Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo

• Decision Date: 07 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 25,125.,25,125.
• Citation: 118 P.3d 203,2005 NMCA 110
• Parties: Jane DOE, by and through her parents and next friend, J.H., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO, Santa Clara Development Corporation, d/b/a Big Rock Casino Bowl, Defendants-Appellants, and Steven Bird, Miguel Ortigoza, Timothy Ortigoza, and Emily Ortigoza, Defendants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

118 P.3d 203

2005 NMCA 110

Jane DOE, by and through her parents and next friend, J.H., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO, Santa Clara Development Corporation, d/b/a Big Rock Casino Bowl, Defendants-Appellants, and Steven Bird, Miguel Ortigoza, Timothy Ortigoza, and Emily Ortigoza, Defendants.

No. 25,125.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 28, 2005.

Certiorari Granted, No. 29,350, August 12, 2005.

As Corrected September 7, 2005.

Merit Bennett, Merit Bennett, P.C., Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Richard W. Hughes, Sean J. Flynn, Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom & Schoenburg, LLP, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

VIGIL, Judge.

{1} This case requires us to decide whether a New Mexico state court has subject matter jurisdiction of a personal injury suit brought against Santa Clara Pueblo as a result of events occurring at a casino owned and operated by Santa Clara Pueblo on its land. The district court denied the Pueblo's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the effect of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721 (1988, as amended through 1997), we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Facts and Proceedings

{2} Jane Doe, a fourteen-year-old girl, by and through her parents and next friend, J.H. (jointly referred to as Plaintiff), sued the Santa Clara Pueblo, a federally recognized Indian tribe, and Santa Clara Development Corporation, a corporation wholly owned by the Pueblo that operates the Big Rock Casino Bowl (the Casino) on tribal land within the Santa Clara grant. We refer to Santa Clara Pueblo and the Santa Clara Development Corporation together as "Santa Clara."

{3} Plaintiff alleges that she was visiting the Casino with her mother and grandmother; that she was kidnapped in the Casino parking lot by three males; that she was taken to a car parked in the Casino parking lot and driven away; that she was then repeatedly assaulted, battered, and raped by her abductors; and that they then dumped her near her home in Española, New Mexico. Plaintiff alleges Santa Clara is liable because the Casino failed to provide adequate security and lighting in the parking lot, and failed to aid in locating Jane Doe when it was apparent she was missing from the premises, all of which proximately caused damages. The district court denied Santa Clara's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but certified its decision for an interlocutory appeal, and we granted Santa Clara's application for an interlocutory appeal. An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction involves a question of law which we review de novo. Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668.

{4} The district court denied Santa Clara's motion to dismiss based on its determination that, pursuant to a valid tribal-state compact, the IGRA permits state courts to assume subject matter jurisdiction over personal injury suits arising on the premises of a tribal gaming facility located on tribal land. On appeal, Santa Clara argues that the district court improperly denied its motion to dismiss because, absent a grant of jurisdiction from the United States Congress, state courts are powerless to hear cases that arise on tribal land. Santa Clara further contends that the IGRA does not constitute such a grant of jurisdiction. Additionally, Santa Clara argues that the IGRA does not allow a state and a tribe to enter into a compact that shifts jurisdiction over personal injury claims to state courts. Plaintiff concedes that state court jurisdiction over her claim must derive from the IGRA, but she contends that the New Mexico state district court has subject matter jurisdiction of her claim because a tribal-state compact validly shifts jurisdiction from tribal court to state court.

Pertinent Provisions of Law and Compact

{5} The IGRA is "a comprehensive regulatory framework for gaming activities on Indian lands which . . . established the framework under which Indian tribes and states could negotiate compacts permitting [high-stakes] gaming on Indian reservations located within state territory." Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted). The IGRA divides tribal gaming into three categories. Social and traditional games comprise the first category, known as Class I gaming. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). Class II gaming consists of bingo, pull-tabs and certain card games. § 2703(7). The third category, Class III gaming, includes all games which are not Class I or II gaming. § 2703(8). Class III gaming includes blackjack and slot machines, id., and is commonly known as "high-stakes" gaming. Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 9 n. 1, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. In order to offer Class III games in New Mexico, the IGRA requires tribes, including Santa Clara, to enter into a compact with the State of New Mexico governing gaming activities on the tribe's land. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C). The State of New Mexico and Santa Clara negotiated a compact (the Compact) under the Compact Negotiation Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 11-13A-1 to -5 (1999), which the state legislature approved in 2001. See S.J. Res. 37, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.2001); see also NMSA 1978, § 11-13-1 (1997 and 2004 Supp. compiler's note). Pursuant to the IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior approved the Compact between the State and Santa Clara on December 14, 2001. See Indian Gaming, 66 Fed.Reg. 64,856 (Dec. 14, 2001) (notice of Secretary of the Interior approval of compacts between New Mexico and, among others, Santa Clara); see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).

{6} The Compact acknowledges that the "safety and protection of visitors to a Gaming Facility is a priority of" Santa Clara and that one of the purposes of the Compact is "to assure that any such persons who suffer bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise have an effective remedy for obtaining fair and just compensation." Therefore, Santa Clara "waives its defense of sovereign immunity in connection with any claims for compensatory damages for bodily injury or property damage up to the amount of fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) per occurrence asserted," and "agrees to proceed either in binding arbitration proceedings or in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the visitor's election, with respect to claims for bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise." The Compact further states that "any such claim may be brought in state district court, including claims arising on tribal land, unless it is finally determined by a state or federal court that IGRA does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors' personal injury suits to state court."

{7} As a general rule, "[e]xclusive tribal jurisdiction exists . . . when an Indian is being sued by a non-Indian over an occurrence or transaction arising in Indian country." Found. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 105 N.M. 514, 516, 734 P.2d 754, 756 (1987) (citations omitted); see Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 2003-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 134 N.M. 133, 74 P.3d 67. However, Congress may confer jurisdiction over such a suit on a state court. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959); see South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 343, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998) (noting that "Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, including the power to modify or eliminate tribal rights").

{8} We note that Congress has granted jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters involving reservation Indians to any state that is willing to accept it provided that the assumption of jurisdiction is approved by the affected tribe. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a), 1324 (1968); see also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177-78, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). However, New Mexico has not elected to assume jurisdiction over tribal lands. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Vill. of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 332, 361 P.2d 950, 954 (1961); see Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 203, 206, 561 P.2d 476, 479 (1977); see also New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 559 (1910) (stating that New Mexico has disclaimed jurisdiction over Indians and Indian land); N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 2 (same). Therefore, if New Mexico courts have subject matter jurisdiction in this case it must derive from the IGRA.

{9} The IGRA sets out the provisions that may be included in a compact negotiated to facilitate Class III gaming activities. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). In pertinent part, a tribal-state compact may include provisions relating to:

(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity; [and]

(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations[.]

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C). Based on these provisions, Santa Clara argues that New Mexico's state courts lack jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's claims because her "personal injury claims have nothing to do with the `licensing or regulation' of [C]lass III gaming activities." We disagree.

{10} Pursuant to the IGRA and the Compact Negotiation Act, New Mexico and Santa Clara entered negotiations to form a compact to permit Santa Clara to offer Class III gaming on its tribal land. The Compact that emerged from their "good faith negotiations" devotes an entire section to defining the mechanism by which visitors may be compensated for their injuries. In particular, the Compact expressly allows visitors to bring their claims in state court. Because the State and Santa Clara negotiated and agreed to address remedies for visitor injuries in the Compact, it is apparent that both parties themselves determined that...