Doe v. Roe

Citation500 F.Supp.3d 1319
Decision Date10 November 2020
Docket NumberCase Number: 17-23333-CIV-MARTINEZ-OTAZO-REYES
Parties Jane DOE, Plaintiff, v. John ROE, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Gerard P. Fox, Pro Hac Vice, Lauren M. Greene, Pro Hac Vice, Michael D. Murphy, Pro Hac Vice, Sebastian E. Kaplan, Pro Hac Vice, Chaka C. Okadigbo, Pro Hac Vice, Gerard Fox Law P.C., Los Angeles, CA, Santiago A. Cueto, Cueto Law Group, P.L., Coral Gables, FL, Jay Mitchell Levy, Jay M. Levy, P.A., Miami, FL, Jennifer Suzanne Carroll, Law Offices of Jennifer S. Carroll, P.A., Jupiter, FL, Kenneth Ray Noble, III, Kirwin Norris PA, Winter Park, FL, Daniel Lawrence Wallach, Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Harris Keith Solomon, Brent V. Trapana, Brinkley Morgan, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOSE E. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant John Roe's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 151). The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff Jane Doe's ("Plaintiff") Response in Opposition (ECF No. 158), the relevant record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. After careful consideration, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an alleged oral agreement entered into by the parties in 2002, shortly after their daughter was born ("Child X"). Prior to Child X's birth, Plaintiff and Defendant maintained a nine-year relationship while Defendant was married to another woman. (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 11, ECF No. 127). According to Plaintiff, "from the moment of Child X's birth, Defendant demanded that Plaintiff keep his parentage of Child X confidential." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 16). As a result, she alleges that they entered into an oral agreement whereby Defendant would:

(1) create a trust, the principal of which would be paid to Child X when she was 27, and prior to that would yield $20,000 a month [ ] and (2) pay Plaintiff one million dollars in exchange for both her compliance with his demand that she refrain from making it publicly known that she was Child X's father as well as in exchange for her agreement to raise Child X alone.

(Pl.’s Opp., at 1, ECF No. 158).

In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges five counts against Defendant: (I) Fraud in the Inducement; (II) Fraud; (III) Promissory Estoppel; (IV) Breach of Contract; and (V) Unjust Enrichment. (2d Am. Compl.). Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all counts. (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 151).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there will be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, an issue is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant, thus, must point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(c), the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving party, who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party "may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleadings," but instead must come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for a breach of an alleged oral contract between the parties, as well as Plaintiff's claims for fraud, fraud in the inducement, and promissory estoppel. He argues, inter alia , that these claims are barred by the statute of frauds. (Mot. Summ. J., at 3–6, 14–15, 17).1 Even assuming, without deciding the matter, that a contract between the parties exists,2 the Court agrees that the alleged oral agreement falls under the statute of frauds, thereby barring Plaintiff's claims. As to Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment, the Court finds that it similarly fails because Plaintiff has not conferred a benefit upon Defendant.

A. Applicable Law

As a threshold matter, the Court must decide whether New York or Florida law applies. In diversity actions such as this one, the Court is required to apply the substantive law of the forum state, including its conflict-of-law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elect. Mfg. Co. , 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941) ; Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In Florida, a "true conflict" of laws exists when "two or more states have a legitimate interest in a particular set of facts in litigation and the laws of those states differ or would produce a different result." Walker v. Paradise Hotel, Ltd. , No. 01-3564, 2003 WL 21361662, *2–3 (S.D. Fla. April 25, 2003). On the other hand, a "false conflict" exists where the laws of the interested jurisdictions would produce the same outcome. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Technologies , 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1218 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Tune v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 766 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ). When a "false conflict" exists, the law of the forum state—Florida—applies. Cavic v. Grand Bahama Dev. Co. , 701 F.2d 879, 882 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[U]nder applicable conflict-of-laws principles the law of the forum would govern the substantive issues due to the absence of facts justifying the application of the law of some other jurisdiction.").

Plaintiff asserts for the first time in her response to the Motion that New York law governs her claims. (Pl.’s Opp., at 2–4). She claims that the alleged "agreement, promises, and misrepresentations that form the basis of her complaint occurred in New York." (Pl.’s Opp., at 2). Notwithstanding, and contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, regardless of whether Florida or New York law is applied to the facts of her claims, the Court ultimately concludes that the outcome of this case is the same, creating a "false conflict." Accordingly, the Court will apply Florida law. See Cavic , 701 F.2d at 882.

B. Breach of Contract

Moving on to the merits of this action, the Court finds that the statute of frauds bars Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. The statute of frauds sets forth that "no action shall be brought ... upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of 1 year from the making thereof" and is not in writing. Fla. Stat. § 725.01 ; see also N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a) (In New York, the statute of frauds requires that an oral agreement be memorialized by a writing if that agreement cannot "be performed within one year from the making thereof."). The statute is "strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to correct, and [ ] courts should be reluctant to take cases from its protection." LynkUs Commc'ns, Inc. v. WebMD Corp. , 965 So. 2d 1161, 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Yates v. Ball , 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341, 344 (1938) ); see also Pickering v. Am. Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. , No. 98 CIV. 8998 JFK, 1999 WL 1225246, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 1999) (there is a "strong public policy favoring application of the Statute of Frauds.").

According to Plaintiff, the parties entered into an oral agreement in 2002, that Defendant would,

(1) create a trust, the principal of which would be paid to Child X when she was 27, and prior to that would yield $20,000 a month (a trust that was viewed as an alternative form of inheritance), and (2) pay Plaintiff one million dollars in exchange for both her compliance with his demand that she refrain from making it publicly known that he was Child X's father as well as in exchange for her agreement to raise Child X alone.

(Pl.’s Opp., at 1; see 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29).

It becomes evident by the terms of the alleged oral agreement that the complete agreement cannot possibly be performed within one year of its making. Plaintiff's primary obligation under the agreement, namely, that she maintain Child X's paternity a secret, extended in perpetuity.3 (See Sanctions Hearing Trans., at 114: 1–5 (Plaintiff testified that she was required to keep Defendant's identity a secret for the rest of her life)). Plaintiff was also required to "raise Child X on her own." (2d Am. Compl. ¶ 29). This obligation extended, at the very least, for 18 years, until Child X reached the age of majority. Finally, Defendant's obligations pursuant to the alleged agreement were also impossible of being performed within one year of the contract's making. The agreement called for Defendant to create a trust for Child X, and make monthly payments of $20,000, until Child X was 27 years old, at which time the principal of the trust was to be paid to her. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29; Pl.’s Opp., at 1). Under those terms, Defendant's obligations extended for a period of 27 years. As such, "it is clear from the object to be accomplished ... and the surrounding circumstances that the agreement alleged by [Plaintiff] was intended to extend for a...

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