Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Archdiocese of Detroit, No. 249394 (MI 12/21/2004)
Decision Date | 21 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 249394.,249394. |
Parties | JOHN DOE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF DETROIT, an Ecclesiastical entity, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 02-242117-NO.
Weiner & Cox, PLC (by Cyril V. Weiner and Elizabeth C. Thomson), and Allan Falk, P.C. (by Allan S. Falk), for the plaintiff. Southfield, Okemos
Bodman LLP (by Thomas Van Dusen, James J. Walsh, and Joseph E. Viviano) for the defendant. Troy
Amicus Curiae:
Bendure & Thomas (by Mark R. Bendure) for the Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, National and Michigan Chapters. Detroit
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Kelly and H. Hood*, JJ
Defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Detroit appeals by leave granted the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) in this case alleging sexual abuse by Robert Burkholder, a Roman Catholic priest. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicable statutes of limitation did not bar plaintiff John Doe's claims. We reverse because plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraudulent concealment that would toll the statutes of limitation applicable to plaintiff's claims. While we are thoroughly sympathetic to the plight of sexual abuse victims, especially those victimized by Catholic priests, our courts are constrained to correctly apply statutes of limitation and their exceptions in every case. The statutes of limitation have expired in this case and plaintiff has not stated a fraudulent-concealment claim on which relief may be granted.
In December 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Burkholder sexually abused him from 1972 to 1976, when plaintiff served as an altar boy at the Immaculate Heart of Mary (IHM) parish in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiff alleged that Burkholder used his position of religious authority to establish a relationship with plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff recalled that Burkholder sexually assaulted him approximately fifty times, including on day trips, in Burkholder's vehicle, and on church grounds. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint adding that Burkholder sexually abused him again in June 1983 in Hawaii. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware that Burkholder had previously abused other boys, but did nothing to prevent further abuse. Plaintiff alleged that, "It was not until October, 2002 and thereafter that John Doe was able to discover, or reasonably should have discovered, that Burkholder's conduct was wrongful, that John Doe had suffered damage and injury as a result of that conduct, and/or that Burkholder's conduct was a likely cause of John Doe's damages and injuries."
Plaintiff's complaint included claims of (1) clergy malpractice, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) negligence, (5) vicarious liability, and (6) premises liability. In the negligence count, plaintiff alleged that defendant fraudulently concealed plaintiff's causes of action against defendant "by affirmatively misrepresenting Burkholder as a priest or spiritual counselor, fit to serve his duties in the Church, and by allowing him to continue to act as a Priest despite complaints made by other parishioners of sexual abuse." Plaintiff further alleged:
69. The Archdiocese further concealed Burkholder's sexual abuse activities by continuing to relocate him to different Churches within the community that had no knowledge of Burkholder's behavior, as described herein.
70. By engaging in activities to conceal the sexual abuse activities of Burkholder, the Defendants impliedly or expressly condoned his behavior thereby supporting Burkholder's explanations to Plaintiff that his sexual activities with Plaintiff were natural, approved of by God and the Church.
Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that the statutes of limitation barred plaintiff's claims. Responding to plaintiff's allegation that he did not discover his claims until he read about similar cases in October 2002, defendant submitted authority that the discovery rule cannot be applied to extend the time for bringing tort actions for alleged sexual abuse committed against plaintiffs when they were children. Defendant also argued that, on the facts of this case, the discovery rule did not extend the statutes of limitation. Burkholder concurred in the motion.
Plaintiff responded to the motion by arguing that there were questions of fact regarding whether his claims were barred when defendant fraudulently concealed them. Plaintiff argued, "It has only been within the last 12-18 months through widespread media coverage that it has become common knowledge that the catholic [sic] churches through[out] the country maintained a quiet and inconspicuous system of moving priests from parish to parish who had been found molesting children." Plaintiff also argued that he
did not become aware of a cause of action against Defendants until October 2002. It was at this time that [he] was given an article about the criminal prosecution of Burkholder for molesting a boy and that he sought assistance in investigating a claim for the assaults he suffered at the hands of Burkholder. Through investigation, including research of this Court's files, Plaintiff received information that the Archdiocese may have been told about Burkholder years before he met Plaintiff, but did nothing to stop him.
Plaintiff argued that there were questions of fact pertaining to the statutes of limitation, including what actions defendant took to conceal Burkholder's actions, the reasons for Burkholder's transfers, the complaints received by defendant about sexual abuse, and "the time that Plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of a claim against [defendant] for its involvement in providing Burkholder access to children." Plaintiff also argued that, although Burkholder was "finally asked to leave in 1993," there were questions of fact regarding how public this action was and when defendant learned of Burkholder's behavior.
Defendant filed a supplemental response arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred because, even though plaintiff did not know all the details of the evidence that would prove his claims against defendant, he knew or should have known that his causes of action against defendant existed. In support of this argument, defendant submitted portions of plaintiff's medical records demonstrating that plaintiff informed a nurse, a therapist, and a social worker in 2000 that he had been sexually abused by a priest and that he recalled the abuse when he was twenty-five years old.
At oral argument, plaintiff clarified that he did not maintain that he was unaware of Burkholder's identity or the cause of action against Burkholder, but that defendant concealed plaintiff's causes of action against defendant. Specifically, plaintiff argued that he was unaware that defendant knew about Burkholder's conduct and actually facilitated it by moving Burkholder from one parish to another while representing him as a religious authority.
The trial court entered a stipulated order dismissing plaintiff's claims against Burkholder. With regard to plaintiff's claims against defendant, the trial court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition stating, "I think there is a question of fact whether the church knew of Burkholder's activity, and when they knew it, et cetera."
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Rheaume v Vandenberg, 232 Mich App 417, 420-421; 591 NW2d 331 (1998). In reviewing the record to determine if defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we consider all affidavits, pleadings, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties and construe the pleadings in plaintiff's favor. Id. at 421. Absent a disputed question of fact, the determination whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitation is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Colbert v Conybeare Law Office, 239 Mich App 608, 613-614; 609 NW2d 208 (2000).
Plaintiff's claims against defendant include intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence (both ordinary and premises liability.)1 Intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitation. MCL 600.5805(10); Lemmerman v Fealk, 449 Mich 56, 63-64; 534 NW2d 695 (1995).
With regard to claims arising from alleged wrongs that occurred when plaintiff was under the age of majority, the statutes of limitation were tolled until one year from the time the disability of infancy was removed. MCL 600.5851(1). If plaintiff was born in 1965, he would have reached the age of majority in 1983. Accordingly, plaintiff had until 1984 to file these claims. The statutes of limitation were not tolled by MCL 600.5851(1) for claims arising from the alleged wrongs that occurred in Hawaii after plaintiff's eighteenth birthday. In any event, plaintiff concedes that the statutes of limitation should have run on all of his claims against defendant, but contends they were tolled because defendant fraudulently concealed plaintiff's causes of action against defendant. We disagree.
Plaintiff's complaint appears to implicate the discovery rule, which is commonly invoked in claims involving childhood sexual abuse. We conclude that the discovery rule has no application in this case.
The general accrual statute, MCL 600.5827, provides that "the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results." Stated another way, a...
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