Doe v. Saint Joseph's Catholic Church

• Decision Date: 08 March 2022
• Docket Number: S21G0549
• Citation: 870 S.E.2d 365
• Parties: DOE v. SAINT JOSEPH'S CATHOLIC CHURCH et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

870 S.E.2d 365

DOE

v.SAINT JOSEPH'S CATHOLIC CHURCH et al.

S21G0549

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: March 8, 2022

Michael Brian Terry, Jane D. Vincent, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, 1201 West Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 3900, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3417, Darren Wade Penn, Alexandra "Sachi" Cole, Penn Law LLC, 4200 Northside Parkway, NW, Building One, Suite 100, Atlanta, Georgia 30327, for Appellant.

Melina Danielle Lewis, University of Georgia School of Law, 225 Herty Drive, PO Box 1792, Athens, Georgia 30602, Emily M. Hetherington, Wilbanks Cease Clinic, University of Georgia School of Law, P.O. Box 1792, Athens, Georgia 30603, for Amicus Appellant.

Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP, 1105 W. Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 1000, Atlanta, Georgia 30309-3608, for Appellee.

Colvin, Justice.

In December 2018, Phillip Doe filed suit against Saint Joseph's Catholic Church, Archbishop Wilton Gregory, and the Archdiocese of Atlanta (collectively, "the Church"), asserting various tort claims based in part on childhood sexual abuse Doe allegedly suffered while serving as an altar boy at Saint Joseph's in the late 1970s.¹ The trial court granted the Church's motion to dismiss, ruling, in pertinent part, that Doe's "non-nuisance tort claims" were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-33,² and could not be tolled for fraud by OCGA § 9-3-96, which provides that

[i]f the defendant or those under whom he claims are guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff has been debarred or deterred from bringing an action, the period of limitation shall run only from the time of the plaintiff's discovery of the fraud.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Doe v. Saint Joseph's Catholic Church , 357 Ga. App. 710, 712-715 (1) (a)-(c), 850 S.E.2d 267 (2020). We granted the Church's petition for certiorari, asking

[w]hether the trial court erred in granting [the Church's] motion to dismiss [Doe's] non-nuisance tort claims based on the determination that the complaint failed to allege facts that could support the application of OCGA § 9-3-96 sufficient to toll the statute of limitation as to the non-nuisance tort claims.^{[3 ]}

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Although the trial court correctly determined that Doe's claim seeking to hold the Church vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior was time-barred, the court erred in concluding at the motion-to-dismiss stage that Doe could not introduce evidence of fraud within the framework of his complaint sufficient under OCGA § 9-3-96 to toll the limitation period as to his claims of negligent training and supervision, negligent retention, negligent failure to warn and provide adequate security, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.

1. Doe filed suit against the Church on December 20, 2018. According to Doe's amended complaint, the Church employed Father J. Douglas Edwards as a priest to oversee Saint Joseph's day-to-day operations from 1976 to 1981. In that role, Father Edwards was responsible for training altar boys and supervising them during Mass, regular meetings, practices, and overnight trips. Doe alleged that he served as an altar boy under Father Edwards's supervision for approximately three years in the late 1970s, from the age of 12 to 15. According to Doe, Father Edwards sexually molested him eight to ten times between 1976 and 1978, during the time period when he was serving as an altar boy.

Doe alleged that, before Father Edwards abused him, the Church knew that Father Edwards and other priests belonging to Archdioceses across the country had a history of sexually abusing children. Nevertheless, according to Doe, the Church engaged in a "systematic cover-up effort" to conceal the danger that the priests posed to minor parishioners like Doe, even as they encouraged Doe and other minor parishioners to serve as altar boys under the care and supervision of such priests.

Doe further alleged that on August 9 and 16, 2018, Archbishop Gregory issued public statements apologizing for "sexual abuse by Church leaders of children, young people and those over whom they exercised authority," the failure of Church leaders "to protect others from such damaging and deviant behavior," and the Church's disbelief and neglect of those who "came forward to tell Church officials of their torment." According to Doe, however, he "had no knowledge that [the Church] knew that Edwards had been accused of molesting children" until November 6, 2018, when the Church "formally acknowledged th[e] culture of sexual abuse by its priests" by releasing a list of priests "credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor." This list included Father Edwards, who had died in 1997, and showed that, in the 14 years preceding his transfer to Saint Joseph's, Father Edwards had served at nine different Catholic churches and taken a year-long leave of absence.⁴

The Church moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that Doe's claims were time-barred pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-33. In response, Doe argued that OCGA § 9-3-96 tolled the limitation period until November 2018, when the Church disclosed its knowledge of credible sexual-abuse allegations against Father Edwards.

Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court rejected Doe's tolling argument and granted the Church's motion to dismiss. The trial court concluded that, even assuming the Church was in a confidential relationship with Doe and had fraudulently concealed its knowledge of Father Edwards's dangerous propensities, OCGA § 9-3-96 could not toll the limitation period because Doe "knew of the alleged abuse" and "the identity of his alleged abuser" in the 1970s and had not exercised reasonable diligence to discover his causes of action.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. While acknowledging that there was "no question that the facts alleged by Doe implicate the [Church] in a fraud involving moral turpitude," the majority concluded that Doe could not benefit from tolling under OCGA § 9-3-96. Doe , 357 Ga. App. at 714 (1) (c), 850 S.E.2d 267 (footnote and punctuation omitted). Because "Doe knew he had been injured," "knew the identity of the perpetrator," and "was aware of the [C]hurch's inaction" after Father Edwards abused him, the majority reasoned, "Doe was aware at that time that the [C]hurch had breached its duties to him by hiring Edwards, exposing Doe to Edwards, and failing to protect Doe from Edwards." Id. at 714-715 (1) (c), 850 S.E.2d 267. Accordingly, the majority concluded that the alleged fraud could not have "prevented Doe from pursuing his claims" against the Church. Id. at 714 (1) (c), 850 S.E.2d 267. Then-Chief Judge McFadden dissented, arguing, in relevant part, that OCGA § 9-3-96 tolled the limitation period because the Church's "allegedly fraudulent conduct" was "the gravamen" of Doe's claims and "the [Church's] conduct [was] distinct from the ex-priest's predation." Id. at 719, 850 S.E.2d 267 (McFadden, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2. We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Love v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors , 311 Ga. 682, 684, 859 S.E.2d 33 (2021). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim cannot be granted unless

(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.

Stendahl v. Cobb County , 284 Ga. 525, 525 (1), 668 S.E.2d 723 (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss, we construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. See id.

A plaintiff who seeks to toll a limitation period under OCGA § 9-3-96 must make three showings: first, that "the defendant committed actual fraud"; second, that "the fraud concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff," such that the plaintiff was debarred or deterred from bringing an action; and third, that "the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the statute of limitation." Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp. , 289 Ga. 437, 444-445 (5) (b), 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011) ; see also OCGA § 9-3-96 (providing that tolling applies only if a fraud "debarred or deterred [the plaintiff] from bringing an action").

(a) To benefit from tolling under OCGA § 9-3-96, Doe must first establish that the Church committed an actual fraud. See Daniel , 289 Ga. at 444-445 (5) (b), 711 S.E.2d 709 ; see OCGA § 9-3-96. Doing so requires a showing of either "(1) actual fraud involving moral turpitude, or (2) a fraudulent breach of a duty to disclose that exists because of a relationship of trust and confidence." Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. Frame , 269 Ga. 844, 846 (1), 507 S.E.2d 411 (1998). Here, Doe sufficiently alleged both types of actual fraud in his causes of action for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment (Counts 9 and 10), which Doe relies on to toll the limitation period for all of his claims.⁵

First, Doe alleged that the Church "knew or should have known that any child in [Father] Edwards’[s] presence was in danger" and

made false representations to [Doe,] with reckless disregard for the truth, as to the safe and spiritual environment provided within [the church's] walls[,] with the intent of inducing [Doe] to rely on those statements, remain a member of the congregation, and follow and trust priests like [Father] Edwards.

This allegation – that the Church induced Doe's reliance on Father Edwards for safe supervision by affirmatively misrepresenting that Father Edwards was a safe supervisor,...