Doe v. Smith
| Decision Date | 22 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2015-CA-00740-SCT,2015-CA-00740-SCT |
| Parties | Catherine Doe v. Stan Smith |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
BEFORE WALLER, C.J., KING AND MAXWELL, JJ.
MAXWELL
,
¶1. When consent for a supposedly “uncontested” adoption is gained by intentionally concealing the identity of a known natural parent from the chancellor, a fraud is perpetrated upon the court.1 Such was the case here, where the natural mother schemed to give away her child without the natural father's consent. She did so by falsely claiming—in her sworn consent and joinder and testimony at the adoption proceedings—that she was unaware of her son's natural father. And her deception caused the court to grant an adoption to a third party based on false, material representations.2
¶2. The natural father discovered the mother's deception and filed a petition to set aside the adoption. Under Rule 60(b)(6) a chancellor is authorized to hear “independent actions” to set aside a “judgment based on fraud.” M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)
. And that is just what the chancellor did here.
¶3. After review, we find it was within the chancellor's discretion to set aside the adoption based on the mother's fraud. We affirm.
¶4. On April 24, 2013, Luke was born in Mississippi to unmarried parents—Katy and Stan.3 Shortly after his birth, Katy and young Luke moved from Mississippi to Florida to live with Stan and his parents. But the relationship soon soured, and Katy and Luke moved back to Mississippi in September or October of 2013.4 After moving back to Mississippi, Katy realized she was pregnant again. And according to Stan, around November 2013, Katy told him about her pregnancy. But Katy told Stan he was not the child's father. She instead claimed a man named Mark had gotten her pregnant.5 So, believing he had only one child with Katy, Stan filed suit in DeSoto County, on March 7, 2014, to establish paternity of that child—Luke. He also asked the chancellor to determine custody, visitation, and support for Luke.
¶5. Less than a month later, Katy married Mark. And on May 24, 2014, Katy gave birth to a son, whom she named Matthew.6 She planned to give Matthew up for adoption. And three days after his birth, Katy signed a consent and joinder to Matthew's adoption by Charles and Catherine, a married couple. In her consent to the adoption, Katy claimed she was unaware of the identity, name, or address of Matthew's biological father. That same day, May 27, 2014, Katy's husband Mark underwent paternity testing to determine if he was Matthew's father. These test results, received on June 10, 2014, showed a 0.00% probability that Mark was Matthew's father. Catherine and Charles went ahead and filed their petition to adopt Matthew in Marshall County on June 24, 2014.7 And when the petition was brought for hearing, Katy lied in court. Relying on her misrepresentations, the chancellor entered a final decree granting the adoption on July 25, 2014.8
¶6. In early August, 2014, Stan and his mother asked Katy about her new child Matthew. Katy told them Matthew was born in July. But when Stan and his mother asked to see the child, Katy declined. Instead of being truthful about the adoption, Katy claimed the child was with Mark's mother and was ill. Stan continued to press Katy about Matthew, eventually threatening to seek a paternity test. And on August 10, 2014, Katy came clean and admitted to Stan that Matthew was his son. She also told him Matthew had been adopted.
¶7. On October 8, 2014, Stan petitioned the court to reopen Matthew's adoption, determine paternity, and set aside the adoption decree. To secure appearance of the necessary parties, Stan issued both Rule 4(c)(1) and Rule 81(d)(1) summonses to the adoptive parents and to Katy and Mark. The adoptive parents filed an entry of appearance and objection. They claimed Stan lacked standing to petition the court. And they also argued reopening the adoption was not in Matthew's best interest. The record shows Katy and Mark did not respond at all.
¶8. The chancellor ordered a paternity test, which was performed on January 12, 2015. The test results showed a 99.998% probability that Stan is Matthew's father. After receiving these test results, Stan and the adoptive parents entered an agreed order setting the matter for an April 21, 2015, trial.
¶9. Before trial, the adoptive parents filed a motion to dismiss Stan's petition. They sought dismissal under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)
or, in the alternative, appointment of a guardian ad litem and temporary custody of Matthew.9 Stan responded and argued, as Matthew's natural father, he had standing to ask the court to set aside the adoption.10 He also insisted his parental rights were never terminated, nor had any such request been made. So as he saw it, temporary custody and appointment of a guardian ad litem was improper. At trial, the adoptive parents pursued their motion for dismissal. But rather than pressing Rule 12(b) grounds, they argued Stan failed to follow the proper procedures under Mississippi Code Sections 93–17–5 and 93–17–6.11 The chancellor denied their motion.
¶10. After hearing testimony from Katy, Stan, Stan's mother, and Catherine, the chancellor found Katy knowingly had lied to his court—both in her affidavit and her testimony at the adoption proceedings. And the record shows Katy admitted to these lies at trial:
Faced with this evidence, the chancellor specifically found that Katy knew Stan was Matthew's father after Mark's paternity test. And she intentionally concealed this information from the parties and the court during adoption proceedings.
¶11. The chancellor also found there were no attempts to locate or determine Matthew's natural father during the adoption proceedings and no service, by publication or process. Catherine's attorney acknowledged this procedural defect, conceding that Stan was not properly noticed and should have been made a party to the adoption. The chancellor also mentioned Stan's diligence. He pointed out that when Stan learned of Matthew's paternity and adoption, he immediately contacted his attorney to set aside the adoption. Ultimately, the chancellor found Katy's intentional lies and concealment of Matthew's true father's identity amounted to a fraud upon the court. And he set aside the adoption for these reasons.
¶12. Catherine now appeals, arguing (1) the chancellor erred in setting the adoption decree aside, (2) Stan lacked standing to petition the chancellor to set aside the adoption, and (3) process for the April 21, 2015, trial was improper.
¶13. Our standard of review is limited. A chancellor's modification of a prior order under Rule 60(b)
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Trim , 33 So.3d at 475 (¶ 7) (citing Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Bolles , 535 So.2d 56, 58 (Miss.1988) ).
¶14. A fraud upon the court is an intentional misdeed that “vitiates a judgment” because “the court is misled and deceived” about the facts it relies upon when administering the law. Trim , 33 So.3d at 477 (¶ 15)
(quoting Brown v. Wesson , 114 Miss. 216, 74 So. 831, 834 (1917) ). Rule 60(b)(6) gives judges broad authority to set aside judgments entered, resulting from such fraud.
(citing M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and Tirouda v. State , 919 So.2d 211, 214 (Miss.Ct.App.2005) ). However, to qualify as “fraud upon the court,” there must be exceptional and compelling circumstances and the deceptive act(s) must be material and extreme. Not just any falsity or misstep, even if intentional, is enough for relief.
¶15. “Relief based on ‘fraud upon the court’ is reserved for only the most egregious misconduct, and requires a showing of ‘an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.’ ”13 Wilson v. Johns – Manville Sales Corp. , 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.1989)
(quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co. , 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir.1978) ). Mere nondisclosure of pertinent facts to the court “does not add up to ‘fraud upon the court’ for purposes of vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b).” Trim , 33 So.3d at 477–78 (¶ 16) (quoting Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N & H Instruments, Inc. , 616 F.2d 833, 836 n. 8 (5th Cir.1980) ). Furthermore, the fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Moore v. Jacobs , 752 So.2d 1013, 1017 (Miss.1999) (citing Stringfellow v. Stringfellow , 451 So.2d 219, 221 (Miss.1984) ).
¶16. Here, the chancellor found Katy's deceptive acts and omissions—which she admitted she knowingly made—met these high marks. Katy had filed a voluntary, sworn joinder and consent to Matthew's adoption.14 And in it, she represented she was unaware of Matthew's biological father's name, identity, or address. But under oath at the April 21, 2015, hearing, Katy admitted to lying about Matthew's father's identity in her consent. She also admitted she lied when testifying at Matthew's adoption proceeding. She said she did so because she knew Stan would be a poor parent and caregiver.
¶17. We have held that the effective administration of justice requires our chancellors have accurate financial information to distribute marital assets during divorce. See Trim , 33 So.3d at 477–78 (¶¶ 16, 17)
( a party who filed a substantially false,...
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