Doe v. Roe

• Decision Date: 20 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 30474.,30474.
• Citation: Doe v. Roe, 127 P.3d 105, 142 Idaho 202 (Idaho 2005)
• Parties: In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption of John Doe I, a Minor Child. John DOE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John ROE, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 105

127 P.3d 105

142 Idaho 202

In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption of John Doe I, a Minor Child John DOE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John ROE, Respondent.

No. 30474.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Coeur d'Alene, October 2005 Term.

December 20, 2005.

Amaro Law Office, Coeur d'Alene, for Appellant. Rami Amaro argued.

Ian D. Smith, Coeur d'Alene, for Respondent.

TROUT, Justice.

John Doe (Husband) appeals from a magistrate court decision that denied his petition to terminate John Roe's (Father) parental rights to Baby Doe and to allow Husband to adopt the child.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Husband was married to Baby Doe's mother (Mother) when Baby Doe was born and, as a result, Husband was shown as the father on Baby Doe's birth certificate and Baby Doe was given Husband's last name. Husband and Mother lived together for several years with Baby Doe and another child born to Husband and Mother although, ultimately, a divorce action was filed. Throughout this time, unbeknownst to Husband, Mother was having sexual relations with Father, including both before and after Baby Doe's birth. Approximately four and one-half years after Baby Doe's birth, Husband finally learned during the divorce proceedings that he was probably not the biological father of Baby Doe. Despite that, the magistrate judge presiding over the divorce found Husband to be the presumed, natural father of Baby Doe because Baby Doe was born into Husband's marriage with Mother and Husband had acted in all respects as the child's father. The magistrate judge awarded Husband primary physical custody of Baby Doe and his brother. In response, Mother went to the person she believed to be the biological father, Father, and encouraged him to step forward and assert his parental rights.

Prior to entry of the divorce decree, in an attempt to protect his rights as Baby Doe's father and foreclose any possibility that the biological father would assert any parental rights, Husband filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the unidentified biological father and to adopt Baby Doe. Husband sought to terminate the biological father's rights on the grounds that (1) the biological father abandoned Baby Doe pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(a) and (2) that termination was in the best interests of Baby Doe and the biological father pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(e) (2002)¹. After Husband filed the petition, at Mother's encouragement Father took a paternity test, which established that he was Baby Doe's biological father. Father, thereafter, appeared in the case and objected to the termination proceeding, claiming he did not assert an interest in his child earlier because he was unaware that the child was his.

The matter went to trial and at the conclusion, the magistrate judge declined to terminate Father's rights, finding there was insufficient evidence that Father had abandoned the child or that termination was in the best interests of Father and Baby Doe. The magistrate judge, however, concluded that Husband "is the presumptive father, the decreed father, the psychological father and custodial father of [Baby Doe]. He will retain custody of [Baby Doe]." The trial court then granted Father limited visitation rights, suggested Baby Doe should "spend some time with all three parents" and entered a child support award. Husband appealed and requested a permissive appeal to this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1, which was granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over the trial judge's conclusions of law. Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002). "The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law over which this court exercises free review." Woodburn v. Manco Prods., Inc., 137 Idaho 502, 504, 50 P.3d 997, 999 (2002).

"In an action to terminate parental rights, `where a clear and convincing standard has been noted explicitly and applied by the trial court, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence.'" Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 39 Idaho 930, 934, 88 P.3d 749, 753 (2004). Only clearly erroneous findings are overturned, which means a reasonable person would not have relied on them in concluding as the fact finder did. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho at 605, 38 P.3d at 1261.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standing

Husband argues at the outset that Father has no standing to appear in this proceeding and object to the termination of his parental rights because at the time Husband filed the petition to terminate, Father had done nothing to assert his parental rights. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wished to have adjudicated....[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 477, 50 P.3d 488, 492 (2002).

The issue of whether Father has standing begs the real question of whether he has any parental rights at all. If Father has parental rights, then there is no question that he may suffer an injury in fact if those rights are terminated. Permitting him to appear and object to termination is a means by which he could prevent that injury, giving him standing. However, the threshold question is whether he has rights at all which must then be terminated and that is the real issue presented by this appeal.

B. Termination Action and Petition for Adoption

A child born during wedlock is presumed to be the child of the mother and her husband. I.C. § 16-2002(k). Indeed, shortly after filing this termination action, Husband received a decree of divorce from Mother, clearly indicating that he was the natural and presumed father of Baby Doe and was entitled to primary custody of both Baby Doe and his brother.

I.C. § 16-2004 states in pertinent part that a petition to terminate parental rights may be filed by: "[e]ither parent when termination is sought with respect to the other parent" or "any other person possessing a legitimate interest in the matter." I.C. § 16-2004(a) and (d) (emphasis added). Because Husband was presumptively Baby Doe's legal father at the time the termination action was filed and was not seeking to terminate the rights of the other parent (Mother), subsection (a) does not appear to apply. While Husband may be "any other person possessing a legitimate interest," at the time the action was brought no one had asserted parental rights superior to, or even in opposition to, Husband's rights. Essentially, Husband filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of a person who had never asserted any rights to begin with. After the termination action was filed, Father stepped forward with genetic testing proving that he was Baby Doe's biological father. It has not been challenged on appeal by either party, so we will assume for the purposes of this appeal that Husband was able to file this action as an interested person seeking a declaration of his rights to parent Baby Doe.² Nonetheless, even though Husband may have properly brought the termination action, the question still remains as to whether Father has any cognizable parental rights to terminate.

C. Denial of Termination Petition

Idaho Code § 16-2005(a) provides that parental rights may be terminated if "the parent has abandoned the child...." I.C. § 16-2005(a). Based on the facts and arguments presented, the magistrate judge declined to terminate Father's rights, finding that there was insufficient evidence that Father had abandoned Baby Doe under the termination statute. The underlying premise in a parental rights termination action, however, is that the defendant parent has some parental right to his or her child, which should be terminated. Thus, where there is an initial question as to whether a putative father has a parental interest in his child, it is necessary to begin the inquiry with a determination of the precise nature of the biological father's interest. Only after a parental interest has been identified can a court properly evaluate whether this interest may be terminated.

Mere biology does not create a father with legal rights and responsibilities to a minor child. At the time this termination action was pending, I.C. § 16-2002 provided that for an unmarried biological father to be considered a "parent," he must meet one of the following three criteria: (1) his "paternity is established by court decree," (2) he "has filed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity with the vital statistics unit of the department of health and welfare pursuant to section 7-1106, Idaho Code," or (3) his "consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to section 15-1504 [16-1504], Idaho Code." I.C. § 16-2002(j) (2002). Father does not fall into any one of these definitions of a "parent."

First, Father has not had his paternity established by court decree. In the answer to the petition to terminate his parental rights, filed more than four years after Baby Doe's birth, Father requested as relief that the trial court enter an Order of Paternity finding that he is the natural father of Baby Doe. Father then filed a notice of intent to admit the genetic test report into evidence. The trial court in its Findings of Fact noted that "[e]vidence has been presented to this Court that [Father] is the biological father of [Baby Doe] with a 99.92% probability." Father never brought any action to establish his paternity and merely entering a paternity test into evidence during a termination action in no way constitutes a court decree which would fulfill Father's obligation of asserting his parental rights.

Second, Father has never filed an acknowledgment of paternity with vital statistics. Indeed, because Baby Doe...