Doe v. Roe

• Decision Date: 01 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 15901,15901
• Citation: 717 A.2d 706,246 Conn. 652
• Parties: Mary DOE v. John ROE, et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 706

717 A.2d 706

246 Conn. 652

Mary DOE v.John ROE, et al.

No. 15901.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 28, 1998.

Decided Sept. 1, 1998.

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, was Barbara L. Cox, and Jean L. Welty, New Haven, for appellants(respondents).

Douglas R. Daniels, New Haven, for appellee(petitioner).

Penn Rhodeen, New Haven, for minor child.

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and McDONALD, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

The narrow question presented by this appeal is whether the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction to render judgment in accordance with an agreement that includes a promise by a surrogate mother to consent to the termination of her parental rights in Probate Court.The trial courtPittman, J., rendered judgment in accordance with such an agreement.Subsequently, the trial court, Alander, J., upon review of the judgment, and after concluding that it purported to terminate the surrogate mother's parental rights, vacated the judgment on the ground that, under the circumstances, the court that had approved the agreement lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do so.Because we conclude that approval of the agreement was within the authority of the Superior Court, we reverse.

The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed.On January 25, 1994, the petitioner, Mary Doe, signed a surrogacy contract with the named respondent, John Roe, to carry a child fathered by him through artificial insemination.The petitioner further agreed to voluntarily surrender custody of the child to the named respondent and his wife, Jane Roe, ¹ upon birth, and to allow for the subsequent adoption of the child by Jane Roe.Jack Roe(child), who was conceived pursuant to this surrogacy contract, ² was born on December 13, 1994.Immediately after the child's birth, the petitioner turned him over to the respondents in accordance with the parties' surrogacy contract.³

On April 10, 1995, when the child was almost four months old, the petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking custody of the child.On the same day, the petitioner also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking sole guardianship of the child and a determination that the surrogacy contract was void as against public policy and voidable because it was signed under duress and false pretenses.Thereafter, the respondents filed a counterclaim seeking: (1) specific performance of the surrogacy contract; (2) permanent custody of the child; and (3) an order enjoining the petitioner from attempting to form a parent-child relationship with the child.

On July 8, 1996, the parties reported to Judge Pittman that they had reached an agreement settling all of the outstanding issues raised by the petitioner's claims and the respondents' counterclaim.The two part agreement (agreement), which the parties filed with the court, consisted of a stipulation and an open adoption and visitation agreement ⁴ that was incorporated by reference into the stipulation.The agreement provided that the petitioner would execute the documents necessary to terminate her parental rights, thereby enabling Jane Roe to adopt the child.⁵In return, the petitioner would receive: (1) visitation rights with the child; ⁶(2) access to information concerning the child; and (3) payment for certain legal and medical expenses.The agreement also provided for confidentiality and joint counseling, and set forth the specific terms of visitation by the petitioner.Moreover, the parties agreed to withdraw all existing legal and administrative proceedings against each other.⁷

Judge Pittman canvassed each of the parties to ascertain "the voluntariness and the fact of everyone's understanding the agreement."The colloquy was interrupted when the petitioner indicated that she misunderstood the purported finality of the adoption arrangement.⁸A discussion followed regarding whether the petitioner could seek to reopen the adoption in Probate Court if the respondents breached the agreement.Judge Pittman called a recess so the parties could clarify that the adoption of the child would become final after it was ordered by the Probate Court.Following the recess, Judge Pittman renewed her canvass of the parties regarding their understanding of all aspects of the agreement.Judge Pittman, satisfied that the parties understood the implications of the agreement, rendered judgment ⁹ in accordance with it, and confirmed the respondents' continued custody of the child.¹⁰The following day, July 9, 1996, the respondents filed an application in Probate Court for stepparent adoption of the child.

On March 4, 1997, the respondents filed a motion in Superior Court, seeking to hold the petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with certain terms of the agreement.The respondents claimed that the petitioner had violated provisions of the agreement relating to custody and visitation, and that she had attempted to revoke her consent to the termination of her parental rights, also in breach of the agreement.With respect to the termination issue, the respondents sought an order from the court directing the petitioner to affirm her consent to the termination of her parental rights and enjoining her from contesting the termination proceedings.

On May 27, 1997, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.She claimed that, by rendering the 1996 judgment relating to the execution of termination documents, Judge Pittman, in effect, had sought to terminate her parental rights.Relying on Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 549-50, 438 A.2d 755(1980), the petitioner asserted that the trial court, Pittman, J., lacked jurisdiction to render the 1996 judgment.

Judge Alander held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on June 9, 1997.At the hearing, the respondents withdrew that portion of their contempt motion that sought an order requiring the petitioner to consent to the termination of her parental rights.The respondents, however, pressed their motion insofar as it sought enforcement of the provisions of the agreement relating to custody and visitation.Judge Alander concluded that Judge Pittman, in rendering the 1996 judgment, had intended to finalize the termination of the petitioner's parental rights, a matter over which the Superior Court, under the circumstances, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Although it is undisputed that the custody and visitation issues were within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, Judge Alander also declined to enforce those provisions of the agreement on the ground that they could not be severed from the provisions dealing with the termination of the petitioner's parental rights.The custody and visitation provisions, Judge Alander stated, were "afterthought[s]" to an agreement concerned primarily with termination and adoption.Consequently, Judge Alander denied the respondents' motion for contempt and vacated the 1996 judgment in its entirety.¹¹

The respondents appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, Alander, J., vacating the 1996 judgment.We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book§ 4023, now Practice Book§ 65-1, andGeneral Statutes § 51-199(c).

On appeal, the respondents and the child's attorney claim, first, that the trial court, Pittman, J., had jurisdiction to render a judgment incorporating an executory agreement to terminate parental rights and to undertake adoption proceedings in the Probate Court.Accordingly, they ask this court to fully reinstate the 1996 judgment.Alternatively, the respondents claim that, even if the trial court, Pittman, J., did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment incorporating the parties' agreement regarding the termination of the petitioner's parental rights, the custody and visitation provisions of the agreement were severable from the termination provisions and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the trial court, Pittman, J.As to those portions of the 1996 judgment, the respondents claim that General Statutes § 52-212a¹² prevents the petitioner from opening or setting aside the 1996 judgment because more than four months have elapsed since it was rendered.Consequently, in the event that we affirm Judge Alander's decision to vacate the portions of the agreement relating to the termination of parental rights, the respondents seek reversal of Judge Alander's decision with respect to the those portions of the agreement dealing with custody and visitation.

The petitioner counters that Judge Alander properly vacated the 1996 judgment.Specifically, she asserts, and the respondents do not contest, that there are two, and only two, statutorily authorized vehicles for terminating parental rights, namely: (1) a petition to the ProbateCourt pursuant to General Statutes(Rev. to 1995)§ 45a-715, as amended byPublic Acts 1995, No. 95-349, § 4;¹³ and (2) a direct petition to the Superior Court on behalf of a child in the custody of the commissioner of children and families pursuant to General Statutes(Rev. to 1995)§ 17a-112, as amended byPublic Acts 1995, No. 95-238, § 3.¹⁴SeeHao Thi Popp v. Lucas, supra, 182 Conn. at 550, 438 A.2d 755.¹⁵She argues, further, that because an integral part of the 1996 judgment purported to effectuate a termination of parental rights, and because that termination was not effectuated pursuant to either one of the two statutorily authorized vehicles, the trial court, Pittman, J., lacked subject matter jurisdiction to effect such a termination.

We conclude that the 1996 judgment incorporating the parties' agreement did not terminate the petitioner's parental rights and, accordingly, the trial court, Pittman, J., did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to render the 1996 judgment.We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court, Alander, J., vacating the 1996 judgment.¹⁶

A determination regarding ...