Doe v. Saint Louis Pub. Schs.

Decision Date23 September 2021
Docket Number4:19-cv-03080-MTS
PartiesMINOR DOE, Plaintiff, v. SAINT LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MATTHEW T. SCHELP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Saint Louis Public School District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc [30], and Defendants Dorothy Rohde-Collins and Kelvin Adams's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Doc. [32]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendant Saint Louis Public School District's Motion in full and denies Defendants Dorothy Rohde-Collins Kelvin Adams's Motion for dismissal in part and grants dismissal in part.

I. Background[1]

This case arises out of the alleged sexual harassment and abuse[2] of Plaintiff Minor Doe, a former student of Defendant St. Louis Public School District (the “District”), by Michael West, an employee of the District and an in-school suspension monitor at Vashon High School, where Plaintiff previously attended school. Plaintiff alleges that, for nearly an entire school year, West “repeatedly and without cause summoned [Plaintiff] to his office and forced [Plaintiff] to spend hours in detention” with West, which disrupted Plaintiff's schooling. Doc. [1] ¶ 15. The District did nothing to stop this conduct. Id. During that time, West “was grooming” Plaintiff, repeatedly calling and texting him, offering to buy things for him, and giving him money “and other things of value.” Id. ¶ 16. In one instance, West met Plaintiff at a shopping mall to give him money; in another, he met Plaintiff at a relative's house, “where West offered to give [Plaintiff] money to buy food if he got in the car.” Id. Once Plaintiff was in the car, West began rubbing Plaintiff's knee. Id. During the summer after Plaintiff's first year at Vashon, “West solicited [Plaintiff] to perform sexual acts on himself and others in exchange for money, ” and told Plaintiff he would keep a percentage of the money “for arranging the sexual acts performed for others.” Id. ¶ 17. West also requested that Plaintiff send pictures of his genitals to West's phone. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiff refused West's request and told his father, who reported West to the St. Louis police. Id. West was charged with one count of sexual trafficking of a child and one count of promoting child pornography. Id. ¶ 19.

The District, Plaintiff alleges, “would not allow [Plaintiff] to begin his sophomore year at Vashon because . . . [Plaintiff] and West could not be in the same school together.” Id. ¶ 20. Despite the criminal charges against him, as well as “audio recording and text messages proving West's deplorable conduct, ” the District permitted West to remain at Vashon and to continue working with students. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. The District did not relieve West of his duties “until the local news and media outlets reported” the charges against him. Id. ¶ 22.

Instead of allowing Plaintiff to begin the 2017-18 at Vashon, the District gave him “two equally unattractive options”: either “switch to another school on the opposite side” of St. Louis, or “continue his education ‘virtually' at home via computer.” Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff ultimately was placed in an online program. Id. ¶ 24. Despite West's alleged sexual harassment and abuse, the District did not offer Plaintiff “counseling, assistance, or the opportunity to remain at Vashon, ” causing Plaintiff to fall behind in his studies and “essentially lose an entire school year.” Id. And, Plaintiff alleges, his placement in an online program “constantly reminded [him] that he had been abused, which left him feeling as though he was now . . . different.” Id.

Plaintiff transferred to Roosevelt High School for the following academic year, “and again[] was treated differently than other students and was soon transferred out of that school.” Id. ¶ 25. Despite Plaintiff's “obvious needs, ” the District never offered him counseling, assistance, or the opportunity to return to Vashon. Id. Plaintiff has since left the District and is continuing his education elsewhere, and he “remains well behind his peers in almost every academic measure.” Id. ¶ 26.

Plaintiff alleges the District's handling of the situation has subjected Plaintiff to “continued and ongoing harassment and bullying from former friends and students.” Id. ¶ 27. The District, Plaintiff asserted, “had actual knowledge of the bullying and abuse [of Plaintiff], but did nothing to ameliorate or mitigate” that conduct. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts the District “had a duty to protect” Plaintiff and its handling of the situation exacerbated Plaintiff's harm by subjecting him to “ridicule and scorn, ” thereby causing him serious emotional damage. Id. ¶ 28-30.

Based on those facts, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against the District, Defendant Dorothy Rohde-Collins, and Defendant Kelvin Adams, [3] making the following seven claims against all Defendants: (1) a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count I; (2) deliberate indifference to sexual abuse and hostile environment under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, Count II; (3) failure to accommodate and/or eliminate hostile environment and/or prevent retaliation under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, Count III; (4) negligence under Missouri law, Count IV; (5) negligent failure to supervise under Missouri law, Count V; (6) negligent hiring/retention under Missouri law, Count VI; and (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress, Count VII. Id. at 6-16. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), arguing that all Plaintiff's claims fail. Docs. [30]; [32].

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), [a]fter the pleadings are closed . . . a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” A court should grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings “if, assuming as true all facts pleaded by the nonmoving party and according it all reasonable inferences, no material issue of fact remains, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Thach v. Tiger Corp., 609 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 2008)). In assessing a Rule 12(c) motion, courts apply the same standard as is applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Clemons, 585 F.3d at 1124). Thus, to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gallagher, 699 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court “need not accept as true a plaintiff's conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts, ” and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. Discussion

Though Plaintiff asserted all seven of his claims against all three Defendants, the District set forth different arguments for the shortcomings of Plaintiff's claims than did Defendant Rohde-Collins and Defendant Adams (“Individual Defendants). The Court will therefore first assess the Individual Defendants' arguments as to all seven claims before addressing the District's contentions for why Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law.

A. The Individual Defendants
1. Count I: Substantive Due Process Claim Under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Individual Defendants argue Plaintiff's § 1983 claim fails because it is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Doc. [33] at 4. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The question of whether a defendant should be afforded qualified immunity is a question of law. Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 584 (8th Cir. 2004). To overcome the qualified immunity of the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff must show that the Individual Defendants: (1) received notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts, (2) were deliberately indifferent to the offensive conduct after gaining knowledge, and (3) such failure proximately caused the injury to the student. Plamp v. Mitchell Sch. Dist. No. 17-2, 565 F.3d 450, 457 (8th Cir. 2009); Thelma D. v. Bd. of Educ., City of St. Louis, 934 F.2d 929, 933-34 (8th Cir. 1991); see also, Cox v. Sugg, 484 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining for causation purpose that “supervisors…are liable under § 1983 for a subordinate's violation of a third person's constitutional right only if their deliberate indifference to the offensive conduct and failure to take adequate remedial action proximately caused the injury.”).

First the Individual Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to plead a deprivation of a constitutional right. Doc. [33] at 5. A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claimant must “identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated” and the Court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Cnty. of Sacramento v....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT