tiana Scogin Mykkeltvedt, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jonathan Tonge, Patrick J. McDonough, Andersen, Tate & Carr, P.C., Duluth, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Admir Allushi, Charles Kyle Reed, P. Michael Freed, Lillian Kate Henry, Emma Jeanette Fennelly, Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Marcella Coladangelo Ducca, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Atlanta, GA, C. Ashley Saferight, Pro Hac Vice, Chelsea R. Mikula, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, Cleveland, OH, Sandra Wunderlich, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants Westmont Hospitality Group, Inc., Red Roof Inns, Inc., Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management, LLC, RRI III, LLC.

Admir Allushi, Charles Kyle Reed, P. Michael Freed, Emma Jeanette Fennelly, Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Marcella Coladangelo Ducca, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Atlanta, GA, C. Ashley Saferight, Pro Hac Vice, Chelsea R. Mikula, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, Cleveland, OH, Sandra Wunderlich, Pro Hac Vice, Tucker Ellis, LLP, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant FMW RRI NC, LLC.

C. Shane Keith, Elliott Crawford Ream, Warner S. Fox, Hawkins Parnell & Young, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Varahi Hotel, LLC.

ORDER

WILLIAM M. RAY, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Red Roof Inns, Inc., FMW RRI NC, LLC, Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management, LLC, and RRI III, LLC's (collectively "Red Roof Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 [Doc. 148], Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 [Doc. 149], Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Jane Doe 3 [Doc. 150], and Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff Jane Doe 4 [Doc. 151]. Upon consideration of the arguments presented and authorities cited by the parties, the applicable law, and all appropriate matters of record, all of the motions for summary judgment are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 3 bring claims against the Red Roof Defendants for damages resulting from their alleged trafficking at two Red Roof hotel locations: the Smyrna Red Roof hotel located at 2200 Corporate Plaza, Smyrna, Georgia 30080; and the Buckhead Red Roof hotel located at 1960 N. Druid Hills, Atlanta, Georgia 30329. Plaintiff Jane Doe 4 brings claims against the Red Roof Defendants for damages resulting from her alleged trafficking only at the Smyrna Red Roof hotel.

At all times during the alleged trafficking, the Buckhead Red Roof hotel was owned and operated by the Red Roof Defendants under the following framework: RRI III, LLC was the real estate holding company that owned the land; RRI West Management, LLC was the management company that operated the hotel and employed regional staff; and Red Roof Inns, Inc. was the corporate entity that employed the local hotel staff.

The Smyrna Red Roof hotel was likewise owned and operated by the Red Roof Defendants during the alleged trafficking of Jane Doe 3 and Jane Doe 4. However, during the relevant periods of trafficking alleged by Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, the Smyrna Red Roof hotel was owned and operated by Varahi Hotel, LLC. In December 2012, Varahi had contracted with Defendant Red Roof Franchising, LLC to use the brand and Varahi paid royalties and fees to Red Roof Franchising, LLC, which in turn paid Defendant Red Roof Inns, Inc.

All four Plaintiffs allege the Red Roof Defendants: (1) violated the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), O.C.G.A § 16-14-4(a) and (c), and are subject to civil liability for their operation of the hotel(s); (2) violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, and are subject to civil liability for their operation of the hotel(s); and (3) were negligent in failing to keep the hotel(s) safe and secure.¹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions" and cannot be made by the district court in considering whether to grant summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating same standard).

If a movant meets its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, "and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn" in favor of that opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Graham, 193 F.3d at 1282 ("[T]he evidence of the non-movants is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.").

If the record presents genuine factual issues, "a trial judge must not make findings but is required to deny the motion and proceed to trial." Georgia State Conf. of NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 775 F.3d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2015). A fact is "material" only if it can affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing legal principles. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. But "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," summary judgment for the moving party is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiffs' Negligence Claims

Under Georgia law, "[t]he essential elements of a negligence claim are the existence of a legal duty; breach of that duty; a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury; and damages." Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., 311 Ga. App. 693, 695, 716 S.E.2d 713 (2011) (citation and punctuation omitted). Among other duties relevant in this case, Georgia law "imposes a nondelegable duty upon a landowner to keep [its] premises in a reasonably safe condition." TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 462, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003) (en banc). This includes the duty to protect against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts which do not sever any causal relationship with a plaintiff's injuries. Id. Reasonable foreseeability does not require "actual knowledge of criminal conduct," Walker v. Aderhold Props., Inc., 303 Ga. App. 710, 713, 694 S.E.2d 119 (2010) (en banc), nor does it require—as Defendants argued—substantially similar criminal acts. Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 316 Ga. 718, 726, 890 S.E.2d 209 (Ga. June 29, 2023). "[T]he pertinent question is whether the totality of the circumstances relevant to the premises gave the proprietor sufficient 'reason to anticipate the criminal act' giving rise to the plaintiff's injuries on the premises." Id. Reasonable foreseeability can also be proven with evidence that the owner "acknowledge[d]" the danger at issue, or "a danger could be so obvious that an issue for jury determination could exist regarding notice and/or foreseeability despite the absence of a prior similar incident on those premises." Wallace v. Boys Club, 211 Ga. App. 534, 536 n.2, 439 S.E.2d 746 (1993). Thus, a defendant remains "liable for third-party criminal attacks if [defendant] has reasonable grounds to apprehend that such a criminal act would be committed but fails to take steps to guard against injury." TGM, 264 Ga. App. at 462, 590 S.E.2d 807. Moreover, "it is well settled that the question of reasonable foreseeability [of a crime] is generally a question for the jury to decide." Carmichael, at 725, 890 S.E.2d at 221.

The Red Roof Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' negligence claims relating to the Buckhead and Smyrna Red Roof hotels fail as a matter of law because the criminal acts of third parties, like Plaintiffs' traffickers, were not foreseeable and severed any causal relationship with Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. However, the Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the negligence claims.

Prior incidents of prostitution are sufficiently similar to the crimes that caused Plaintiff's injuries—namely, keeping a place of prostitution, prostitution, pimping, and sexual servitude—to make the latter crimes foreseeable. There is evidence to show that, before and during the relevant time periods, consumer feedback and police activity alerted the Red Roof Defendants that prostitution and pimping was occurring at the Buckhead and Smyrna Red Roof hotels. Furthermore, there is evidence showing that hotel employees at both locations were aware of the prostitution occurring on the premises, they acknowledged that prostitution and sex trafficking share common indicators, and they reported the criminal activity to management. Because there is both evidence of prior, substantially similar...